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THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 



J. S MALONE 



(second edition) 



MCONq> 



CHICAGO 

CHARLES H. KERR & COMPANY 

1893 



%I 16 1893 J 
> of w***^ '.if 



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Copyright 1893 by 
Mary A. Malone 



CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Introduction 5 

PART I. SENSIBILITY. 

CHAPTER 

I. Causality — A Predicate of Sensibility. . 23 
II. The Same Continued 34 

III. The Implications of End of Existence — 

Predicates of Sensibility 42^ 

IV. Responsibility — A Predicate of Sensi- 

bility 46 

V. Intelligence — A Predicate of Sensi- 
bility 49 

VI. The Self — An Impersonation of Sensi- 
bility 72 

VII. Inferences and Objections Suggested 

by Part i 78 

PART II. INTELLIGENCE. 

I. The Two Species of Cognition and Their 

Corresponding Objects 86 



4 CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

II. Other Illustrations , n6 

III. Discursive Cognition 134 

Section 1. Imitation 135 

Section 2. Physics 150 

Section 3. A Practical Illustra- 
tion " 154 

Section 4. An Objection 158 

Section 5. Another Objection.... 161 

IV. Deduction and Induction: Analysis 

and Synthesis, &c 167 

Section i. Growth...; 178 

Section 2. Empirical View 189 

Section 3. Evolution 195 

V. A Glance at Several of Kant's Doc- 

trines 202 

Section i. Popular Theory 207 

Section 2. An Objection 212 

Section 3. Experience 220 

Section 4. Other and Higher Au- 
thority 225 

VI. A Final Glance at Materialism 239 

Conclusion 256 



INTRODUCTION. 

The first and most vital trait of materialism is, that 
it primarily springs from sensibility, and not from in- 
telligence; from tendency, and not from theory. It is 
not possible to become a materialist by starting out 
with the question: Is mind or is matter the prime 
factor of the universe? To decide such question, mind 
and mind only, must be the sole judge, jury and law. 
As the sole active and interested party in the case, 
mind could not decide against itself; or even if it 
should, what would signify a decision coming from a 
self-repudiated source? 

Instead, materialism originates from tendency, and 
from vicious tendency withal. True enough, being 
once born from tendency, it makes haste to clothe it- 
self with theory, as a shield of defense. So also, 
every vicious act has a ready-made argument for its 
excuse or justification. This means that the why and 
how vice can justify itself, are identical with the why 
and how of materialism. Both alike disclose a serious 
flaw, either in intelligence or in sensibility; either in the 
head or in the heart. Which of the two is to blame? 
Rather, which of the two is the causal and responsiblt 
element of mind? 



6 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

This is not a trite question; but the first and most 
momentous one underlying human character. It is 
well to answer it on the spot: Which of the two is held 
responsible by a civil tribunal when trying a man for 
his life — which, his intelligence or his prompting 
sense motive? Of course, the question is too plain to 
be put to a sane man. But the strange fact is, though 
seeing and acting out the truth in practical life, on 
turning away, we instantly deny it in theory. That is 
to say, according to universal instinct and usage, the 
sense motive is the mainspring and responsible agent 
in the practical issues of life; while theoretically, in- 
telligence is the supreme authority: Am not I and all 
other discreet people governed by calm and sober re- 
flection? is an expression of it in theory. 

This contradiction — the admission of sense causali- 
ty in practice and its denial in theory, is the beginning 
point of all philosophical strife. The contradiction 
not only implies an error, but an all-inclusive error, 
respecting the root principle of human character. 
The question comes: Is sense or is intelligence the 
supreme authority of mind? Answer: Practically, 
sense is; theoretically, intelligence is. The latter 
will be seen to be a pure illusion; and as such, is the 
first and chief instrument of materialism — vicious ten- 
dency, for converting intelligence into a shield of de- 
fense. 

Materialism lurks in every path of experience, 



INTRODUCTION 7 

whether practical or theoretical, impeding the one and 
mystifying the other, much as darkness does the trav- 
eler. Every inquiry of moderate scope, no matter 
when, where, or by whom begun, sooner or later leads 
into the wilderness of materialism. No wonder then, 
that in one or other of its phases, it has been the main 
trouble of philosophy from the first. Through all the 
ages, thoughtful men, seeing its harmful influence, 
have made a life long struggle against it. 

To get fully rid of it — to make a clean sweep of 
the infamous plague once and for all, wise men, 
even before the days of Plato, resorted to idealism: 
denied the positive reality of matter, holding it to 
be an illusory appearance only. In modern times, 
the devout and far-seeing Berkley is found fore 
most in this line of thought. Next and most nota- 
ble, are seen the four great German thinkers, led 
on by Kant, the aim of each seeming to be the phi- 
losophical annihilation of matter so as thereby and 
therewith, to chase the spectre materialism wholly 
out of existence. Their high and full blown zeal 
regarded it as a life and death question: either 
materialism is false and must be driven out of the 
present world, else all hope of a world to come is 
vain. 

Nevertheless, though matter be annihilated; 
though materialism be left without any logical 
crutch; yet, like another old man of the sea, it 



8 THE self: what is it? 

still holds its iron grip on the neck of philosophy. 
This is wholly inexplicable, except on the assump- 
tion, that it originates in and is backed by vicious 
tendency, which, springing perennially from de- 
praved sensibility, will continue to assert itself in 
spite of all logical opposition. 

But the point is, that the struggle of philosophy 
must ever continue vain and fruitless, so long as it 
stands on two such primary errors: (i) That ma- 
terialism is a creature of intelligence; and (2) that 
intelligence is the supreme authority of mind. To 
glimpse the question in a nut shell, let it be an- 
swered thoughtfully: How can a vicious man em- 
ploy intelligence for devising vicious deeds, and sub- 
sequently for justifying said deeds, except on the 
assumption, that sense is the controlling authority, 
with intelligence as its passive instrument? 

That sensibility — including not only the five, but 
all the senses, is the causal and responsible agent, 
must be assumed as the first, most momentous, and 
self evident of philosophical truths. All our moral, 
religous, social, civil, political, and other institu- 
tions of practical import, are grounded on this 
great primary truth. Thus, to find the mainspring 
of any given action, we go straight to the sense 
motive, and award praise or blame, life or death, ac- 
cording to the moral quality of said motive; thus 
instinctively recognizing sense as the responsible 



INTRODUCTION 9 

head, without one thought of intelligence, except 
as a passive instrument. 

Again, no one practical fact is plainer or more 
universal, than that every man's life is governed 
by some one or more senses — by the moral sense or 
otherwise, which dominating authority unceasingly 
employs intelligence as a passive instrument for 
serving its special purposes. Thus, the intelligence 
of the miser is always serving the demands of ava- 
rice, in money getting; that of the thief, in steal- 
ing; that of the ambitious man, in preferment; 
that of the philanthrophist, in doing good; that of 
the parent, in the well being of his family, and so 
on to the end; insomuch, that to know a man's 
ruling sense or senses, is to know, in advance, 
how his intelligence will be employed. 

And again, we are necessitated to assume the 
veracity of intelligence in all cases; otherwise, our 
debates and inquiries which tacitly assume it, are 
the sheerest folly. But if intelligence be both 
truthful and self-controlling, then it could not — 
neither from choice nor from exterior force — be in- 
duced to take part in falsehood; indeed, on the 
assumption of its veracity and self-control, false- 
hood would be simply impossible. But as a matter 
of universal practical fact, intelligence is just as 
ready and just as willing to lie as to tell the truth ; 
just as efficient a tool for the thief, as for the phi- 



io the self: what is it? 

lanthropist. This shows beyond dispute, that 
while intelligence per se is truthful, it is meanwhile 
passive and like all other passive instruments, may 
be indifferently employed, either for right or wrong 
purposes. 

But this self-evident, practical fact, is denied in 
all speculative theory. It is the usage in mental 
philosophy for instance, to begin, continue and end 
the inquiry, with intelligence; indeed, such inqui- 
ries, explicitly or implicitly, usually regard intelli- 
gence — divine reason, not only as the climax, but as 
the all-in-all of human character. This is often done 
too, without one allusion to sense, unless of an in- 
cidental kind. From a practical cbmmon sense 
standpoint, tnis is to play Hamlet with Hamlet left 
out; it is to attempt an analysis of mind, with its 
basic element left out. 

This however, is the point to be emphasized : 
Here on the one hand, a world full of practical 
facts point to sensibility as the supreme authority 
of mind; while on the other, a world full of theo- 
ries assume intelligence to be supreme. As direct 
opposites, one of the two must be false; and being 
false, all deductions from it must be equally false. 
Whch is true, and which false? 

What is the highest tribunal for such an issue? 
What can be higher than universal instinct and 
usage, backed by a common sense interpretation of 



INTRODUCTION II 

the practical facts relevant to the issue? Accord- 
ing to this highest tribunal, intelligence, so far 
from being the autocrat of mind, is but a passive 
instrument — a mere cat's paw, for subserving the 
demands of sensibility. To assume otherwise, is 
not only an error, but an all-inclusive error, re- 
specting the foundation principle of human charac- 
ter. Such a frightful error, at such a vital point, is 
certainly an ample answer to the ever-recurring 
question: Why has philosophy made no decisive 
forward step since the days of Plato? 

The illusion leading to this contradiction be- 
tween practice and theory, is so subtle as to be 
quite difficult of realization. It will be fully no- 
ticed at the proper place; and with it, will be dis- 
closed an endless number of other consequent and 
kindred illusions, which perplex the world of the- 
ory. Just here and now, two questions demand 
notice: Why and how is such a fundamental con- 
tradiction possible? 

As respects the why, man would only be a ma- 
chine, and not a man, without his crowning trait 
of responsibility. But responsibility cannot exist 
without moral free agency; nor free agency, with 
out a power to do either right or wrong at option; 
nor the latter, without depravity. That is, the 
same provision made in the mental economy for the 
full play of depravity, free agency, etc., also 



I2 THE self: what is it? 

allows the misuse of intelligence for purposes of 
contradiction, sophistry, falsehood, etc.; for, to 
preclude the latter, would balk free agency. 

The other question — as to the how or mode of 
contradiction, may be called the central problem of 
mental philosophy, especially if we judge from the 
magnitude of the contradiction just pointed out. 
Besides, it will be found that a full solution of 
contradiction, must sooner or later involve every 
distinctive trait of mind. 

Thus, the attempt to explain the contradictions 
of intelligence, by means of intelligence itself, im- 
plies two vital facts: (i) That intelligence —the 
instrument employed for the inquiry, is truthful per 
se, else it is extreme folly to employ it in this, or 
any other inquiry. But (2) the very point to be 
inquired about — the contradictions of intelligence, 
tacitly imply it to be false. 

But it cannot be both true and false. Besides, 
since to employ it at all, is to assume its integrity ; 
and since, according to practical fact, its misuse 
is referable to an over-ruling sense — hereby involv- 
ing sense and its relationships; and since again on 
the other hand, to discriminate between the true 
and false phenomena of intelligence, must amount 
to an analysis of intelligence itself, it follows, that 
to properly explain contradiction, must involve 
an analysis of the entire mind — both sense and intel- 



INTRODUCTION 1 3 

ligence. It is at least not extravagant to call it 
the central question of mental philosophy. 

Hence, and in other words, this treatise is pre- 
sented as an analysis of mind or self-hood — not in 
detail, but to the extent of fundamental traits only. 
Part I. is devoted to an analysis of Sensibility, as 
the basic element of mind, and whence is deduced 
sense causality as the most significant upshot. This 
upshot, as personating the basic principle of mind, 
is assumed to be the primary fact of mental philos- 
ophy ; and being such, is thenceforth employed as 
the axiom or dominating principle of inquiry. 

Part II. is devoted to an analysis of intelligence, 
the central problem of which is a solution of its 
apparent contradictions; and which, as just said, 
involves sooner or later a reference to every distinct 
ive trait of mind. 

The first named — sense causality with its impli- 
cations — being pretty generally self-evident, will 
need no theorizing arguments for proof ; but only 
to be fairly presented by a common sense interpre- 
tation of practical facts. But the second — a solution 
of contradiction, which among other things requires 
an exposure of the illusions leading to contradic- 
tion — will prove the most difficult part of the in- 
quiry. This is much as to say, there is no trouble 
about the doctrine of Copernicus: it needs no ad- 
ditional proof. The trouble rather is, to expose the 



14 the self: what is it? 

illusion, whereby, on turning away from Coperni- 
cus, we still imagine the sun to rise and set. 

By the way, one or another illusion has obscured 
every step of our way so far. We cannot stop to 
discuss them at this place. But in order to mitigate 
honest perplexity somewhat, as also the premature 
disgust of those who may be inordinate zealots of 
intellect, a hint must be given just here upon the 
chief one of these stumbling blocks. It is this: 
How can sense be called supreme, or how can it 
operate at all, without the aid of intelligence? 

Unity of mind, it is replied, will not allow sense 
and intelligence to be two independent individuals; 
they may be regarded in logical, but not in real 
antithesis. All human activity manifests the two 
as distinct, yet in perfect unity or concert of action; 
one meanwhile always being dominant, and the 
other subservient, hereby necessitating the infer- 
ence, that one is subject and the other a predicate. 
But since intelligence is always manifested in a 
subservient relation, it must be assumed as a pre- 
dicate or endowment of sense, somewhat as a flame: 
is of a burning body. 

Otherwise than this, no phase of human activity 
is intelligible. Responsibility for instance, always 
implies the presence of intelligence; yet, though 
always implied, intelligence is never explicitly rec- 
ognized as being responsible. Instead, sense and. 



INTRODUCTION 1 5 

sense only is responsible. Hence, intelligence being 
always implied, yet sense only being responsible, 
sense must be self-endowed with intelligence. 
Otherwise, sense would be dependent on something 
other than itself; and in which case, this other 
something would be responsible instead of sense. 

The smart question, how can brilliant intelligence 
issue from blind sense, is quite away from the mark. 
We know nothing of essences ; and can only judge 
from phenomena. According to the latter, intelli- 
gence can only act after and in obedience to sense 
prompting ; and as a literal and undeniable fact, 
does sustain the relation of predicate or endowment 
to sense, in all its practical manifestations. There 
is no alternative: unless, may be, a theorizing analy- 
sis of essences may yet prove all practical facts to 
be utterly false. More of this, however, at the 
proper time and place. Only remember, that though 
sense and itelligence are of necessity distinct and 
opposite logically, they are in reality but two pha- 
ses of one and the same thing; sense being the 
thing or subject, with intelligence as its pre- 
dicate. Or thus, sense is cause, and intelligence 
is its instrument. 

Returning, all contradiction is brought about by 
illusion; and the prime illusion indicated above — 
the mistaking of intelligence for the supreme au- 
thority or Self, may be called the first and chief of 



16 the self: what is it? 

all. This first and chief is followed by an endless 
number and variety of others, to explain each of 
which, would be an endless work. Hence it may 
be added, that the culminating problem of this 
book, is to find one principle, whereby all contra- 
diction, sophistry, falsehood — the whole brood of 
make-believes, may be explained in one and the 
same process. 

An attempt at the same thing in the first edition, 
was not sufficiently clear. This was doubtless owing 
to the fact, that the exposition was given to the 
reader, precisely as it was wrought out by the au- 
thor : in other words, it was too abstract. The 
chief care in this edition has been to employ all 
the concreteness possible with such a problem. 

To this end, a series of illustrations are employ- 
ed, the first being the solar contradiction just al- 
luded to. In this instance, one witness asserts that 
the sun rises and sets; while the other asserts pre- 
cisely the reverse. Both assertions are true, accord- 
ing to their respective standpoints, though possi- 
tively contradictory. What is the fault, and how 
can it be consistently reconciled with the integrity 
of intelligence? 

The object is not to explain this one for its own 
sake ; but to deduce a general principle, which will 
explain all contradiction. The phenomena to be 
explained, are so vast and varied, that a principle 



INTRODUCTION 1 7 

applicable to all, will at first seem vague, because 
of its generality. The solar will hence be followed 
by a number and variety of other illustrations, 
sufficient to give all the clearness desired by thought- 
ful readers. 

Without said principle — without understanding 
the contradictions of intelligence, no proper analy- 
sis of intelligence is possible. Nor is it extrava- 
gant to say on the other hand, that to understand 
contradiction, is to see intelligence simplified an 
hundred-fold; insomuch, every one of normal com- 
mon sense, will feel himself at home in the study. 
And why not? Plainly, intelligence itself must be 
intelligible to common sense, else it can be no fit 
instrument of truth about other things. 

The scope of inquiry hinted at in the foregoing, 
does not lead to a remote or fruitless theorizing ; 
but rather to the A, B, C, of all philosophical in- 
quiry; to those great primar} 7 principles underlying 
both practice and thought. 

For instance, it will be seen as we proceed, that 
precisely the same class of illusions, which deny 
the Copernican philosophy, may be and constantly 
are urged against the existence of God, the immor- 
tality of mind, moral free agency, and indeed 
against all immaterial things. 

Nay, by like illusive means, the entire realm of 
intelligence itself, may be and constantly is virtually 



18 the self: what is it? 

turned wrong end foremost. Thus, instead of one 
simple, universal and unchanging method of inquiry 
—suited to the infant and philosopher alike, we are 
deluded with a so-called induction, synthesis, or 
other like counterfeit, which results not only in 
mystification, but in practically reversing the one 
true method. 

With the battle thus half won, and by the same 
illusive means, the principle of cause and effect is 
also presently reversed. To reverse these two — the 
method of inquiry and the principle of cause and 
effect, virtually amounts to reversing the whole 
world of thought; so that, instead of nature's own 
order of proceeding from causes to effects and from 
wholes to parts, we now see like Leucippus that the 
total universe is a mere effect, produced by a com- 
bination of atoms as its cause. 

Then again, this combination of atoms, whereby 
parts produce wholes, and effects produce causes — 
what is it, or how can it end, except in the doc- 
trine of growth? This growth in turn, becomes so 
expansive and exuberant, as presently to cancel all 
just conceptions of Identity and Permanence; but 
without these two principles, we cannot conceive,, 
either of intelligence or rational existence. 

These for example, with an endless number of 
other illusive sophistries, are in the same category 
and may be exposed by one and the same process* 



INTRODUCTION IO. 

To realize such result will shield us from the din 
of much logical debauchery; will give a firm grasp 
upon the little we may happen to know — sufficient- 
ly at least to feel sure that there are such things 
as truth and reality; and hereby, bridge over the 
abyss of universal skepticism. 

Whether or not true, the evils of materialism are 
assumed to be worse now than ever before, Worse in 
this, that besides being as bad practically as 
ever before, they claim more loudly than hitherto, 
a high rational justification. More than ever 
before, the grossest phases of materialism are bois- 
terous in claiming scientific origin and sanction ; so 
boisterous indeed, as to be overheard by the popu- 
lar ear. 

Hence, now perhaps more than ever before, the 
good of society requires a philosophy adapted to 
the popular ear. But here precisely has ever been 
a great trouble: though the popular ear is quick to 
hear any sophistry in proof of a favorite and vicious 
tendency, it yet becomes instantly deaf to any sober 
thought in opposition to said tendency. 

It is possible, however, that materialism has 
overshot its mark in the present case. It has man- 
aged, mainly by its scientific pretenses, to excite 
much popular interest in certain great problems; 
which latter however, can find no ample solution, 
except in the sphere of philosophy. Thus, with- 



20 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

out so intending, materialism has perhaps opened 
up a way between philosophy and the popular ear. 
At any rate, the vital interests at stake, justify an 
attempt at its realization. 

In reference to the situation here indicated, this 
treatise was written. In addition, and in view of 
the great odds to be met in the undertaking, it is 
assumed as a serious possibility with regard to phi- 
losophy — as indeed with regard to many other 
things, that its chief enemy may perchance be one 
of its own household: viz., metaphysical rig-ma- 
role, tedious definitions, learned nomenclature, with 
other like cheap ritual. Fearing as much, such hin- 
drances will be avoided as fully as can be. And 
though such precaution will have drawbacks pecu- 
liar to itself, it is yet hoped, that the popular read- 
er and young student, may hereby be brought more 
directly face to face with that august something 
called Mind or Self. 

Full details in such an inquiry, would require 
several volumes, and thus again balk the end in 
view. To avoid this, the great labor has been to 
condense; to give the most concise outline possible, 
without sacrificing intelligibility. 

Part I will be easy enough; but Part II cannot 
be got without some interest and thought. The 
first assumption of every inquiry is, the veracity of 
the inquiring intelligence; but this veracity is di- 



INTRODUCTION 21 

rectly impeached by endless contradictions. These 
latter occur not only in the least questions, but 
perplex and even deny the most momentous truths 
— implicitly deny ail truth. To explain the ground 
of contradiction, so as to vindicate the integrity of 
intelligence, to intelligence itself, and therewith get 
a valid standard for all intelligible truth, must be 
the first and most vital problem of intelligence. It 
is to prove that, which is the ground of proof; to 
measure that, which is the measure of all knowl- 
edge. 

Can such problems be mastered in a hasty and 
careless way, as one might read a novel or news- 
paper? Certainly not. Neither does this mean to 
say, that great sagacity is required for the task. 
Every normal mind has sagacity enough for all 
problems of interest to itself. Without such in- 
terest — without a desire to know, sagacity is vain 
and useless; with the desire, the way is open to any 
human knowledge ; in fact, the desire is the guar- 
antee of the sagacity. Those having an interest in 
the inquiries of Part II have nothing to fear; those 
having none, had better lay the book aside at once. 

The two editions are the same in essential re- 
spects; but superficially, this second is wholly new. 
The first edition was too abstract. This one may 
perhaps go to the other extreme. The only help 
for these and other short-comings, is the patience 



22 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

and charity of the reader. As for the rest, it is 
fully believed that this edition will be far more in- 
telligible and readable than the first. 



THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

PART I. 
SENSIBILITY. 

CHAPTER 1. 

CAUSALITY — A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY. . 

We naturally enough regard the human mind as 
consisting of two distinct spheres: viz., Thinking 
and Feeling. The thinking sphere is variously 
called intelligence, intellect, thought, brain, and 
so forth, according to the occasion. The feeling 
sphere is called sensibility, heart, will, desire, and 
so forth. 

The antithesis between thinking and feeling is 
logical, more than real, as will be seen later on. 
For present purposes, it is hard to find two anti- 
thetical terms, which will distinguish properly be- 
tween thinking and feeling. To avoid needless 
debate, let us adopt the one word intelligence to 
represent the thinking, and the one word sensibility 
to represent the feeling trait of the mind. 

23 



24 the self: what is it? 

Henceforth these two words will be used generic- 
ally; intelligence, to represent all the thinking or 
cognitive powers; and sensiblity, to represent all 
appetites, desires, emotions, affections, or other 
feeling powers of mind. The latter especially must 
be sharply noted; for in most writings of the kind, 
the word sensibility is restricted to the. five sen- 
ses, while as here used, it personates the entire 
realm of feeling or sense. 

It is also well to note, that with few exceptions, 
which will be specified, the word mind will also 
be used in its full import, including God, spirit,, 
soul — everything not included in the word matter. 

Thus we set out on the two general assumptions : 
First, that total existence presents two phases — 
mind and matter; and secondly, that mind, the 
special topic of this treatise, also presents two 
phases — sensibility and intelligence. 

The emphasis here put upon the two words sen- 
sibility and intelligence, is to pave the way to the 
following propositions: The conceptions (i) Cause, 
(2) End, (3) Responsibility,^) Intelligence, and (5) 
Selfhood are each and all grounded in sensibility. 
All together, the five propositions virtually affirm 
that sensibility is the very essence of mind; for 
being subtracted, nothing of any worth remains to 
the latter. 

We can properly call that essence only, which 



CAUSALITY A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 2$ 

seems to be the permanent ground or subject of 
certain predicates. It is common to say, that we 
know nothing of essence per se; can know nothing 
but the facts of phenomena. So that, in saying 
that sensibility is the essence of mind, is only 
meant, that the traits ju'st named as being predi- 
cable of sensibility, pretty well exhaust our concep- 
tion of mind. 

It is moreover well to note here in the outset, 
that one great trouble will burden us all the way 
through this Part I. No one argument in the usual 
sense will occur in the entire book; instead, only 
enough exposition to get the given proposition 
fairly in view, and then demonstration by self-evi- 
dent facts. But despite such facts, illusions will 
stand ready to contradict at every crook or turn. 
What is to be done? We must ignore contradic- 
tions until Part II, when their exposure will be the 
special work. But why not expose them first? Be- 
cause contradiction — materialism, is simply inexpli- 
cable without a previous analysis of sensibility as 
its source. 

It is much easier for instance, to prove the Coper- 
nican doctrine than to disprove the illusions which 
contradict it; indeed, the latter is simply impossi- 
ble, without the former; although, in the former, 
as in the present case, illusions act as a contrary- 
wind and tide from first to last. 



26 the self: what is it? 

Now to the first proposition, viz: Causality is 
grounded in sensibility. Human causality— which 
is the kind more especially in question, is of course 
assumed to be of a secondary or derived kind, 
though none the less valid on that account for hu 
man purposes. That man is endowed with causality, 
is clearly implied in moral responsibility. Respon- 
sibility implies that the agent so endowed has the 
power to act or not act at discretion, but a power 
to act or not act at discretion presupposes causality 
in the agent who can so act. 

Causality is thus a necessary implication of re- 
sponsibility. But does not responsibility itself 
need proof? Certainly not. It is assumed in all 
our possible theories and conventionalities; in so 
much, it cannot even be debated without meanwhile 
assuming it, just as would be the case in debating 
the reality of existence. 

But the causality implied in responsibility, is of a 
moral kind: is there no other phase of causality, 
than the moral? Plainly enough. The moral phase 
ought to control all human conduct ; instead, it is 
often opposed and even wholly overthrown. Now, 
this rebellious element must also be endowed at 
least with causality, else it could not thus baulk 
the moral authority. 

Tn short, the human mind is liberally endowed 
with causality. This brings us to the immediate in- 



CAUSALITY — A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 2J 

quiry of the chapter: Where is this causality 
grounded — in sensibility or in intelligence? 

As usually conceived of, simple energy, power, 
force, or whatever else you choose to call it, must 
be positively passive, as contrasted with causality. 
Literal energy can be nothing but itself — simple 
energy, and no more. It cannot be both itself and 
meanwhile something else exterior to itself; which 
prompts itself to activity. Indeed, in itself it is 
nothing; it does not exist nor can it be conceived 
of, except as a predicate of causality. Causality 
of necessity precedes and includes it, just as cause 
precedes and includes effect. 

So then, besides simple energy in its common 
import, causality also implies a self-motive energy 
— an originating and secondary energy both in one. 
Its activity is self-prompting, and its self-prompt- 
ing is an activity in one identical and spontaneous 
act. 

Whether or not possible to define it more sharp- 
ly; or whether it imply anything more, this at least 
suffices as a test for present purposes. With this 
test it hazards nothing to say, that nowhere in the 
realm of human thought can we find any concrete 
illustration of causality, except in the sphere of 
sensibility. 

But the word sensibility is too generic and vague, 
for the precise point in question; and since the 



28 the self: what is it? 

word desire, more fitly perhaps than any other one,, 
characterizes all sensibility and is meanwhile pecu- 
liarly suited for the precise point in hand, let it be 
used just here instead of sensibility, to personate the 
feeling sphere of mind. 

Now then, we cannot define causality, without 
meanwhile defining desire; nor define desire, with- 
out also defining causality. This difference only: 
causality is the name of an abstraction ; desire is 
the concrete manifestation of that abstraction. 

Desire is something which acts in itself, acts for 
itself, and prompts itself to action. It equally im- 
plies activity, act, actor, all in one — a trinity in 
unity. This by the way, is the earliest glimpse of 
the trinal principle; which, being a rudimental 
element of sensibility, will be seen by and by as 
an indispensable necessity to intelligence, as man- 
ifested in the three fundamental principles of logic, 
another phase of the same thing. 

The very existence of desire, and its self-motive 
activity, are identical : that is, it can neither exist, 
nor be conceived of, except as a self-mover; and 
as such, is the only concrete illustration of the 
something called causality. 

According to human intelligence, the facts here 
seen, must be as true respecting God, as they are 
of man. Man cannot act voluntarily without some 
motive, much less God ; and the said motive can 



CAUSALITY A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 29 

only be some desire or prompting of sensibility. 
This simply means that neither man nor God could 
act, without some desired end in view. With God 
as with man, intelligence can only be a passive 
instrument for realizing the promptings of sensibil- 
ity. Divine Sensibility only, could be the primal 
cause of the universe, and divine intelligence the 
instrument thereof. Throughout the Hebrew and 
Christian Scriptures, God always acts from love, 
mercy, indignation, or other sensibility: the in- 
stances are too numerous to mention. 

Plato regarded self-motion as the most decisive 
trait of the primal Cause, though he did not refer 
self-motion in so many words to sensibility. How- 
ever, he did so implicitly; for besides regarding 
the One and the Good as the primal Cause, intel- 
lect is represented as coming later; so that, the 
One and the Good must consist of sensibility, un- 
less it be assumed that the mind principle contains 
some essential element other than sensibility and 
intelligence. It must be admitted however, that 
elsewhere and in other connections, his doctrine 
seemed the reverse of this. 

There is a remarkable passage in one of the Vedas, 
which concurs fully with the view herein taken : 
"The One lay void, wrapped in nothingness. It 
(the One) was developed by the power of fervor: 
desire first arose in it, which was the primal germ 



30 the self: what is it? 

of mind; sages searching in their intellect, have 
discovered in their heart, the bond which connects 
entity with non-entity." 

As to other and later authorities, none are re- 
membered who made inquiry into this specific ques- 
tion. The Germans wrote much about causality, 
spontaneous activity and so forth, but did not refer 
it specifically, either to sensibility or to intelli- 
gence. By implications, they might be claimed on 
either side; yet, the drift of their writings was 
opposed to the view here taken. The truth is, not: 
having examined the precise question, they cannot 
be justly quoted as being either pro or con. 

Returning to the question, it follows that each 
individual sense is a distinct causal activity in it- 
self — is a literal self-mover; while all the senses to- 
gether represent the sum total of human causality. 
It also follows, that dumb brutes are likewise so 
endowed, else they would be incapable of sponta- 
neous activity. Indeed, causality may be granted 
to vegetation— to all modes of life, in so far at 
least as such life may imply the principle of de- 
sire. By the way, can vital force be better defined 
than to call it a desire for existence? 

Of course, causality, free causality, moral quality 
and so forth, are distinct things. Because all de- 
sire is causal, it does not follow that it is free and 
morally endowed. Several problems of interest here 
suggested are irrelevant to our question. 



CAUSALITY A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 31 

Self motion is but another name for causality: 
then the question is, except desire, what else is so 
endowed? Positively nothing conceivable. Even 
allowing gravitation or other like force to be a dis- 
tinct reality in itself, yet clearly it cannot act until 
something exterior to itself, first excites and calls 
out its activity. Whereas, desire, though often 
excited by exterior objects is characterized as act- 
ing in and of itself, independently of all foreign in- 
fluence. 

All desire — as that of hunger, thirst, avarice, van- 
ity, love, ambition, and so forth, can, and con- 
stantly does act prior to and independently of a 
specific exterior object. Our entire life struggle 
indeed, might be summed up as one of indefinite 
desire; desire for something which perhaps is never 
seen, nor realized, nor even conceived of distinct- 
ly. In thus acting in and of itself, and independ- 
ently of exterior objects, desire is essentially causal, 
contrasted with which, all other known forces and 
things, can only be called instruments. 

But this is not one half. Instead of being moved 
by exterior objects only, desire is never at itself — 
is never wrought up to its highest pitch, except by 
the 7vant, the absence, or may be, by the non-ex- 
istence of some object. This shows not only how 
desire is causal in the common meaning, but how it 
mounts up to creative energy. That is, desire 



32 the self: what is it? 

wants a given object; but the object does not exist; 
whereupon it creates said object. The desire for, 
yet the absence or non-existence of the universe, 
is the only intelligible mainspring of its creation. 
Clearly, all outward activity is but the manifesta- 
tion of inward desire : without this fountainhead of 
energy, the universe would be stone dead. 

Turning about now, it is hard to see how intel- 
ligence can put in a claim for causality. Intelligence 
is but intelligence — pure cognition or knowing. It 
has no emotion, no desire; and being passionless, 
must also be motiveless; and being motiveless, 
must be as passive per se as a marble statue. 

This is not denying that it manifests activity in 
its varied processes. But this is not the question: 
instead, it is whether said activity is causal or in- 
strumental, original or mechanical. 

It will be asked, Could the universe be created 
by desire without intelligence? This thoughtless 
and ever-recurring question always goes on the 
mistaken assumption, that intelligence is afar off 
and independent of desire. Whereas, desire as the 
cause of all things, must be the cause of intelli- 
gence also. Intelligence as one of its predicates or 
properties is implied in all its activities, just as 
light is always implied by the lamp. 

These reflections are an attempt to get the ques- 
tion fairly in view. A question of such moment, 



CAUSALITY A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 33 

must not only have abstract plausibility, but empiri- 
cal demonstration, which will be found in the next 
chapter. 



CHAPTER II. 

THE SAME CONTINUED. 

In place of the long word sensibility, let the short 
word sense be used hereafter, to represent all phenom- 
ena of feeling; remembering especially, never in any 
case to restrict it to a five sense limitation. 

Of course, intelligence is present and takes part in 
all human activity; but it is present as a subordinate: 
instrument only, and never as a causal authority. 
Here precisely is the trouble with the practical aspect 
of the question, viz., The failure to distinguish sharp- 
ly between the two conceptions, causality and instru- 
mentality. 

Take away the exterior object which excites the 
compass needle, and it is dead. Why? Simply be- 
cause the needle is not a causal, but only an instru- 
mental power. Causal power on the contrary, works?, 
in, and of, and for itself, independently of foreign aid, 
as was seen of desire. The two conceptions, cause 
and instrument, are as wide apart as can be, which 
must be kept constantly in mind, in a practical study 
of this question. 

Though a pure instrumeut, the needle controls the 
34 



THE SAME CONTINUED 35 

mariner at sea; and so likewise do the maps, charts, 
and other like guides employed in the voyage. Back 
of these again, is intelligence, which employs said 
guides as its instruments. Here stopping short, in- 
telligence seems to be the primary cause. But look- 
ing still back of intelligence, it is undeniable that a 
desire for gain, pleasure, renown, or other like sense 
impulse, is the prime motive cause of the voyage. 
Hence, compass, map, chart, intelligence — all alike 
are but simple instruments, employed to serve the de- 
sires of sense as the prime cause. 

The stone or wooden house is but a symbol of the- 
real and original house, presented by the architect's 
design, and would be impossible without said design.. 
But is this all? Evidently, the design itself — a device 
of intelligence, would in turn be equally impossible, 
without some antecedent need, desire, or other like 
sense demand, as the prime cause. 

Illustrations like these, and all pointing to one and 
the same truth, are simply infinite. What use of 
more? It is a much easier and shorter cut to look for 
one single, voluntary human action, which is not trace- 
able back to a sense motive as its mainspring. In 
every case, without exception, sense motive will be 
seen as such mainspring or cause, while the devices 
of intelligence with like certainty, will be seen as 
passive instruments. So very passive indeed, that in- 
telligence is just as ready to go out for high-way rob- 



36 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

bery, as for purposes of philanthropy. Yes, intelli- 
gence is just as ready, just as willing, just as expert, 
in serving the purposes of the robber, as those of the 
philanthropist. Without the least exception, it pass- 
ively obeys whatever may happen to be the strongest 
sense impulse at the given time. 

The causality of sense and the instrumentality of 
intelligence are so evident, that anything further 
would seem even absurd. But on the other hand, the 
question is so beset with illusion, it is well to study it 
a little further; for on turning away from Copernicus, 
we instantly see the sun rising and setting as usual. 

Sense causality is not only the mainspring of all in- 
dividual activity, but that of society also in the aggre- 
gate. Take, for instance, the conception commerce — 
the complex and varied activities of the commercial 
world. They may be all summed up in the two 
words, demand and supply. What is demand but the 
wants — the desires of sense; and what is supply but a 
response to said demand, prompted by the same sense 
desires, that prompted the demand? 

Some persons claim to love and seek knowledge 
for its own sake; and think this, at least, an excep- 
tion, in which sense has no share. But to confess 
to seeking a thing for the love of it, is to yield the 
point in question, love being one of the chief of 
the senses. A very little reflection wiil show that 
the business man, the scientist, the theologian, the 



THE SAME CONTINUED 37 

artist, the philosopher, the pedant, the real stu- 
dent, all alike seek knowledge as an instrument for 
realizing their r spective sense demands. There is 
and there can be no tx»_Lplion : in every case,sense is 
both the sun and moon which control all the ebbs 
and flows of human activity. 

But says one, by means of reflection intelligence 
sometimes reverses the destiny of a man — the des- 
tiny even of a nation. True enough; so also might 
a straw or any other trifle ; but such influence would 
be instrumental and not causal after all. This ob- 
jection forgets that reflection itself is but an instru- 
ment of sense at the start : that is, earnest and use-, 
ful reflection never did and never can occur except 
at the bidding of sense. In other words still, wher- 
ever sense may be found, and in whatever it may 
be interested, there precisely, and there only, will re- 
flection be found following like a shadow. To 
know the sense aspirations of a man, is to know 
the scope of his reflections in advance : without be- 
ing told, we know already in advance, that the 
miser is reflecting on money getting; and so of 
every other man, according to his ruling sense or 
senses, showing that reflection itself is but an instru- 
ment — a servant of sense. 

But the previous chapter and this one so far, are 
mainly intended to get the question fairly in view. 
If the various facts employed in this presentation 



38 the self: what is it? 

do not suffice as ample demonstration, then take 
this summary view: On the one hand, select any 
act, of any man — whether of a virtuous or vicious 
man, whether of a wise man or simpleton ; and 
then, on the other hand, send any man — whether 
virtuous or vicious, wise or simple, to find the main- 
spring of the given action: would not the latter 
man — without any thought, but led by infallible 
instinct, go straight to sense motives, in order to 
find the desired mainspring? 

Moreover, would not any moral, civil, social, 

religious, political, or other tribunal, either acquit 

*or condemn in the given case, accordingly as the 

said action might have originated from a good or 

bad sense impulse? 

As result, we have universal usage, instinct and 
common sense to prove, not only that sense and 
sense only, is causal, but also that sense and sense 
only is responsible, thus proving two of the five 
propositions at one stroke. Demonstration stronger 
and plainer than .this is inconceivable. 

What more? Only this: Despite the demonstra- 
tion, I am quite positive that while other people 
may be controlled by sense impulse, I am not: my 
conduct. is governed by reason — calm, sober reason. 

This at once ends all debate. It not only demon- 
strates sense causality, but exposes the illusion 
which contradicts it. Of course, if everybody else 



THE SAME CONTINUED 39 

is governed by sense, then so am I also; otherwise 
and of necessity, either I am superhuman, else labor- 
ing under an illusion. Which of the two is most 
likely? Instead of seeing the plain truth, each one 
of us, on the contrary, imagines himself to be duly 
sober, and hence can well enough see everybody 
else as drunk; this too, without seeing that every 
one else is in the same ridiculous muddle with him- 
self — that is, imagines one thing of himself and 
quite another thing of other people. As result, 
every one testifies that sense causality is universal, 
with one exception only; but on comparing wit- 
nesses, no two agree as to the identity of this one 
exception, and hence, the exception must be an il- 
lusion. 

This very subtle, this first and chief materialistic 
illusion as hinted in the Introduction, is partially ex- 
plicable in this way. Intelligence is constantly oc- 
cupied in devising ways and means for meeting 
the demands of sense. Said devices sometimes in- 
volve so much, and require so much time and labor, 
that they eclipse the original sense motive; and 
hence, instead of seeing them as instruments only, 
we presently see them as the mainspring — as the 
all of the given enterprise. 

But still nearer the question, when the action is 
of a kind which needs vindication from censure, we 
are more apt to refer said action to rational designs, 



^0 the self: what is it? 

which are not responsible, than to confess the ugly 
sense motive, which, as the real mainspring, is re- 
sponsible. In thus trying to deceive others, we 
just as often deceive ourselves; and by the habit, 
become confirmed in seeing intelligence as the main- 
spring of our own conduct, though not that of other 
people. 

It may be added as still nearer the mark, that 
the same phase of intelligence, which, transcending 
its legitimate sphere, causes contradiction respect- 
ing the solar problem; the same percisely, and by 
virtue of the same incompetency, also causes con- 
tradiction in the present question^ 

But this is not the place for explaining contradic- 
tions. This one especially, the first and chief of 
all, cannot be understood at this stage of the in- 
quiry. It is only glimpsed at now, in order to 
show, that while the demonstration of sense caus- 
ality is positively invincible, there is, on the other 
hand, no vestige of argument against it, except this 
infatuated illusion: as for myself, I am governed 
by reason and calm reflection. 

Two chapters have been given to sense causality, 
and well enough too; for the acute reader can al- 
ready see, that sense causality being true, the re- 
maining four propositions necessarily follow. Being 
the causal element, it of necessity includes every 
other vital element of mind. The four remaining. 



THE SAME CONTINUED 41 

propositions will be sufficiently demonstrated on be- 
ing fairly stated. The one which derives intelli- 
gence from sense, though having stronger and more 
abundant proof than the other three, is also more 
beset with illusion, and will hence require more 
attention. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE IMPLICATIONS OF END OF EXISTENCE PREDICATES 

OF SENSIBILITY. 

It is not easy to state this second proposition in 
a few plain words suitable for the caption of a chap- 
ter. The meaning is not difficult, however. It 
simply assumes, in the first place, that all human 
aspiration looks to some culminating good, as its 
final end) and in the next place, that said end is 
predicable of sense. 

What is the upshot of existence — what its high- 
est end, as looked at from a human standpoint? 
Kant tells us that it is happiness; but makes haste 
to qualify the statement by saying, we must not seek 
happiness directly, nor allow it to be a rule of con- 
duct. Rather, we must seek to become worthy of 
happiness; must do rightly for right's own sake, 
and hereby happiness will come without the seeking. 
This view regards happiness as a result, and not as 
the aim or end of a proper life. 

From a like standpoint, Carlyle tells us of a some- 
thing above happiness, which he calls blessedness. 

42 



THE IMPLICATIONS OF END OF EXISTENCE 43 

What he precisely means by blessedness may be un- 
certain, though doubtless his meaning is not far off 
from that of Kant. That the latter has not placed 
the mark too high is obvious. A good man will not 
only sell present happiness, but even life itself for 
the sake of integrity and honor, thus showing that 
he values honor above happiness and life together. 

But the point is, not to find out the precise some- 
thing which is the end of existence, so much as to 
find out its predication — whether in sense or in in- 
telligence. Perhaps all will admit, that some one 
or other of these — happiness, moral worth, blessed- 
ness, or the like is the end in question. Very well: 
is that special something predicable of sensibility 
or intelligence? 

Now no matter which is selected, whether hap- 
piness, moral worth, or other reasonable one, it 
will turn out in any event, that the one so selected, 
is but another name for some state, mode, or condi- 
tion of sense. This is but saying again, that hap- 
piness, moral worth, or otherwise, are things which 
represent certain phases of sense only, and not those 
of intelligence: they are predicates of feeling and 
not of thinking; we can only feel, not think hap- 
piness. 

Of course, happiness, moral worth, and so forth, 
imply more or less intelligence. This is true only 
in a relative, not in an essential sense. As seen in 



44 the self: what is it? 

the last chapter, intelligence is but an instrument, 
relatively to a cause; and so it can only be a means, 
relatively to an end. 

That is to say, the conceptions cause and end 
are correlates: we cannot separate cause from its 
correlate end; nor end from its correlate cause. 
They are little else than different aspects of the 
same thing. 

This is illustrated by the conception commerce, 
which like human existence, implies a correlated 
cause and end. Thus, the cause (demand) and the 
end (supply) are identical with this exception: cause 
(demand) is the desire for, while end (supply; is 
the realization of the object desired. 

But while cause and end as correlates, are much 
the same, they differ essentially from the concep- 
tions instrument and means ; fully as much as com- 
merce differs from railway; commerce is a thing in 
and for itself, while railway is but its tool. So in- 
telligence in this instance is but a tool, called in- 
strument relatively to cause, and means relatively 
to end. Hence, whether as independent, or as an 
attribute of sense, it can in no event be called an 
essential factor in the conception, end of existence. 

Some people admire intelligence so extravagantly, 
that they think the sole business of future existence 
will be to cultivate the intellect and get knowledge. 
Granted; but where unto, except for the happiness 



THE IMPLICATIONS OF END OF EXISTENCE -fj 

resulting therefrom? But intellect cannot feel hap- 
piness; so that, even in heaven, it can only be an 
instrument or means, and neither a cause nor an 
end. Hence on the other hand, happiness or what- 
ever we choose to call the culminating end of exist- 
ence, can only be properly grounded in sense. 

Without a correlated cause and end — without a 
cause to act, and an end as an outcome of the ac- 
tivity, there would be no need nor room for respon- 
sibility, as the next essential trait of human charac- 
ter. Besides, the two conceptions, cause and end, 
will prove indispensable to the final make-up of 
the Self; and hence, are emphasized here, as the 
first suitable opportunity.. 



CHAPTER IV. 

RESPONSIBILITY A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY. 

It was said at the start that responsibility, beings 
an assumption of universal theory and usage, must, 
always be taken for granted. Yet, there are those 
who challenge this universal verdict, and hint that 
responsibility may possibly be a dream of fancy. 
To allow a mistake about that, which is the foun- 
dation of all human conventionality, not only im- 
plies the rottenness of that foundation, but the 
utter invalidity of mind. None but philosophical 
outlaws could have temerity enough to hint such a 
doubt. 

Responsibility must be absolutely granted ; for 
if it be doubtful, then everything is doubtful and 
all debate is sheer folly. Being granted, the ques- 
tion of the chapter is, where is it grounded, in 
sense, or in intelligence? As already seen, univer- 
sal instinct and usage refer it to sense. Moreover, 
in always presupposing causality, it must with the 
latter also be grounded in sense. 

First, to be responsible, the agent must be able^ 
46 



RESPONSIBILITY A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 47 

to act in and of itself; and such ability plainly pre- 
supposes causality. 

Next, besides acting in and of itself, it must be 
able to act or not to act at option — it must be free; 
which free activity again presupposes causalicy. 

Next again, responsibility implies a moral en- 
dowment — an ability to distinguish between moral 
right and wrong. But such ability would be both 
useless and meaningless, except as the endowment 
of a free causal agent. So that, the three vital 
traits of responsibility, in presupposing causality, 
must along with the latter, be grounded in sense. 

Sense only can be morally praiseworthy or 
blameworthy. Who ever heard, or who can even 
conceive of an intellectual immorality — an intellec- 
tual crime? Why not? Plainly because, intellect, 
in not having either of the three vital traits — caus- 
ality, free causality, moral quality — cannot be re- 
sponsible any more than a machine. 

We blame sense and sense only, for all vice; in- 
somuch, and to say nothing of other people, we 
even loathe our own senses for leading us into 
vicious ways. We only laugh at or pity the failings 
of intellect; but despise those of sense. Instinct 
thus prompts us; and in so doing, it points infal- 
libly to sense as the real and only responsible 
agent. 

But why not the ever-recurring objection just 



48 the self: what is it? 

here, that has been met all along at every turn? 
viz., Responsibility implies intelligence; else how 
could it distinguish between moral right and wrong? 
Of course, responsibility implies intelligence. We 
do not censure stones and stumps, if for nothing 
else, because they have no intelligence. But what 
of this? 

It only proves that intelligence itself is an impli- 
cation of sense. How? Because, though clearly 
implied in every act of responsibility, it is yet 
wholly irresponsible itself; and hence, it can only 
be an endowment — a passive instrument of sense, 
which latter, beyond dispute, is the only responsi- 
ble agent. Always present, but always ignored; at 
this rate, it can only be a servant of the real re- 
sponsible agent. 

This undeniable fact, while pertinent just here 
as resulting from the above reflections, amounts to 
a positive demonstration of the next coming propo- 
sition: Intelligence is a predicate of sense. Study 
this one fact carefully, and there will be but little 
need of the abundant proof presented in the next 
chapter. 



CHAPTER V. 

INTELLIGENCE A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY. 

This proposition is proven by the fact just pointed 
out above: indeed, it had already been proven half 
a dozen times, by implication at least. But it is 
so beset with illusion as to require other and more 
direct proof. The facts which might be so employed, 
if fully set forth, would fill several volumes. The 
trouble is to condense, to reduce the more vital 
facts to one chapter. 

Perhaps nine-tenths of our debates are" about 
words, or other trifling ritual. Let the like be 
avoided in the present case. No sane philosophy 
can ever mount above plain, sturdy common sense. 
Guided by the latter, let the chapter be made the 
means of getting a clear view of the real question. 
With such view, with prejudice, illusion and other 
like obscurities out of the way, the truth will be 
plain enough. 

In the first place, the proposition affirms that in- 
telligence is a predicate of sense. This does not 
mean that it is identical with, or is manufactured 
by sense; but springs forth from sense somewhat 

48 



50 the self: what is it? 

as a flame springs forth from a burning body. 
Moreover, in springing from sense, it never be- 
comes independent of sense; but ever continues in 
the relation of a passive instrument for subserving 
sense demands. Sense causality and responsibility, 
which admit of no denial, imply all and ever* 
more, than is here affirmed of the relations between, 
sense and intelligence. 

On the contrary, it is assumed, not specifically 
affirmed but vaguely assumed, that a sort of intel- 
lectual hierarchy, consisting of various purely in- 
tellectual faculties, distinct from and above sense,, 
supervise and control human conduct. 

In other words, our proposition regards all intel- 
ligence as springing from and dependent upon sense 
— notthe five senses only, but all the senses; and 
hence, that the various senses are the only distinct, 
individual faculties of intelligence. Whereas, the 
opposite opinion is that intelligence springs from 
purely intellectual faculties, which latter, implic- 
itly at least, are distinct from and above sense. 
Such intelligence, being distinct from and above 
sense, virtually denies sense causality and respon- 
sibility. But no matter. 

With this dim glimpse at the start, the question 
will grow clearer as we proceed. The most aston- 
ishing thing is, that no valid fact or argument is 
to be found, either against our proposition, or ■ in 



INTELLIGENCE — A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 51 

proof of an intellectual hierarchy. The one is de- 
nied and the other affirmed by assumptions only. 
Being challenged, these assumptions would reply 
about this way: "How is it possible for blind sense 
to be the source of intelligence?" 

Though but an expression of prejudice, such re- 
ply implies two plain assumptions. First, it tacitly 
assumes to know, what ought to be the pre requi- 
sites of a faculty or attribute of mind, in order to be 
fitly prepared for receiving and exercising intelli- 
gence : not blind senses certainly, but pure intel- 
lectual faculties. 

And why? We know nothing of the essence of" 
either sense or intelligence, and just as little about 
the essential fitness of this or that faculty, for the 
exercise of intelligence. We can only judge by facts 
of phenomena, or in their absence, by the common 
sense relations of things. In respect of essence, 
we cannot positively say, that even a brick-bat is 
unfitted for exercising intelligence ; but in respect of 
facts and fitness of things, we can. 

Why then is a brick-bat not endowed with intel- 
ligence? Among many reasons, perhaps the plain- 
est and shortest would be another question : Why 
ought a brick bat or any thing else to be so en- 
dowed? Rather, what is the need or purpose of 
intelligence at all, except for something which is a 
thing in and for itself? — a thing which includes 



52 the self: what is it? 

both cause and end in itself, and which hence has 
needs and wants to be supplied? 

Except sense, nothing else is a thing in and for 
itself; while each individual sense has a little world 
of wants to be supplied. On the other hand, ex- 
cept intelligence— which has no desires of its own, 
nothing else can devise ways and means for meeting 
the demands of sense. This relation between the 
two, will not allow intelligence to be afar off nor 
superior to sense; but instead, requires it to be near 
at hand and subordinate to sense; requires it to 
serve the purposes of sense, somewhat as the light 
of the fire-fly is intended to light up the way for 
the fire-fly, and not to shine simply for its own glory. 

Cf course, endless volumes have been written on 
this question; not to prove, but to explain and 
arrange an already assumed hierarchy of intellec- 
tual faculties. It suffices to say just here, that all 
the phenomena of the case, are far more explicable 
by other self-evident means. It will finally be seen 
in fact, that there is neither need, nor any logical 
standing-room, for such faculties in the mental 
economy. 

But in the second place, the objection assumes 
that sense is but blind feeling. Neither is there 
any vestige of proof for this: it results chiefly from 
metaphysical speculation. In hair-splitting debates 
about sensation and perception, the former is called 



INTELLIGENCE A PREDICATE OK SENSIBILITY 53 

blind by way of distinction between the two. Once 
so started, it is presently assumed as a self-evident 
fact, though having no pretense of proof. 

But observe, the question is not, that pure feel- 
ing is identical with pure intelligence, but rather, 
that intelligence is grounded in and springs forth 
from stnse. This latter, which is the real ques- 
tion, is confirmed by the same wise authority which 
had just assumed sense to be blind; for along with 
this assumption, tney also hold that sensation al- 
ways precedes and is positively indispensable to 
perception: in fact, they often unwittingly put 
sensation and perception in the relation of cause 
and effect, and which is going beyond our proposi- 
tion. 

Moreover, on turning away from their artificial 
hobbies, these same high authorities, presently fall 
into the natural usage of employing the word sense 
as an equivalent of intelligence. Thus : a man of 
sense, superior sense, sound sense, moral sense, 
common sense, and so on. What does" this mean? 
Usage so common and general as this, points direct- 
ly to instinct as its source. As such, it must be 
decisive on the question, unless it can be traced to 
an origin other than instinct; for instinct after all, 
is the truest philosopher. 

In the absence ot proof on the one side, let us 
turn to that of the other. It is admitted on all 



54 



THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 



hands, that intelligence first dawns forth from sense. 
But this is not one half; for though admitting that 
intelligence first dawns forth from sense, yet it is 
then carelessly assumed that being thus once risen, 
it mounts above and independent of sense. This too 
in the teeth of the other and equally universal ad- 
mission, that all the operations of intelligence —all 
knowledge — must be counted as so much irrespon- 
sible theorizing, until verified by a sense test. What? 
Even so; intelligence first dawns forth from blind 
sense, and ever after continues under its blind cen- 
sorship — a blind judge, who is yet the sole and high- 
est authority respecting all knowledge. 

It is common, especially with materialists, to say, 
I believe nothing contrary to my five senses. Many 
systems of philosophy explicitly, and quite all im- 
plicitly, go on the assumption, that the five senses 
are the sole test of all knowledge. This treatise 
holds to the sense test also; but instead of five only, 
it includes all the senses. This view, as will be seen 
later, is the only way to explain the contradictions 
and obscurities attaching to this quite complex ques- 
tion. 

However, these reflections open the way for a still 
nearer approach to the question. On the one hand, 
they forbid a real and sharp antithesis between 
sense and intelligence; on the other, they justify 
us in conceiving of intelligence as an emanation 



INTELLIGENCE A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 55 

from sense — as the outstretched arm of sense, reach- 
ing out for its desired objects. The relation be- 
tween the two, is perhaps still better illustrated, 
by the relation between a flame and burning body. 

Now then, ignoring outside hear-say on the ques- 
tion, and avoiding all needless abstraction, let us 
try for a common sense view, a practical view at 
the very fountain head. Every man's common sense 
ought to assert its own authority, especially upon 
a question so plain and yet so momentous philosoph- 
ically as this. 

Take for example, that trite and most contracted 
of all senses, commonly called the palate, which 
judges of sweet, acid, bitter etc. This is only a 
sense — a blind sense or feeling as we say; yet it 
perceives, distinguishes, and infers, respecting 
sweet, acid, etc. But perception, distinction and 
inference are the three essential elements of intelli- 
gence. 

Let us see: we cannot identify or perceive any 
special object, without distinguishing it from other 
objects; so that perception is clearly impossible 
without distinction. Meanwhile, we cannot distin- 
guish without inference; that is, without infering 
the given object to be what it is, and not some: 
thing else. Thirdly, we cannot infer without an 
antecedent perception and distinction — without 
something to infer about. 



56 the self: what is it? 

Now, the all-important point to be noted here, is 
this: Perception, distinction and inference, though 
three, are one and inseparable. Neither one can 
act, neither one can exist, or be conceived of, with 
out the other two. If this be doubted, then read 
the last paragraph again and study it well. 

These three in one, are a trinity in unity prin- 
ciple, and are substantially the same with the three, 
fundamental principles of logic — Identity, Oppo- 
sition, and Ground. 

They hence and also constitute the one, sole, un- 
changing method of inquiry — common to infant and 
philosopher alike, and which may be called analysis 
or any name you choose. It will be seen in Part. 
II, that induction, synthesis, and other so called 
methods of inquiry, are illusions resulting mainly 
from confounding the inquiring method with the ob- 
ject inquired about. But it is obvious to common 
sense here and now, that these so-called methods 
themselves — that all conceivable inquiry — must of 
necessity begin, continue and end with these three 
activities, perception, distinction and inference. In- 
deed, to be conscious, to reason, to know, to think, 
to remember, to imagine — all cognitive activity, 
include perception, distinction, and inference, and 
would be impossible without them. But remember 
above all, that these three are one and inseparable. 

Now returning, it follows of necessity, if the 



INTELLIGENCE — A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY" 57 

palate and the palate only, can perceive sweet and 
acid, then the palate and the palate only, can dis- 
tinguish and infer — can know anything about them 
per se. In such obvious case, where is the need, 
the room, or the possibility for a so-called intel- 
lectual faculty to aid the palate in its special func- 
tions. The perception of sweet is a feeling, and 
unless your intellectual faculty can feel, it could 
know nothing in the case. To allow it to feel on 
the other hand, is to make it a sense, and herewith 
the question is settled. It is hence undeniable, that 
the palate is the supreme authority — the sole philos- 
opher in its own sphere, and neither needs nor can 
be taught by any other faculty. 

The palate, though the sole yet sufficient author- 
ity in its own sphere, is withal the most contracted 
of all the senses. Beginning with it at zero, we 
may rise step by step to the highest, and find the 
same prime facts respecting each and all. Each one 
has its own specific functions, with an intelligence 
sufficient for and peculiar to said functions; so that, 
while each may aid another indirectly, no one can 
either loan or borrow, in essential respects. 

Take vision, in the next place. Vision and vision 
only can perceive colors; and hence, it and it only 
can distinguish and infer respecting colors — can 
know and reason about them. 

The zealot for intellect fails just here: vision he 



58 the self: what is it? 

thinks, first perceives color and then by some hook 
or crook, turns it over to intellect for further ex- 
amination. He forgets that the process is but one; 
that if vision only can perceive color, then it only 
can distinguish and infer in the case. On the other 
hand, that if intellect cannot perceive colors, so 
neither can it distinguish or infer respecting them. 

This does not mean, that vision knows everything 
about the given colored object. The object may 
present other traits wholly incognizable to vision. 
Though vision only can perceive the color of the ca- 
nary bird, hearing only can perceive its song. Though 
each may aid the other indirectly — as hearing may 
aid vision in locating a sounding object, yet neith- 
er one can aid the other in essential functions. Each 
sense has its specific sphere and must be the su- 
preme authority in that sphere. If an3 ? one should 
be incapable in its special work and need aid from 
another, then it would be a failure, and ought to 
be wholly superseded by that other. 

This is enough about the five senses. Except 
their varying purposes and functions, the general 
facts are much the same in each case. Are these 
all? But these five can only know matter and its 
implications. Is there nothing for us to know, ex- 
cept matter? — no God, mind, knowledge, justice, 
truth, beauty, and other like immaterial objects? If 
there be such objects, they cannot be known until 



INTELLIGENXE A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 59 

perceived ; and they cannot be perceived except by 
a corresponding sense; as color by vision, or sweet 
by the palate. 

Except the illusions which lead us to see intelli- 
gence as causal and responsible, perhaps the most 
astonishing are those which restrict perception to 
the five senses. Because these five employ phys- 
ical organs, in order to perceive physical objects, 
all other senses not so endowed, are assumed to 
be blind. This is about equal to saying, specta- 
cles are indispensable to vision and everybody is 
blind who does not use them. 

In strange contrast with this proofless assump- 
tion, is the common and intuitively recognized fact, 
that the esthetic sense commonly called taste, is 
perceptive and intelligent to a most brilliant de- 
gree. Taste is a sense; a sense without physical 
organs; and yet, despite its blindness, it is the 
sole authority in the vast realm of the beautiful. 
Among other things, this realm includes poetry, 
oratory, sculpture, painting, music, architecture, 
and what not — all under the jurisdiction of blind 
taste. Of course, most phases of the beautiful re- 
quire physical organs and objects in order to their 
concrete manifestations. It could not be otherwise 
in view of our dual nature. But still, the very high- 
est activities of taste, are precisely those in which 
physical organs and objects are wholly excluded, 



60 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

viz., In its primary perceptions and designs of the 
beautiful. Concrete manifestations by the aid of 
physical means, are only awkward symbols of these 
primary designs; and which, as the original and 
real, are pure mental products, without any physi- 
cal adjuncts. 

Taste, beyond all doubt, though destitute of phys- 
ical organs, can perceive its immaterial objects: yea^ 
can perceive them with even more certainty, pre- 
cision, and vivacity, than the materialist can per- 
ceive a house across the street. Every artist at 
least, will confirm this. 

Now then, taste is a sense; it has no physical 
organs; yet, it is perceptive to a most brilliant 
degree, and is withal, the sole dictator in the vast 
realm of the beautiful. But despite the vastness 
of this realm, where is the need, the room, or the 
possibility of an outside intellectual faculty, to 
give aid to taste in its specific functions? No 
more need, room, or possibility, than in the case 
of the palate or vision. 

Next, glance at the moral sense, which is 
certainly the highest and most signicafint of ail- 
Though destitute of physical oragns, this sense and 
this only, can preceive moral right and wrong. But 
moral right and wrong include the great principles 
of truth, justice, equity, etc. Then again, truth, jus- 
tice, equity, etc., are the fundamental elements of all 



INTELLIGENCE — A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 6l 

our moral, social, religious, civil, political, and oth- 
er economies. So then, if the moral sense only, can 
perceive moral right and wrong, it and it only can 
distinguish and infer — can know or reason about right 
and wrong, as well as about their varied and nu- 
merous implications. At this rate, the moral sense 
is the only legitimate moralist, priest, judge, states- 
man, philosopher, etc. 

And at this rate again, what becomes of our in- 
tellectual utility doctrines? To exclude a host of 
other facts, if even the palate is independent of in- 
tellectual aid, much more so ought the moral sense 
to be, since its functions involve our highest and 
most vital interests. The moral sense is a feeling — 
a feeling already endowed with all needed intelli- 
gence, just as the palate or vision, and unless the 
intellectual faculty coming to its atd, be endowed 
with feeling, it can know no more about right and 
wrong than about sweet or acid. 

Note, and note with emphasis: We ever forget, 
that while sense and sense only can perceive — as the 
palate perceives sweet, and vision perceives color — 
so also, they and they only can distinguish and in- 
fer respecting their specific objects; and for the 
simple reason too, that perception, distinction, and 
inference are positively one and inseparable. In a 
word, to say that the moral sense only can perceive 
right and wrong, is virtually saying that the moral 



62 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

sense only can distinguish, infer, reason, or know 
anything about them or their vital implications. 

But an analysis of intelligence is the work of 
Part II. This chapter is simply intended to trace 
intelligence to its sense origin; and hence this must 
suffice respecting individual senses. Beginning with 
the palate as the lowest, we have reached the 
moral sense as the highest, and find the same essen- 
tial facts in each case: each sense has its specific 
functions and objects; each naturally enough, has 
intelligence sufficient for and peculiar to its special 
wants ; nor can any one either loan or borrow in 
respect of essential function. 

As for the rest, it may be asked in a wholesale 
way, what do we know about love, anger, humor, 
wit, envy, avarice, and many others, except from 
these senses in, person? Positively nothing; no more 
than a blind man can know about vision. Besides, 
as a positve matter of fact, each sense can perceive, 
distinguish, and infer respecting its special objects; 
but perception, distinction, and inference personate 
all the essential elements of human intelligence. 

Again and on the one hand, as intlligence does 
not include cause and end in itself — is not a thing 
in and for itself, it must be intended for the pur- 
poses of something which is in and for itself. On 
the other hand, since our combined senses repre- 
sent all our desires and needs ; and since each sense 



INTELLIGENCE A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 63 

is amply endowed with intelligence for its own 
wants, then the combined intelligence of all, must 
equal the combined wants of all. What need or 
room then, for a so called intellectual — foreign in- 
telligence? 

Quite a trite objection was omitted in the chapter 
on responsibility; but being pertinent just here, 
may be noted in passing: viz., Insane people are 
irresponsible and hence responsibility is grounded 
in intelligence. But with the next breath, the 
objector will chide religion, love, avarice, anger, 
or some like sense influence, as being the cause 
of insanity. This shows that the absence of intel- 
ligence, instead of beng the cause, is only a joint 
effect along with irresponsibility; while both absent 
intelligence and irresponsibility as joint effects, 
are referable to diseased sense as the prime cause. 

But the objection overshoots the mark again, and 
which makes it pertinent just here. It suggests 
the question, how can the varying phases of insan- 
ity be explained, except as resulting from varying 
sense sources? Some are insane in one, and others 
in two or more respects. Allowing intelligence to 
be of one homogeneous intellectual kind, this could 
not happen: there could be no partial insanity; it 
would be either total, or not at all on this assump- 
tion. 

No matter what may be the merits of the trinal 



64 the self: what is it? 

principle as an abstract form without content, yet 
it mounts to the highest significnce as the model 
of that self-prompting activity, which is the most 
characteristic trait of causality, and which withal 
has no concrete exemplification, except in sense — 
desire. Being thus, as respects form at least, the 
very mould of desire, and assuming meanwhile that 
intelligence is an emanation from sense, it would 
be quite strange if this trinal principle were not 
the first and quite all-inclusive trait of intelligence: 
as for instance, in the trinality, perception, distinc- 
tion, and inference. 

Moreover, being duplicated in the three funda- 
mental principles of logic, we can see more clearly, 
that it is not an invention of intelligence. Intelli- 
gence could not make logic, but was made by it. 
Logic is the frame work — the bone and sinew of in- 
telligence, and by virtue of which, intelligence is 
what it is. Thus, the two facts, that trinality on 
the one hand, is the all-inclusive trait of intelli- 
gence; and on the other, has no living personifica- 
tion except in sense, point most unequivocally to 
sense as the fountain-head of intelligence. 

If this view be too abstract, we may see much 
the same from a clearer standpoint. Take for in- 
stance, those traits of intelligence which Kant calls 
a priori, which the Scotch call primitive, or which 
are popularly called mother-wit, instinct, common 



INTELLIGENCE — A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 65 

-sense, etc. These are rooted, and indeed buried so 
deep down in sense, as to be wholly incognizable to 
intelligence: they can only be realized in feeling 
and not in knowing. 

As relates to intelligence, they are simply incog- 
nizable and inexplicable; as relates to sense, they 
are simply felt to be true. We know them to be 
true of necessity ; but the knowing is a feeling and 
not an intelligible knowing. 

The law of cause and effect, which is implied in 
all coherent thought, is an example in point. Hume 
has shown, and nobody denies it, that no reason can 
be given why an effect necessarily follows from a 
cause. Still, we know it, and know it of necessity; 
but the knowing is' a feeling and not an intelligible 
cognition. 

It is not extravagant to say, that the last and 
highest test of all truth, is a simple feeling of neces- 
sity to accept it as such. It will be seen at the 
proper place, that to perceive, is to know; to know, 
is to perceive ; and meanwhile, that feeling — not 
the illusive, go-between something called touch, 
but pure, simple feeling is the soul and highest 
test of all knowledge. 

Accordingly, sense and intelligence as before said, 
are not indeed identical ; and as one reason of their 
difference, sense is decidedly the higher authority 
in matters of knowledge. Higher? Most certainly; 



66 the self: what is it? 

and the same fact precisely has already been seer* 
from another standpoint: viz, Intelligence not only 
first dawns forth from sense; but all its subsequent 
operations are worthless until tested by sense. 

It may be added as a final thought, that unity of 
mind — one of the first assumptions of philosoph}% 
will not allow of two rival powers in the mental 
economy. Either sense must be the central and 
supreme element, with intelligence as a subordinate; 
else, contrariwise. But sense causality and responsi- 
bility settle this point beyond dispute. 

A multitude of other facts might be cited. These 
suffice ; while others might obscure the sufficient 
and self-evident facts already cited. Though suffi- 
cing, they were not intended for demonstration, so- 
much as to get the question clearly in view and en- 
able each reader to see the truth for himself. 

It must be noted before closing, that nothing 
above was meant to deny or disparage a so-called 
intellect, but rather to deny that any intelligence 
can exist distinct from and independent of sense; 
and which amounts to saying, that all intelligence 
is of sense and sense only. As for the rest, the 
word intellectual is quite indispensable as an ad- 
jective form of the word intelligence. 

Neither is it meant, to deny the reality of reason, 
imagination, memory, or other like traits. They 
are simply denied as individual faculties; and re- 



INTELLIGENCE A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 67 

garded instead, as general, impersonal principles, 
which enter into the constitution of each individ- 
ual sense. Just as we may say, each sense is en- 
dowed with feeling, activity, will, or other imper- 
sonal principle; so also, each one is endowed with 
reason, imagination, memory, etc., sufficient for and 
adapted to its own peculiar needs. 

As these impersonal generalities — reason, imagin- 
ation, memory, will, etc., are the materials employed 
in the structure of a mythical intellectual hierarchy, 
it is well to note just here: First, reasoning for in- 
stance, at its least or at its most, implies nothing es-- 
sential, except to perceive, distinguish and infer.. 
But it is obvious that each of the senses can do pre- 
cisely the same, not to mention still other functions. 
What the need then for a faculty to reason only? — 
why and what would it reason about? 

Second, if only vision can perceive colors, only 
vision can know colors; and if only it can know 
colors, then only it can remember, imagine, and rea- 
son about colors. To say otherwise, is to say, that 
a faculty may remember and reason about that, 
which it has never perceived, or known, or thought 
of. 

Despite all, the devotee of an intellectual hie* 
rarchy is still suspicious and asks: What is to unify 
and control this heterogeneous multitude of senses, 
except some chief and central intelligence — a su- 



68 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

preme reason? True enough; only, this central 
power is not of intelligence only, but rather one 
of sense, endowed with intelligence; for otherwise, 
we fall back into the old rut of a causal intelli- 
gence. 

Also, unity of mind is a first assumption of phi- 
losophy, and hence its various parts must look to 
unity; that is, its various senses — both in sensi- 
tive and intellectual respects, must tongue and 
groove — must be complemental; so that, it does 
not of necessity require a Solomon to keep such a 
mass unified. 

As for the rest, the central power is, or ought 
to be, the moral sense; if for nothing else, it rep- 
resents our highest interests. But the moral sense 
is often dethroned, and its place usurped by one or 
more stronger senses. Except for the possibility 
of such revolution, there would be no room for 
moral free agency in the mental economy. How- 
ever and hereby, the given usurper at once becomes 
the central power in question, and as such subordi- 
nates all others to its own purposes. 

As individuals, each sense remains just what it 
was — retains its identity; yet, as fully as can be, 
it subserves the said central power. All combined, 
the mass moves this way or that, according to the 
dictates of the central or strongest power. Hence, 
there is no more need for an intellectual Solomon 



INTELLIGENCE A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY 69 

in the case, than for such an one to overlook the 
motions of the solar system. Each system is in- 
herently able to take care of itself, only with 
God's help. 

So much by way of exposition. Indeed, do not 
the facts amount to demonstration? Just these 
three for instance: It must be admitted on all 
hands, (i) that intelligence first sprouts forth from 
sense; (2) that its root principles are buried so 
deep down in sense as to be realized only by feel- 
ing, being withal wholly incognizable to intelli- 
gence; and (3) that all its subsequent activities are 
worthless, until verified by a sense test. 

Should the phantom of a distinct and controlling 
intellectual hierarchy still flit before us, the only 
alternative is self evident, practical matter of fact. 
Such proof is not wanting. It has been employed 
before; but this does not matter. The last four 
propositions of this Part I, are included in the 
first — that is, in sense causality; so that, a proof 
of one amounts to a proof of all. The fact in ques- 
tion is this: 

The intelligence of every man is constantly em- 
ployed in subserving the demands of his ruling 
sense or senses. Thus: the intelligence of the 
miser, is converged on money getting; that of the 
thief, on stealing ; that of the ambitious, on pre- 
ferment; that of the philanthropist, on doing good; 



7o 



the self: what is it? 



that of the average man on the love and main- 
tenance of his family; that even of the philosopher, 
on those studies dictated by his sense demands. 
Yes truly, even the wise philosopher is primarily 
prompted and controlled by sense, and not by any 
supreme reason; and so on with all men to the end 
of the chapter. 

A world full of theories, arguments, illusions, 
and prejudice avail nothing against one practical 
fact. In this instance, we have (i), the fact that 
every man is controlled by one or more ruling 
senses; (2), that intelligence is invariably a purely 
passive instrument of sense; and (3), that the spec- 
ial phase of intelligence always corresponds to the 
ruling sense in the given case. That is, the intelli- 
gence of the miser will always abound in devices 
and maxims for money getting. 

The only inference is, that the intelligence of the 
miser, is that which springs from and is adapted 
to the peculiar wants of the sense called avarice ; 
just as that which perceives sweet, springs from 
the palate; or as that which perceives color, springs 
from vision. In other words, each sense requires 
a peculiar intelligence, adapted to its own peculiar 
wants; the intelligence needed for vision for ex- 
ample, would not suit for the hearing. At this rate, 
each sense must either have a native born intelli- 
gence of its own ; else, it must per force seize, 



INTELLIGENCE — A PREDICATE OF SENSIBILITY *]l 

be*nd, twist, or otherwise conform intelligence to 
its special uses, as occasion might require. This 
latter seems unnatural and monstrous. 

It plainly follows, that the relation between sense 
and intelligence, implies much more than that be- 
tween a bare antecedent and consequent; insomuch, 
if we say with truth, that the flame springs from, 
conforms to, and is an emanation from the burning 
body, even so and with equal truth, we may affirm, 
that intelligence springs from, conforms to, and is 
an emanation from its corresponding sense. 

Meanwhile, except illusion and assumption, what 
is the proof for an over-ruling intellectual hierarchy? 
In the light of sober facts, it fades away to the 
■most mythical of myths. 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE SELF — AN IMPERSONATION OF SENSIBILITY. 

In view of the foregoing, either the Self must be 
grounded in sense; else, sense must be grounded 
in the Self, either of which would serve for most 
rational purposes. But this leaves the Self too 
vague and impersonal. It is well to see more defi- 
nitely the characteristics whereby selfhood emerges 
from sense; as also, to deduce proof from the Sell 
in person, that it does consist essentially of sense. 

Every thing in existence must come under one 
or the other of these two categories: Either it is 
a thing in and for itself; else, it is a thing in- 
tended for the behoof of something other than it- 
self. In the first event, it is called subject, cause, 
etc., and as such, it alone can claim selfhood. In 
the second event, it is called predicate, instrument, 
means, etc., but as such can make no claim to 
selfhood. 

This amounts to saying, everything which in- 
cludes in itself, the two conceptions cause and end, 
is a self. But inasmuch as all sensibility includes 

72 



THE SELF AN IMPERSONATION OF SENSIBILITY 73 

the two, so and to that extent, dumb brutes may 
claim selfhood. So they may; and so far, man and 
brute stand on a common level. But man mounts 
higher by means of the third proposition — respon 
sibility, which implies moral quality. Without 
moral quality, there could be no responsibility; 
without responsibility, no man. 

Then, cause, end, and moral quality — another 
trinity in unity, represent selfhood in the fullest 
sense. The latter — moral quality, as the climax, 
culminates in responsibility — in responsible man. 
These three essential elements of the highest self- 
hood, submitted to logical formula, would stand 
thus: (1) Cause or subject; (2) End or object; (3) 
Moral quality as the ground whence results the re- 
sponsible or human self. 

No additional proof or abstract exposition, other 
than that of the previous chapters, is needed to 
show that the Self consists essentially of sense. 
As cause, end, and moral quality are predicable of 
sense only, and are meanwhile the three most char- 
acteristic traits of the Self, the latter of necessity, 
must consist essentially of sense. Empirical facts 
only, are needed to complete the proof. From a 
multitude, a few decisive ones may be glanced at. 

Self preservation is well enough called the first 
law of nature : without it, all individuality would 
soon fall back into chaos. According to this prin- 



74 



THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 



ciple, the Self would be firstly and chiefly occupied 
in the preservation of itself; and in the next place, 
would naturally enough feel the deepest interest in 
the selfhood of others. What is the selfhood of 
others; rather, what is the precise point in the 
character ot others, which excites our deepest in- 
terests? If this can be found out, we have de- 
cisive proof for identifying the Self. 

As often said, every one is apt to be mainly en- 
gaged in meeting his own sense demands. This is 
true of all, even of the best men: the philanthro- 
pist — wholly devoted to the good of others, is so 
prompted by impulses of pity, love, benevolence, 
or other sense main-spring. However, on getting a 
spare moment from one's self so as to look abroad 
on others, our attention is firstly and mainly inter- 
ested in the sense experiences of others. In a ro- 
mance, for instance, the sense experience of a beg- 
gar is far more attractive, than the intellectual 
experience of any philosopher, or the political ex- 
perience of any king. 

There are no legitimate exceptions to this nota- 
ble fact. In every day experience, in history, in 
biography, in literature, in the beauties of art, in 
the pulpit, on the stage, in the Bible, in a romance, 
in the newspaper, in common gossip — in all and ev- 
erywhere, we look for and are never deeply inter- 
ested except in exhibitions of sensibility. No mat- 



TEE SELF AN IMPERSOMATION OF SENSIBILITY 75 

ter what its phase: whether beautiful or ugly, vir- 
tuous or vicious, exalting or degrading, sublime or 
monstrous, it always fixes every eye. 

But why so fascinating? Why such a wonder 
worker — such a universal champion, fixing the at- 
tention of every eye and bearing away the garland 
from all the great games of human experience, un- 
less it be the veritable Self in person? 

A still more decisive fact is this : "All that a 
man hath, will he give for his life." Not what he 
is, but what he hath; not himself, but his posses- 
sions, that he will give for his life. This is plainly 
undeniable; but does not yet reach the question. A 
man will not only give all his possessions for his 
life, but turning about, will even give life itself 
for something still more precious. What is that 
other and still more precious something? 

History is a great ware-house full of practical facts, 
bearing on the question. According to these, after 
giving all physical treasures for his life, a man 
will then, in turn, give life itself for certain heart 
treasures or principles; that is, his loves, hopes, 
fears, dislikes, and other like sense qualities. For 
the sake of these latter, millions have given up 
life ; but no man ever willingly died for anything 
else. Least of all, did any man ever die for his 
intellectual treasures: not even Galileo. 

Of course, any trifle may sometimes be the means 



j6 the selg: what is it? 

of first arousing and calling forth sense, to a death 
conflict; but in such case, it is the exasperated 
sense fighting for its own integrity, and not for 
the trifle which happened first to call it out. 

It is not extravagant to say, that every man of 
normal character will sacrifice his life for love,, 
honor, or other like sense interest. On the battle- 
field, most men will sacrifice life on the score of 
patriotism, sooner than be called cowards. Evert 
the thief and debauchee will sacrifice life in obedi- 
ence to some one or other sense prompting. 

It may often be hard to find a man's pet sense — 
his heart treasure. But keep up the pursuit; by 
and by he will retreat to it ; and right there by that 
treasure, he will die, and die hard too. This heart 
or sense element of human character, for which 
men are willing to sacrifice life and everything else, 
must contain the Self. 

Distinct from, yet close akin to this, is the other 
notable fact, that we are always ready to exchange 
possessions with others, when a good bargain is to 
be had. We not only exchange lands and houses, 
but if possible, would even exchange health, beauty, 
body — nay, even intelligence itself, if sure of a good 
bargain in the exchange. On the other hand, no 
beggar in the world would exchange heart treas- 
ures with a king. Indeed, to forfeit one's hopes, 
loves, dislikes, etc., would be to forfeit personal 



THE SELF AN IMPERSONATION OF SENSIBILITY 77 

identity; it would amount to no less than annihi- 
lation. 

This is enough in the way of empirical facts. 
That which we will not sell, nor exchange for any- 
thing else; that for which we will sacrifice every- 
thing, including even physical life, must be the 
veritable Self; and which as here seen, is not a 
physical, nor intellectual but a sensitive or feeling 
something. 

By the way, what better proof can be wanted for 
human immortality? If this life be the all of us, 
how could instinct thus take us by the hair of the 
head and constrain us to sacrifice this all, unless 
there be a future life? Such constraint otherwise, 
would be strange and unnatural to an extreme 
degree. 

Truly, the Self is a heroic traveler, bent on a 
long journey. Its invincible instinct in thus scorn- 
ing death in certain perils is plainly a sort of inborn 
gravity which draws it to a higher and more per- 
manent centre. Alas! for a death-loving material- 
ism, which would fain balk a destiny so sublime. 



CHAPTER VII. 

INFERENCES AND OBJECTIONS SUGGESTED BY PART I- 

This book is presented as an analysis of mind; not 
in its details, but in its fundamental aspects. With 
this view, it was taken in its totality at the start 
and divided into two chief spheres — sensibility and 
intelligence. Sensibility was assumed to be the 
basic or essential element; and hereupon, cause, 
end, responsibility, intelligence and selfhood were 
affirmed to be predicable of sense only. The first 
— sense causality, of necessity includes the four 
remaining propositions. It was seen that the truth 
of this first and all-inclusive one, is among the 
clearest, most vital, and most certain demonstra- 
tions, that the mind is capable of making; and. 
hence, that the four subsequent ones — as implica- 
tions of the first, are equally true. 

Instead then of worrying with inadvertencies or 
minor mistakes occurring along the way, the short- 
est cut for the materialist will be, to assail sense: 
causality. Let him disprove this first proposition, 
and therewith the whole book falls dead. But 
should sense causality still stand invincible desp : f~- 

78 



INFERENCES AND OBJECTIONS 79 

his assaults, then likewise will the drift of this, 
as also that of Part II, stand as unanswerable dis- 
proof of all his empty theories. 

Inferences. Among many inferences to be drawn 
from Part I, one at least must be noted, because of 
its great practical import. It is this: If sense be 
the causal and responsible element of mind, then 
intelligence as a mere passive instrument, cannot 
make man better in moral respects; yet, the com- 
mon assumption is, that men are morally better, 
in proportion to their intelligence. This is plainly 
a most frightful error. 

In the hands of an already good man, intelligence 
is a great instrument for good; but in the hands 
of a bad man it is equally powerful for harm, and 
thus cancels itself as a moral instrument. It needs 
no proof that intelligence is just as ready, and just 
as willing a tool for the highwayman, as for the 
good man ; and hence, is positively a moral neu- 
ter. 

Doubtless, moral instruction, backed by example, 
sympathy, and other such influences, may conduce 
to moral results; but purely secular instruction as 
distinguished from the other, can in no sense do 
so. As respects moral results, intelligence is al- 
ways, either an advantage or disadvantage, accord- 
ing to the antecedent moral conditions in the given 
case. 



8o the self: what is it? 

What is true of individuals, is equally true of 
nations; though statesmen leading on the mass, 
ever cry aloud for more education and more money 
as the two most vital factors of both individual 
and national prosperity. 

All illustrious nations of the present and past, 
primarily started out in comparative poverty and 
ignorance; yet, despite these drawbacks to their in- 
fancy, finally reached the summit. How? Certain- 
ly not by the aid of either money or culture, both 
of which were lacking at the very nick of time. 

Besides, if money and culture be the two vital 
factors of prosperity, then a nation being once so 
endowed, ought therewith to become perpetual. 
But the truth is, precisely the contrary, insomuch, 
that nations never fall into ruin, except when pre- 
cisely at the zenith of culture and wealth. 

Without exception, history shows that a manly, 
heroic sensibility, is the only founder and builder 
of nations; while a subsequently demoralized and 
corrupt sensibility is the only destroyer. Meanwhile 
and through all, culture and money are but tools at 
the most; and strangely enough, though never con- 
spicuous tools in the founding of a nation, they are 
always the most efficient tools in pulling it down. 

No infatuation of our times is so subtle, so rap- 
idly growing or of such frightful promise, as that 
sheer education, backed by the modern press and 



INFERENCES AND OBJECTIONS 8 1 

school system, insures our future prosperity beyond 
all peradventure. This too, in the teeth of the 
plain fact, that all the culture and money of the 
world combined, cannot make one virtuous man. 

But there is no demand for virtuous men. Never- 
theless, to turn loose a man without virtue, no mat- 
ter how highly endowed with money and culture, 
is much the same with turning loose a madman to 
run at large with a fire brand. If every American 
citizen were a Solomon in knowledge and a Crcesus 
in wealth, yet lacking in common honesty, we would 
rush pell-mell to ruin, as certainly as water runs 
down stream. 

If we must have culture and wealth, then we 
must; but because of our exploits in these two re- 
spects, neither truth nor decency will allow us to 
claim, that we have done our whole duty, leaving 
nothing else to do. 

First objection. Several journals in noticing the 
first edition of this book, asked by way of criticism: 
"What is the Self after all? The author has left 
us in the dark." 

Said journals failed to note the fact, that the Self 
had been taken bodily out of the sphere of intelli- 
gence, and put into that of Sensibility, contrary to 
all previously implied opinion on the subject; and 
hence, instead of severe censure for such revolu- 
tionary procedure, the author was quite surprised 
to hear: What is the Self after all? 



82 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

However, it was shown in that, as well as in this, 
that the Self consists essentially of sense, with 
cause, end, and responsibility as its most character- 
istic traits; that responsibility- as the highest of 
the three by its implication of moral quality, points 
directly to the moral sense as the legitimate head 
of the Self; but that, by way of a possibility for 
moral free agency, the moral sense may be dethroned 
by a stronger sense ; which latter, usurping the 
crown and scepter of the former, therewith person- 
ates the supreme authority or Self for the time. 

What more? We cannot draw forth the Self, 
and measure it with a tape line. Until we can, 
perhaps the most definitive, yet concise and ample 
definition possible, is to call it that which happens 
to be the ruling sense in the given case, and at the 
given time. 

Many will deny this; yet all admit it from some 
one or other standpoint. It is a common sense max- 
im for example, that a man is just precisely what 
his ruling sense may be. Again, desiring to exalt 
or degrade a man to the utmost degree, we sum up 
his merits or demerits in that one word, which rep- 
resents his ruling sense; and to know which, we 
already know the man in advance, without seeing 
him. The words patriot, saint, tyrant, thief, etc , 
present the man in a nut shell, and often with more 
precision, than can be got from an average biogra- 



INFERENCES AND OBJECTIONS 83 

phy. Note too, the words patriot, saint, and tyrant 
give no hint as to the man's body or intelligence: 
these two latter are wholly ignored in the make-up 
of the man or Self. 

But the trouble in this matter, is the same as 
that already seen from another standpoint, and con- 
sists chiefly in not seeing ourselves as others see 
us. To find the Self of another, we go straight to 
sense — to his ruling sense, and thus beard the lion in 
his den. But to find one's own Self, is quite another, 
thing. Indeed, such information is not in much-, 
demand; and even when it is, it is much easier 
and more agreeable, to see one's Self afar off and 
high up — a sort of intellectual dignitary, than as a< 
plain, every-day sense; and which perhaps withal, 
has no fine parts worth boasting about. We forget, 
however, that this smart way of deceiving ourselves, 
never deceives any body else. 

As another objection, the book so far, says one, 
is a system of pure sensualism, in which brute 
sense is extolled at the expense of intelligence. 

This class of objectors are apt to be profuse in 
the phrases, brute sense, animal appetites, and the 
like, little thinking at the time, that they hereby 
tacitly yield the very point in question. For plainly, 
such berating of sense, tacitly assumes it to be the 
causal and responsible element of mind ; else, it is 
quite silly and unjust to censure it so sharply. 



Sa. the self: what is it? 

It is also forgotten, that the dumb brute is here- 
by and meanwhile most shamefully slandered. Hav- 
ing no moral sense, the brute is irresponsible ; yet 
by associating human sense and brute appetite as 
one, man and brute are put on the same moral 
level: whereas, a vicious man is far below the ir- 
responsible brute. 

Of course, human sense is bad enough; it is ever 
ready to stray off into wrong paths; and being left 
to go free, is not apt to stop short Of the lowest 
degradation. But otherwise what would be the 
result? Without real or possible degradation, there 
could be no exaltation ; without darkness, no light. 
In truth, a manly control of viciously inclined sense, 
is the very ladder whereby man mounts to his high- 
est honor and happiness. 

By curbing vicious senses, and conforming them 
to the rules of moral honesty, there comes into ex- 
istence that beautiul something, called "the noblest 
work of God." By subjecting self interest to the 
demands of patriotism, the world was honored by 
a Leonidas. So that, without these same viciously 
inclined senses, there could have been no "noblest 
work of God," no Leonidas, no Socrates to thrill 
the world's heart with manly pride. 

Without these senses indeed, we could have had 
no existence at all, either good or bad. And with- 
out them, pray what would even heaven be, though 



INFERENCES AND OBJECTIONS 85 

lighted up with intelligence to the highest blaze? 
No more than a banquet hall, fully adorned and 
lighted up, yet without any guests to enjoy the 
light and beauty. 

This question has two sides then. On the one 
side, though sense is by no means a faultless angel; 
yet on the other, it is the only ladder whereby men 
can mount to essential dignity and happiness. 

Instead of two sides, it is perhaps more fitting 
to say, sense has two possible states or phases: 
one, of the lowest degradation; the other, of the 
highest exaltation. Human language is not able 
to picture either phase, when at its fullest. Milton's 
Satan may in some sort symbolize the phase of 
degradation; while Prometheus mounting up in 
quest of the heavenly fire, will give a glimpse of 
the other. These two phases being conjoined to 
represent the full possibilities of sense, present us 
the image of a very demi-god; standing flat-footed 
in the lowest hell, it is yet able to reach up and 
touch the highest heaven. What folly then, to talk 
of setting up a will-o'-the-wisp intellect, as ruler 
over such a demi-god? 



PART II. 

INTELLIGENCE. 

CHAPTER I. 

THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION AND THEIR CORRE- 
SPONDING OBJECTS. 

Allowing such a thing as intelligible truth, then 
intelligence, as the standard of such truth, must be 
allowed to be truthful also. Yet despite its truth- 
fulness, it abounds throughout with contradiction. 
But how can it be true, and yet contradictor)^? 
This is the one chief problem of intellectual phi- 
losophy. Its solution — the proper explanation of 
contradiction, will prove both an analysis of intelli- 
gence, and an exposure of the false element here 
indicated. 

Evidently, if intelligence be both truthful and 
self-controlling, it could not be false The solution 
is impossible, except on the assumption, that while 
truthful per se, it is yet passive; and like all passive 
instruments, may be misused or perverted by some 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION bj 

superior power. On the other hand, it is a univer- 
sally recognized fact, that sense is the causal and 
responsible element of mind ; and which at once 
points out sense as the only power which could so 
pervert a truthful and passive intelligence. In 
other words, sense causality with its implications, 
is the one universal principle for explaining all 
contradiction and sophistry. 

Hence, an analysis of sense as the basic element 
of mind, must of logical necessity precede that of 
intelligence; indeed, an attempted analysis of the 
latter, is simply absurd without the former. 
Throughout the present inquiry then, a constant 
eye must be kept on sense causality as the only 
means for distinguishing between the legitimate 
activities of intelligence on the one hand, and its 
disturbed activities on the other; which latter are 
but the perturbations caused by an over-ruling 
sense, and result in contradiction. 

The inquiry of course must begin with elemen- 
tary principles. But such inquiries lead into diffi- 
cult abstractions. In order to avoid and mitigate 
such abstractions, as much as can be, it is well to 
use illustration whenever possible. Accordingly, 
as the very first step of the inquiry, an illustration 
will aid us in finding out precisely what it is, that 
we wish to find out. 

To illustration then. The sun rises and sets; the 



88 the self: what is it? 

sun does not rise and set. Here is a positive con- 
tradiction. It is no dispute between ignorance and 
culture as often assumed; instead, it is a dispute 
between two distinct intelligent agents, looking 
form one and the same mind, though doubtless look- 
ing from different standpoints of said mind. One 
asserts, and truthfully too, from his standpoint, that 
the sun rises and sets; the other with equal truth 
from his standpoint, asserts precisely the contrary. 

Besides admitting two distinct agents, looking 
from different standpoints, it may also be admitted, 
that each one has functions peculiar to itself. Still 
the contradiction remains, despite the evident hon- 
esty and truthfulness of each. 

The first clew to the trouble, respects the object 
looked at. True enough, the issue is one and sim- 
ple — about the rising and setting of the sun; but 
the objects looked at are wholly different. One 
looks at the apparent relations of sun and earth; the 
other, at the total, unit motion of the entire solar 
system: one looks at a part — a material part; the 
other at an immaterial whole. 

Neither does this fully mend the matter: the 
contradiction still remains. Yet it points out the 
last and only possible alternative: for allowing the. 
truthfulness of both agents, it follows of necessity, 
that one or the other of the two, is wholly incom- 
petent to the question. One or the other is out of 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION 89 

its legitimate sphere, and incompetent to the prob- 
lem, relatively either to function, or object, or 
both; somewhat as the ear would be incompetent 
relatively to color. 

What then is the precise difference between the 
respective functions and objects of these two in- 
telligent agents? A correct answer to this, includ- 
ing sense causality and its implications, will be a 
full answer to the present inquiry: that is, it will 
not only reconcile this contradiction, but all others; 
and in so doing, will amount to a joint analysis of 
intelligence and materialism, in fundamental re- 
spects at least. 

The outlines of all this, though perhaps dim, will 
be given in this one chapter. A concise and hasty 
procedure is thought best, in order to avoid the fa- 
tigue and disgust, which might otherwise attend an 
inquiry so dry and difficult. A glimpse ever so dim, 
of the outlines in this chapter will, however, grow 
clearer at every forward step. Indeed, everything 
after this chapter, is simply intended to elaborate, 
illustrate, confirm, and familiarize the hasty out- 
lines now to be presented. The problem plainly 
presents two essential elements: the intelligences 
which look, and the objects looked at. That is, (i) 
the powers of cognition: and (2), the objects of cog- 
nition. 

(I.) The Powers of Cognition. 

Our solar illustration clearly points out two dis- 



9 o 



the self: what is it? 



tinct species of intelligence, or cognitive powers. 
This needs no proof. Philosophical as well as com- 
mon sense usage both, implicitly at least, recognize 
two species of cognition. They are variously called 
understanding and reason, dogmatical and demon- 
strative, discursive and intuitive, lower and higher 
intelligence, and so on. Few words are so variously 
and vaguely employed, as the words understanding 
and reason. On this and other accounts needless 
to give, let us adopt the two words discursive and 
intuitive to represent the two species of cognition. 

So then, the analysis begins by dividing total in- 
telligence into two grand species, to be called dis- 
cursive and intuitive. Note well, the words discur- 
sive and intuitive are not employed to represent in- 
dividual faculties, but the two general phases of 
cognition. The discursive phase consists of the five 
senses, which latter act only on physical objects by 
means of physical organs; while the intuitive phase 
consists of all the other senses, which act only on 
immaterial objects without the aid of physical 
organs. 

In a former chapter was pointed out the ground- 
less inconsistency of assuming all the senses to be 
blind, except the five. It will suffice just here to 
say in addition, that the greater and by far most 
vital part of human knowledge, is forever beyond 
the reach of five sense perception: for example, 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION gi 

beauty, justice, equity, etc., and on which are 
grounded our most vital interests. The five senses 
are positively blind to all these higher objects. 
Nay, have we not just seen, that five-sense percep- 
tion is not only stone-blind respecting the true so- 
lar theory, but, positively denies it to the bitter end? 

Then, whence our knowledge of these and other 
like immaterial objects? All knowledge must come 
in one of three ways: either, it must be innate or 
inspirational — both of which the materialist denies; 
else, it must come through some perceptive sense 
corresponding to the given object. Hence, all the 
other senses, as well as the five, must be percep- 
tive; for otherwise, we cannot account for a knowl- 
edge of immaterial objects 

Then returning, cognition is of two chief species: 
the discursive, which acts on physical objects by 
the aid of physical organs; and the intuitive, which 
acts pn immaterial objects without the aid of phys- 
ical organs. These distinctions are sharp, plain, 
and natural withal. 

But do discursive and intuitive differ in no other 
respects? Most certainly. Their material and im- 
material objects differ so widely as to require cor- 
respondingly differing functions. That is, discursive 
cognition operates by means of comparison or meas- 
urement; while the intuitive, by means of contrast 
only. 



Q2 



the self: what is it? 



What is the difference between comparison and 
contrast? None at all, according to some writers, 
who hold that comparison is a universal process 
dominating all cognitive activity. But no matter 
about such vagaries. To avoid delay and abstrac- 
tions, it is enough to say just here, that comparison 
and contrast differ about as much as the two pro- 
cesses — measuring differences and perceiving differ- 
ences. This again may seem quite trifling; yet it 
will prove one of the most vital points of the inquiry. 

For example, the bodies of two men may differ 
in height, weight, etc., and such difference may be 
compared or measured to the least fraction. The 
minds of the same two men may also differ very 
greatly, but this latter can never be measured : it 
can only be perceived by contrast. 

No matter about the original meaning of com- 
parison and contrast. As herein used, comparison 
always implies measuring differences ; while contrast 
implies perceiving differences; and which distinc- 
tion simply means to say in plain English, that the 
objects of the one are measurable, those of ths 
other are not. This again simply points out the 
distinction between mind and matter, which latter 
is the vital point, not the definition of comparison 
and contrast: select any other two words you may 
choose in their stead, so that the vital point is kept 
in view. 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION 93 

Now again, discursive cognition acts through phy- 
sical organs, on physical objects, by means of com- 
parison; while the intuitive acts on immaterial ob- 
jects, without physical organs, by means of contrast 
only. 

Of course it is assumed, that the individual facul- 
ties constituting discursive and intuitive cognition, 
are each endowed with reason, memory, etc. Still 
other traits, obvious to the reader, may be omitted. 
The above sketch gives all the characteristic traits 
of the two cognitions, needed thus far. 

The eye cannot hear, nor can the ear see. Each 
is restricted to and stays in its own sphere; and 
hence, they never collide. But not so with the two 
cognitive powers. The discursive especially, which 
can only act on physical objects by a measuring 
comparison, is constantly attempting immaterial ob 
jects, which are wholly beyond its reach. Such 
meddling with things out of its own sphere, gives 
a glimpse of how disorder and contradiction may 
and constantly do occur. 

(II.) The Objects of Cognition. 

Take either side you may— materialism or ideal- 
ism, and in either event, mind and matter must 
sustain a relation much the same with that between 
cause and effect; and in either event also, the two 
must correspond to a notable degree. 

This is well illustrated by the categories of those 



94 



the self: what is it? 



two famous men, Kant and Aristotle. Starting from 
mind, Kant gives the categories of cognition; while 
starting from matter, Aristotle gives those of the 
objects of cognition. Yet, though starting from op- 
posite poles, their results concurred much as the 
hand concurs with its glove. 

This simply shows, that, in order to be cogniza- 
ble, objects must be adapted to the cognitive power; 
must come within the scope of said power, just as 
color must do for instance, in order to be a suita- 
ble object for vision. 

Being true in special, it must be equally true in 
general respects. Hence, the necessary inference^ 
that all cognizable objects must be divided into 
two great classes, corresponding with the func- 
tions of the two cognitive powers, discursive 
and intuitive. That is, inasmuch as all cognition 
proceeds either by comparison or contrast, even, 
so, all cognizable objects must be either compara- 
ble or contrastable. 

This is but saying again, that all objects must 
come into one or the other of the two categories 
mind or matter; for as a positive fact, matter and 
all its implications are comparable to a fraction; 
while those of mind are precisely the contrary; they 
can only be contrasted, not measured. 

It is an astonishing assumption then, that mind 
and matter are identical. Is human intelligence a 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION 95 

valid authority on the question? But though intel- 
ligence can measure the physical world, yet it can- 
not measure one whit of itself, nor indeed any one 
of its least implications. This distinction between 
mind and matter is plainly an impassable gulf, 
which intelligence can not deny, without denying 
its own innate constitution. 

Here we come to the chief trouble of the inquiry: 
here, we get down to the germinal elements of cog- 
nition: and here, the author feels powerless. Not 
powerless to point out and maintain the distinction 
between mind and matter, but to sufficiently em- 
phasize the fact, that this distinction in its fullness 
is the first and most inexorable condition of valid 
cognition. The elementary character of the question, 
being as it is at the very root of cognition, escapes 
scrutiny by virtue of its simplicity. 

Thus, all cognition and all knowledge — as abstrac- 
tions apart from their content, are no more than a 
series of distinctions. Excepting the power to 
perceive in its primary sense, cognition begins, con- 
tinues and ends in making distinctions. To this 
end, discursive and intuitive cognition are endowed 
with comparison and contrast, for the specific pur- 
pose of making distinctions: and in harmony here 
with, all cognizable objects are either comparable 
or contestable.. 

Plainly then, this great distinction between com- 



96 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

parison and contrast as cognitive functions, and be- 
tween comparable and contrastable as correspond- 
ing traits of cognizable objects, is the first, the cen- 
tral, the parent of all distinctions. The total ma- 
chinery of cognition is constructed in accordance 
with this great distinction. In other words, our 
present economy of cognition is what it is, by vir- 
tue of conformity with this distinction, and could 
not exist without it. 

This amounts to saying firstly, without distinc- 
tions between objects, all individual things would 
melt into oneness or chaos, and secondly, since dis- 
tinctions are so vital, there must be some first, cen- 
tral, equatorial distinction, as a standard for all 
other distinctions. Accordingly we here have a 
great distinction girdling the entire sphere of cog- 
nition: comparative and contrastive as respects 
cognitive powers: and a corresponding comparable 
and contrastable as respects cognizable objects, the 
latter being illustrated by the broad, deep and nat- 
ural distinction between matter and mind. 

It is the latter which causes the trouble com- 
plained of. That is, though as respects cognitive 
processes, we in some sort conform to the great 
distinction: yet in respect of objects — in respect of 
the difference between mind and matter, the dis- 
tinction is so plain and broad, as Jo seem too trite 
for notice; and we hence become incapable of fully 



THO TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION 97 

seeing its vast import. Yet, this indifference, or 
indolence, or whatever it may be called, is precisely 
the gap by which materialism enters and does its 
fatal mischief. 

By carelessly neglecting the distinction between 
mind and matter; or which is the same, by con- 
founding mind and matter or their least implica- 
tions, matter is often unwittingly put in the place 
of mind, symbolizes mind: and by illusion being 
mistaken for mind, it presently supercedes — contra- 
dicts mind. Though quite vague and general, this 
is the gap through which all contradiction, sophis- 
try, and falsehood come into existence. 

Of course this will be denied, at least by those 
who have not seriously examined the question. 
Yet it will be quite plain with a little pains-taking 
interest and attention. As a first step toward a 
clearer and more definite view, let us see the impli- 
cations of the words comparable and contrastable, 
as the traits of matter and mind. 

Whatever is comparable or measurable, must 
have extent — must have extensive quantity. Hav- 
ing extent, it must be divisible; being divisible, it 
must have parts: and having divisible parts, it 
must be perishable. 

On the other hand and precisely to the contrary, 
a contrastable or incomparable object in having no 
extent, can only have intensive quantity. Being in- 



g8 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

tensive as respects quantity, it must be indivisible; 
being indivisible, it must be a unit: and being a 
unit, it must he imperishable. 

To certain minds these implications are self-evi- 
dent. To others they may not be; but such others 
will not Tiave patience to enter into their deduction. 
The delay and fatigue in showing them up was the 
chief cause of failure in this part of the first edi- 
tion. They must be left to speak for themselves. 
They will be realized as true, little by little, at 
least to such as may have sufficient interest to study 
them closely. 

But the point to be noted here, is this: Contra- 
diction, sophistry, etc., do not often result from 
confounding mind and matter in a wholesale way; 
but rather, from confounding their implications; 
insomuch, generally speaking, the more remote the 
implication, the more subtle is the contradiction. 
But this cannot be understood, without illustration. 

The conception infinite for instance, is deduced 
from the endless extent and divisibility of matter 
or its implications — time and space. Though this 
word infinite is not specified in the above list, it is 
clearly implied in the conception divisible, and 
divisible is implied in extensive quantity, while 
this last is predicable of matter. 

Now then to apply this word infinite to God, tac 
itly puts God in the category of matter; insomuch, 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION 99 

that any debate in which this is done, necessarily 
leads to confusion and contradiction. Indeed, as- 
suming God to be infinite, it is easy to disprove 
both his personality and existence. 

To conceive of God extensively as we do of end- 
less space, He vanishes into nothingness; whereas, 
to conceive of Him intensively as we do of mind, 
He instantly comes back; comes back distinctly to 
view, as the great Absolute Mind, as the prime 
Cause and Father of all things; this too, with as 
much distinctness as we can conceive of a human, 
mind. 

But mark, infinite is only an implication of the* 
implication divisible; and if so remote a predicate 
of matter as this, yet suffices to challenge the per- 
sonality and existence of God, of course a common 
habit of carelessly confounding the predicates of 
mind and mater, can but result in endless sophis- 
tries and contradictions. 

But have patience. This point is the trouble 
hinted at above, as indeed of the whole chapter; 
not the trouble of seeing a distinction between mind 
and matter, but to be sufficiently impressed with 
the imperious necessity of keeping the distinction 
between the predicates of the two, as clear as a 
sun-beam in all our inquiries. Otherwise, we re- 
main dupes of illusion and sophistry; otherwise 
indeed, intelligence itself becomes a very will-o'- 



IOO THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

the-wisp for leading us into hopeless darkness. 

Thus again, it will be seen a little later, that a 
very trifling illusion, which results from confound- 
ing mind and matter, suffices to completely reverse 
the principle of cause and effect. To reverse this 
compass-needle of thought, of course turns the 
whole machinery of intelligence wrong-end fore- 
most; so that, instead of the natural order, we now 
see causes result from effects, and wholes from parts. 

Now this very tricky has ever been the very strong- 
hold of materialism. Here precisely was born its 
one and all-inclusive idea: viz., Growth. That is, 
growth by means of adding atom to atom and part 
to part, whereby presently results a cause or whole 
as the effect of such combination. In precise ac- 
cord herewith, is the old atomic theory, which 
makes atoms the cause of the universe; and also 
the same though later doctrine of evolution, which 
makes the human mind a mere effect, resulting 
from the combination of chips and whetstones as 
the cause. 

Yet, in the face of this wholesale'outrage to log- 
ic, common sense, and common decency, we stand 
bewildered and unable to make any direct reply, 
without the distinction in question; for without 
this distinction, we cannot detect the illusion where- 
by the causal principle is so reversed and intelli- 
ge ice so turned wrong-end foremost. 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION IOI 

Of course it is done by confounding mind and 
matter. Mind is assumed — perhaps unconsciously 
by some remote implication, to be an extensive and 
divisible thing: and hence, may grow like a sand- 
bank by the addition of atom to atom. But the 
special illusion in the case will be examined very 
soon. This reference to a reversed causality and the 
subtle deception of the word infinite, are simply 
noted in order to show the frightful havoc which 
results from confounding the implications of mind 
and matter. 

Or let it be roundly stated thus: Despite sense 
causality, and despite the pervertibility of intelli- 
gence, contradiction and sophistry would still be 
positively impossible, without illusion; while illu- 
sion in turn, would be equally impossible, without 
the confounding of mind and matter, or their im- 
plications. To make no mistake then, it is well to 
see these implications again side by side, thus: 

Comparable, Extensive, Divisible, Partial, Perish- 
able. Incomparable, Intensive, Indivisible, Unified, Im- 
perishable. 

If vagueness should attach to any term of either 
series, you have but to contrast it with the corre- 
sponding term of the opposite series. The root con- 
ceptions, comparable and incomparable, being direct 
opposites, each successive term must of logical ne- 
cessity be the direct opposite of its correspondent 



102 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

in the other series. To remember either series or 
any term of either, only requires to think of its op- 
posite. Any one suffices to recall the whole; so 
that, no effort of memory is necessary in the case. 

Though nature has made a distinction between 
mind and matter, as plain and broad as the milky 
way, yet many men — notably materialists, do riot 
see it. Standing in the midst of this broad and 
sun-lit highway, they ever cry aloud: Here, is a 
seeming way to be sure; but it is a blind way, 
neither pointing nor leading any whither: Alas! I 
am lost! I am an agnostic! 

But the distinction with its implications, gives a 
reason for itself: viz., Matter is measurable and Mind 
is not. This capacity and incapacity to be measured 
or compared, may be thought a very trite reason 
for the distinction, yet it is the very rock on 
which the present economy of cognition is grounded. 
That is, without comparison and contrast as cogni- 
tive powers; and without the corresponding compar- 
able and incomparable traits of cognizable objects, 
there could be no distinctions beween objects; and 
without distinctions, no cognition. So that, an 
intelligence which denies a radical distinction be- 
tween mind and matter, denies the very rock 
whereon itself is builded; it is a self-repudiating 
intelligence, quite as amazing, as it is suicidal and 
contradictory. 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION - I03 

It may be stated as a last note under this head, 
that matter, with time and space as its implications, 
constitutes the total realm of measurable objects. 
These and their modifications can be measured in 
mass or in parts, and differences in any case can 
be got to the last fraction. 

Precisely to the contrary on the other hand, mind 
with its predicates, constitutes the incomparable 
realm. Its predicates are life, sense, intelligence, 
all principles, powers, essences, or whatever else per- 
tains to immaterial existence. Of course, this in- 
cludes God, angels, devils, soul, spirit, and all 
other immaterial things, whether real or imaginary. 

Nothing in this realm is measurable. Compare 
mind with matter for instance, in respect of weight, 
bulk, or otherwise. Compare one man's mind with 
another. Compare sense with intelligence: pain 
with pleasure: virtue with vice: knowledge with 
ignorance, and so on. That is, in either instance, 
what, or how much of one, will be an equivalent 
of the other. Such attempt would be absurd; sim- 
ply because, being positive realities, they are just 
what they are, by virtue of being what they are, 
and not by comparison with other things. 

So much for the objects of cognition. Now, what 
have we as final results? First, a total cognation 
divided into two grand species, discursive and in- 
tuitive. The discursive, through physical organs, 



104 the self: what is it? 

acts on physical objects, by means of comparison. 
The intuitive, without such organs, acts on imma- 
terial objects, by means of contrast. Second, all 
cognizable objects divided into two grand classes 
— comparable and contrastable, corresponding pre- 
cisely with the two cognitive powers. 

This striking and general concurrence between 
the powers and the objects of cognition, is a sort 
of reciprocal certificate of each to the other; just 
as vision for instance, certifies to the reality of 
color, while color in turn certifies to the veracity" 
of vision. 

But this scheme — including sense causality, not 
only claims internal proof by virtue of its natural- 
ness, simplicity, and conformity to empirical facts;, 
but also claims external proof as well. That is, it 
claims to explain contradiction, and, in so doing, 
amounts to an analysis of intelligence and an ex- 
posure of materialism jointly. 

This second or external proof can only be got by 
applying the scheme to contradictions. Not to all 
contradictions — for they are simply endless, but to 
a sufficient number and variety of the chief ones, 
to show that all are of the same origin and explica- 
ble in the same way. This being done, we have a 
double proof; and which will amount to proving 
the ground of all proof. 

As a start toward testing the scheme in the seo 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION 105 

ond respect, we can now return to the solar contra- 
diction. 

The first thing in this, is to see the real point at 
issue. It is not about the physical elements of the 
solar system, but about its total motion. Now, 
though the effects of force on matter can be meas- 
ured, yet force itself cannot. It is hence intensive, 
unified, indivisible, etc., like other objects of this 
category. The intuitive cognition then, which 
alone can deal with such objects, is the only Co- 
pernicus capable of grappling the unit motion of 
the system. 

It is equally plain on the other hand, that the 
discursive which can act only by means of the five 
senses, and on matter, cannot reach the question. 
It can only see the physical elements of the sys- 
tem. Nay, it only looks at a part of said elements 
— the sun and earth; and this part, it can only 
judge of by means of a measuring comparison — a 
comparison between the apparent motion of the sun 
and the apparent fixed position of the earth. 

In short, the problem refers to a unified, indivis- 
ible object; and as such, is wholly within the in- 
tuitive sphere. For the same reason precisely, it 
is forever beyond a discursive tape-line, which can 
only apply to measurable things. 

The facts plainly amount to this: The intuitive 
is the only competent, the only legitimate witness 



106 the self: what is it? 

in the case. Meanwhile, the testimony of the dis- 
cursive, is both wholly irrelevant and wholly in- 
competent to the question. Indeed, it cannot be 
called testimony at all; so that, as a literal fact, 
there is no contradiction at all. It is only a seem- 
ing contradiction; and this seeming results from 
the gratuitous intrusion of an incompetent witness. 

This solution meets all the vital demands of the 
case. In the first place, the contradiction implies 
two distinct cognitive powers. To be distinct, 
said powers must have different functions; while 
such functions in turn would require different ob- 
jects. In accord herewith, we have on the one 
hand, (i) a measurable object — sun and earth; (2) 
physical organs for perceiving said object; and (3) 
comparison as the means for judging of the ob- 
ject. On the other hand, (4) an immaterial object — 
the unit motion of the system : (5) perceived 
without physical organs; and (6) judged of by 
means of contrast. 

These six characteristic features of the contradic- 
tion correspond precisely with those of the forego- 
ing scheme. Nor could a fuller and more definitive 
concurrence be required between an individual 
phenomenon on the one hand, and a general scheme 
on the other, whose vast scope includes such an 
endless number and variety of phenomena. Neither 
again can it be said, that the scheme was gotten 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION 107 

up for this special contradiction; for as will be 
seen, it is equally ample for all phases of contra- 
diction. 

Indeed, if any difference at all, other like phenom- 
ena come more nearly up to the full demands of 
the scheme, than the solar. The latter was select- 
ed, because, being so sharp and concrete, it was 
thought the most simple and intelligible to begin 
with. Still, it has one apparently serious defect 
which will be examined presently; and which be- 
ing done, will leave the solution full and complete. 
Meanwhile, no other solution is possible, unless it 
be at least radically the same with the above. 

CONCLUDING NOTES AND EXPLANATIONS. 

Perhaps a still clearer image of discursive and 
intuitive cognition, with their respective functions 
and corresponding objects, may be got by the re- 
spective functions and objects of the architect and 
carpenter. 

Thus, the architect begins, continues, and ends 
with the immaterial unit conception, house; from 
which he deduces his design, without the aid of 
either physical organs or measuring rod. Of course, 
the subsequent so called design, made with pencil 
or ink, is but a symbol of the real and original de- 
sign, which was a pure product of pure mind. 

The carpenter on the contrary, with physical or- 



108 the self: what is it? 

gans, acts on physical objects, by means of compar- 
ison— measuring rod. He begins and continues 
with parts; and though by a combination of parts, 
he finally reaches a total, yet his total is only a 
symbol: a symbol of the real and original house, 
constructed in the architect's mind. 

In other words, the intuitive with its peculiar 
functions and objects — as illustrated by the archi- 
tect and Copernicus, represents the immaterial 
phase of cognition; while the discursive with its 
functions and objects — as illustrated by the car- 
penter and the anti-Copernican doctrine, represents 
the material phase. But though two and distinct, 
they are not antagonistic, but complemental : they 
are both indispensable in view of our dual existence, 
and would not collide if left alone. Instead, they 
act in concert, each aiding the other, in man}' in- 
direct respects. 

However, by far the greater part of cognitive 
phenomena abounds in contradiction; and to ex- 
plain this, is a vital point of inquiry. Time and 
again it has been pointed out, that sense being the 
causal and responsible element of mind, presup- 
poses intelligence to be passive. Moreover, all in- 
quiry tacitly assumes intelligence to be truthful. 
But it cannot be both truthful and contradictory, 
except on the assumption, that being passive withal, 
it is pervertible, and can only be perverted by an 
over-ruling sense. 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION IO9 

But why would sense pervert intelligence? Why, 
it may be asked in reply, does every criminal per- 
vert intelligence in attempting to justify his crime? 
Here is the whole question in a nut-shell. Study 
this out thoroughly, and you understand all con- 
tradiction. 

But as a more direct answer to the question — 
why sense perverts intelligence, it may be replied 
that all wrong action can only be referred to wrong 
sense impulse or motive, and which latter points 
in turn to human depravity. Then again as noted 
Detore, depravity is essential to the mind's moral 
economy. That is, without it, man could not do 
right or wrong at option; without such power, he 
could not be a free agent, without free agency, he 
could not be responsible; and without the latter, 
he could not be a man. 

This amounts to saying, intelligence in being 
truthful, is of necessity passive, in order to be per- 
vertible ; and is pervertible, in order to allow full 
play to depravity and free agency, without which 
latter, the present moral economy would be void. 
Or thus, to be self-controlling and yet truthful, intel- 
ligence could not be made to lie, and hence free 
agency would be inoperative. 

So much for the zvhy sense perverts intellignce. 
Now let us see still more definitively, how it so 
perverts. Not so much by the powers, as by the 



no the self: what is it? 

objects of cognition. That is, firstly and negative- 
ly, sense does not literally change the relations or 
functions of discursive and intuitive, nor otherwise 
coerce either one in its essential activity. 

Instead, secondly and affirmatively, it employs 
the objects of cognition for its work; that is, by- 
means of the object, it deceives the discursive ; and 
by the deception, leads it to contradict the intu- 
itive. In being so led out of its own sphere, its. 
legitimate purpose is perverted; though such per- 
version results from deception, and v not from coer- 
cion. The deception more properly called illusion, 
results from symbolism; while symbolism in turn,, 
results from confounding mind and matter. 

That is, by confounding mind and matter, it of- 
ten happens that matter is put in the place of mind: 
it thus becomes a symbol of mind, and as a symbol, 
it presently, by illusion, passes for mind, and thus 
supercedes, contradicts mind. The letter of the 
law for instance, though but a symbol, yet as a 
symbol presently, by illusion, passes for or super- 
cedes the spirit of the law. 

A little later on, an entire chapter will be de- 
voted to the principle of symbolism. Suffice it 
just here, that symbolism in the first degree, is a 
necessity of our dual existence, and as such is harm- 
less; but on being too much emphasized, it results 
in illusion — the symbol is mistakn for the real, 
and thus supercedes or contradicts the real. 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION III 

Illusion so originating, deceives and misleads 
the discursive in one of two ways: (i) It either 
causes it to assume the given object of debate to 
be physical, when in truth it is not — as in the so- 
lar contradiction; else (2) it causes it to ascribe 
some physical predicate to the immaterial object, 
and thus tacitly put said object into the category 
of matter: as the word infinite for instance, tacitly 
puts God into the category of matter. Contradic- 
tion will inevitably result in either case. 

Now then, the confounding of matter and mind — 
symbol and real, whereby symbolism and illusion 
result, is the identical means in the hands of an 
over-ruling sense, by which it deceives and mis- 
leads the discursive to contradict the intuitive. All 
contradiction, sophistry, falsehood, or make-believe 
of whatever kind, occurs in this way. 

Morally considered, illusions are of two kinds: 
First, those which may be called natural and una- 
voidable — as the apparent rising and setting sun. 
But instances of this kind are too rare to be noted 
as exceptions to the general rule. Secondly, those 
which are purposely employed for deception : as 
those of any deceiver of whatever kind, who em- 
ploys an act, word, or other outward sign to sym- 
bolize the truth. Such symbol, though by illusion 
mistaken for the truth, is yet false — it contradicts 
the truth; and such contradictions can only be re- 



112 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

ferred to vicious sense; and which phase of sense, 
is materialism. 

Why is it called materialism? Because its char- 
acteristic trait is to materialize and degrade mind to 
a level with matter. In order to the latter, its 
tireless and sleepless endeavor is to cancel the dis- 
tinction between mind and matter; for as seen 
above, to accomplish this, would not only pull 
down the present economy of intelligence, but re- 
duce mind, God — every thing to a level with per- 
ishable matter. 

This is truly strange and contradictory; but not 
a whit more so, than vice itself. Materialism — 
vicious sense, in being vicious is opposed to virtu- 
ous sense; and hence deaf to intelligence only in 
so far as it can distort the latter in a way to con- 
tradict the former. Otherwise than this, no plaus- 
ible reason can be given for the labored and cun- 
ning sophistries, which have ever been employed 
to invalidate mind. It need not be replied that 
knowledge, truth, and other like things are the ob- 
jects in view: for all such things are clearly in- 
volved in, and must stand or fall with mind. 

It is objected that the solar contradiction results 
from a natural and unavoidable illusion; and hence, 
does not come fully up to the explanation of con- 
tradiction, as resulting from vicious tendency. This 
is the apparent defect hinted at above: and though 
apparent, it is not really so. 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION II3 

First, since all our frailties and abnormalities 
are referable to depravity, why may not the solar 
contradiction be likewise so referred; especially 
since it is explicable in the same way with others, 
which do result from vicious tendency? 

Moreover, the solar along with all other contra- 
dictions, is only possible by virtue of the provi- 
sion in our mental economy for the full play of de- 
pravity; and being thus a creature of said provision 
it cannot be referred otherwise than to vicious ten- 
dency or materialism as above explained. 

Besides, because a few illusions like the solar, 
are natural and literally unavoidable, is no excuse 
for the doctrine of an inexorable fate: no excuse 
ior following any illusion to the bitter end. The 
same provision whereby illusions come, also opens 
the way for moral free agency. Moral free agency 
presupposes a moral rule — a moral sense, as su- 
preme authority in human conduct. Guided by this, 
illusions are powerless; while without it, we be- 
come the fast followers of illusion. 

It must be remembered as final to this chapter 
that an intelligence at once truthful and contradic- 
tory is theoretically the first and greatest of con- 
tradictions. To explain this, we are necessitated 
to assume intelligence to be passive and pervertible: 
and being so, an over-ruling vicious sense is the 
only power that could pervert it. Hence, sense 



ii4 THE SELF: WHAT ls IT ? 

causality, though having many implications, may 
be called the one final, universal principle for ex- 
plaining contradiction; one, because it refers all 
to one and the same source, and explains them in 
one and the same way. 

This one principle presupposes some correlated 
and subservient scheme for its practical realization. 
The scheme of a discursive and intuitive cognition 
with their respective functions and objects, is a full 
response to said pre-supposition. Apart from such 
pre-supposition however, the scheme, by virute of 
its simplicity, naturalness, and conformity to em- 
pirical facts, stands sufficiently grounded upon its. 
own merits. 

Altogether, the view presented by these hasty out- 
lines, when fully realized, must simplify intelli- 
gence beyond all present conceptions. By explain- 
ing contradiction and sophistry, by dispelling a 
world of intellectual myths, by enticing the reader 
out to think for himself under the guidance of com- 
mon sense and empirical facts, this view must of 
necessity greatly simplify intelligence. 

And pray, why should intelligence itself not be in- 
telligible, since it is our only standard for judging, 
of other things? It is a slander against intelligence, 
that it can only be learned by a life-time study of 
owlish myths and pedantries. Plainly, if intelli- 
gence itself be not intelligible to common sense, it 



THE TWO SPECIES OF COGNITION II5 

is no fit standard for judging of other things. 
Of course, a multitude of other minor points still 
remain to be explained; but to do so just here, 
would tend to obscure the general and more vital 
outlines sketched above. With but a dim image of 
the outlines, most if not all minor details will grad- 
ually come out of themselves, as we proceed hence- 
forth — with more ease and leisure, to expand, ex- 
emplify, and confirm the general structure of the 
system, hastily sketched off above. 



CHAPTER II. 



OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS. 



At every crook and turn we are liable to be mis- 
led by illusions, either from without or within. 
But illusion and positive contradiction are two 
distinct things. Real contradictiori cannot be al- 
lowed without disgrace to intelligence. Vision for 
example, may often mislead, but cannot be posi- 
tively contradictory: for in such case, it would not 
be relied on as to this or that color, and which 
would amount to no vision at all. So likewise of 
all cognition. And though contradictions are only 
apparent, yet they must be seen as apparent, and 
not real; otherwise, their harmful influence will be 
all the same in leading to hopeless skepticism. 
Having a glimpse of the question in its first and 
more difficult aspects, we can now look at it with 
more ease and profit. 

The last chapter shows up cognitive powers and 
two corresponding classes of cognizable objects. 
The two powers — discursive and intuitive, are each 
restricted to its specific function; the discursive 
can only compare, but not contrast; the intuitive 

11G 



0THKR ILLUSTRATIONS II7 

can contrast, but not compare. Meanwhile, they 
are not restricted in respect of their objects. 

Though each has its own specific class of objects, 
yet turning away from these, each can meddle with 
objects beyond its own legitimate limits. To do 
this, the given object in any case must be falsely 
assumed to belong to the sphere of the one med- 
dling. The discursive for instance, in order to. 
reach an immaterial object, must falsely assume 
said object to be material; else assume it to possess 
some material trait, whereby it may be degraded 
to a material basis. Contrariwise, the intuitive 
must assume the given physical obiect to be imma- 
terial or to possess some immaterial trait. In 
either case, contradiction results from the meddling 
of the one with the objects of the other; yet without 
this possibility, there would be no room for sym- 
bolism, nor illusion, nor a consequent pervertible 
intelligence. 

In the last chapter, we glanced at several in- 
stances of discursive contradiction; and now in 
turn, it may be seen how the intuitive also causes 
contradiction by over-stepping its limits. A square 
inch of space for instance, is a measurable and ex- 
tensive quantity, divisible to infinity, and hence be- 
longs to the discursive sphere. Yet the intuitive 
may assume a square inch of space to be a definitive, 
unit quantity, and as such, to be intensive, indi- 
visible, etc., like an immaterial object. 



n8 the self: what is it? 

Here we have the contradiction of infinite and 
finite, in one and the same object. Looked at ex- 
tensively, a square inch is divisible and infinite; 
yet looked at intensively,it is a definitive, indivisible 
unit. Though positively contradictory, both asser- 
tions are positively true, according to the two 
standpoints. In this instance, the discursive is 
true, and the contradiction results from the incom- 
petency of the intuitive to handle physical objects; 
so that, as in the solar instance, there is really no 
contradiction at all. It is only a seeming one, 
caused by intuitive incompetency to the special 
question. It is needless to specify any other in- 
stance ; of course, an indefinite number of other like 
contradictions might occur, respecting any quan- 
tity or phase, of either matter, space, or time. 

It must be noted however, that though intuitive 
contradictions may be numerous and often quite per- 
plexing, they are yet harmless as contrasted with 
those of the discursive. The intuitive, by assuming 
matter to be endowed with mental properties, exalts 
matter; but not at the expense of mind. Whereas, 
the discursive, by assuming mind to be endowed 
with physical properties, materializes and degrades 
mind ; indeed, the tendency and final result is, to 
repudiate mind with all its implications. 

Hence, though the intuitive just like the discur- 
sive, causes contradiction by attempting improper 



OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS II9 

objects, yet its improprieties in this respect, have 
no moral and very little practical significance. It is 
noted here for its theoretical import only: that is, 
to show up the theoretical consistency and harmony 
of the foregoing exposition" respecting contradic- 
tion, as regards both the discursive and intuitive. 
By showing up the ground of all possible contra- 
diction, the said exposition not only fully vindicates 
the integrity of intelligence, but also fully exposes 
materialism. This latter, especially on account of 
its moral phase, has been — either consciously or 
unconsciously, the chief perplexity and burden of 
philosophy from the beginning. 

David Hume, more perhaps than the average 
thinker, was sorely perplexed by contradictions. 
He noted them in every question that caught his 
attention; but never attempted to reconcile them. 
Instead, his attempt was to exaggerate them; and 
which doubtless, largely accounts for his universal 
skepticism. 

Plato on the contrary, never seemed in the least 
annoyed or chafed by contradictions. At times in- 
deed, he employed them as playthings for amusing 
himself. In Parmenides for instance, he presents 
an indefinite number, extracted from the concep- 
tions, one and many, whole and parts, same and 
different, etc. And though he made no attempt 
to explain the ground of contradiction; yet, his 



120 . THE SELF! WHAT IS IT? 

direct and equable procedure through a host of 
riddles to the clear and final results of Parmenides, 
shows at least great practical dexterity in handling 
such things. 

But Kant perhaps has* written more about contra- 
diction, than any other noted author. The space 
so devoted first and last in the Critique, is greater 
than that of this entire volume. Yet, in justice to 
his great sagacity, as well as to the interests of 
truth, it must be said, he did not really study con- 
tradiction/^ se; but taking them for granted, very 
laboriously employed them as an instrument, 
for proving a certain favorite theory to be noted 
later on. 

Justice to truth also requires it to be said, that 
while Kant elsewhere and very often makes a sharp 
distinction between understanding and reason; yet 
on approaching the four great contradictions, which 
he called antinomies, he wholly ignores said dis- 
tinction: instead of two distinct cognitive powers, 
with differing functions, he has but one, which one 
he calls reason. As a both necessary and disastrous 
result, he was finally driven to assume, that reason 
is contradictory in itself; nay, that it is contradic- 
tory from the very necessity of its innate constitu- 
tion. 

He makes reason say with one breath: There is 
a God; and with the next: There is no God. Here- 



OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 121 

by, reason cancels itself; and hence, logically 
enough as Kant claimed, reason cannot prove the 
existence of God. On the same ground, he might 
have added, reason cannot prove any thing ; though 
he only held it to be contradictory respecting the 
four great antinomies as he called them. 

With such a start, it need not be said, that his 
solution was far darker than the contradictions 
themselves; nor would three volumes like this, 
suffice to explain his solutions with their incidental 
contradictions. Later on, however, we will see 
the cause, and can then better excuse his misad- 
ventures in the matter. 

The object now and here, is not to discuss Kant's 
treatment of the antinomies; but simply to test the 
truth of our own foregoing exposition of contradic- 
tion, by applying it to Kant's four antinomies; for 
being as he claims the four most difficult contradic- 
tions, they ought to suffice as a test, for any scheme 
of explanation. 

Let them be glanced at individually, and in the 
same order which Kant followed. The point to 
be watched in each case, is the undeniable manifes- 
tation of two distinct cognitive powers, with their 
respective functions and objects; each one true 
according to its standpoint, though positively con- 
tradictory; and, in short, watch for all the essen. 
tial phenomena manifested in the solar contradic- 



122 THE SELF: WHVT IS IT? 

tion. Space will not admit of Kant's elaborate 
presentation ; so, let each be taken as briefly as can 
be, but in its literal substance. 

First Antinomy. 

Thesis: The world had a beginning. 

Antithesis: The world had no beginning. 

Here is a positive contradiction; and according 
to our solution, it implies two distinct intelligences, 
endowed with differing functions, and looking at 
different objects. To see the two .intelligences — 
discursive and intuitive, with their respective func- 
tions and objects, let each one speak for itself; 
speak enough only, to indicate its functions and 
objects. 

Firstly, the discursive speaks: The world in- 
cludes matter, time, and space, any one of which is 
infinite: but if infinite in respect of time only, it 
must have existed always, and could not have had 
any beginning. 

To which the intuitive replies: The world, as 
consisting of matter, is an extensive quantity; and 
as such, is divisible, perishable, and dependent. 
Being dependent, it must depend upon some inde- 
pendent cause as its creator; and in having a crea- 
tor, it must have had a beginning. 
Second Antinomy. 

Thesis: There is an ultimate, simple substance. 



OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS I 23 

Antithesis: There is no ultimate simple substance. 

The discursive says: Every thing has extent, di- 
visibility, parts, etc. The universe and even God, 
are made up of parts, and hence there can be no 
ultimate simple substance. 

The intuitive replies: All immaterial objects are 
incomparable, intensive, indivisible, etc, and though 
having logical parts, can have no literally divisible 
parts: all such things are ultimate, and as such are 
simple substance. 

Third Antinomy. 

Thesis: There is such a thing as freedom. 

Antithesis: There is no such thing as freedom. 

The discursive says : Every thing that happens 
has a cause; and in being so influenced by some- 
thing exterior to itself,it is under laws of necessity: 
no such thing can be free. 

The intuitive replies: Besides material and per- 
ishable things, which are under laws of necessity, 
there are also immaterial powers, which act at op- 
tion — as illustrated in the conception responsibility 
for instance. These powers act in and for them- 
selves, not only controlling themselves, but to a 
certain extent, controlling dead matter, as well as 
the necessary laws which control dead matter. Such 
discretionary activity necessarily implies freedom. 



124 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT ? 

Fourth Antinomy. 

Thesis : There is a God, as prime cause of the 
universe. 

Antithesis: There is no God, as prime cause of 
the universe. 

The discursive says: (i) Matter, time, and space 
being infinite, had no beginning; and hence no 
need of God as a cause. Besides (2) since nothing 
can happen without a cause, there is no reason why 
God could exist without a cause. 

The intuitive replies: (1) The word infinite applies 
to divisible things; and at the most, but represents 
our inability to see an end to the divisibility of 
such things: it is a non-entity in itself, and as 
such, cannot hinder the existence of any thing, 
much less that of God. Besides (2) the same neces- 
sity which requires a cause for all causable things, 
with a still more rigorous necessity, requires an un- 
causable Cause for the origin and support of all 
causable and dependent things. Contingent causes 
and effects themselves would be void and meaning- 
less, without an uncausable Cause to first vitalize 
and start them into activity; fully as much, as would 
be a last without a first; or an ending without a 
beginning; or a stream, without a fountain. 

So much for the four antinomies. In essential 
respects they are plainly identical with the solar 



OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS I 25 

and all other contradictions. Like others they 
imply two distinct agents or cognitive powers. 
These latter being distinct, presuppose distinct 
functions; which distinct functions, presuppose 
distinct objects corresponding to each. This view 
is confirmed by the uniform and logically consistent 
procedure of each one through the several problems; 
for, though each is consistent and truthful from its 
standpoint, they are directly opposed in final re- 
sults. 

To be truthful, yet contradictory, is inexplicable 
except on the assumption of some mistake; some 
mistake respecting the object. One of the two has 
been misled by some mistake out of its legitimate 
sphere ; and being out, is incompetent to the special 
problem. The shortest way to find out the incom- 
petent intruder, is to find out the sphere to which 
the given problem belongs. 

The first one — beginning of the world, is not 
about the physical elements of the world, but about 
its beginning. That is, about the power which 
brought it into existence: was it by virtue of its 
own, or by some power exterior to itself? Now, 
power is an immaterial object, and as such belongs 
exclusively to the intuitive sphere. For the same 
reason, it is beyond discursive perception, which 
can only see material objects. Yet, the illusion 
of mistaking the symbol for the total and real — that 



126 the self: what is it? 

is, the physical elements, for the power which orig- 
inated the world, lured the discursive out of its 
sphere, just as in the solar contradiction. 

Precisely the same is true of the other three, 
simple substance, freedom and God. Simple sub- 
stance is the very opposite of divisible materiality. 
Freedom — the power to do or not to do at option, 
is predicable of mind only. While God is the very 
personification of mind or immateriality. Hence, 
each one belongs exclusively to the intuitive sphere. 
Yet, since each may be variously illustrated or sym- 
bolized by matter, the illusion of mistaking such 
symbol for the real object, lures the discursive to 
express its opinion on a purely immaterial ques- 
tion, and of course in opposition to the intuitive. 

In brief, being restricted to the five sense per- 
ceptions, the discursive is necessarily restricted 
to material objects; and hence, has neither ability 
nor right to an opinion on either of the four ques- 
tions. Being thus wholly incompetent, its gratui- 
tous and irrelevant opinions, amount to no opin- 
ion at all: there is in literal reality, no contradic- 
tion in either of the four instances: no more than 
in the case of the ear contradicting the eye about 
color. 

Indeed, the same may be said in a wholesale 
way, of all instances, in which the discursive con- 
tradicts the intuitive about any question of imma- 



OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS \2.J 

terial elements. And since such instances are sim 
ply endless, it is strange that Kant should recog- 
nize but four; for, being all explicable in one and 
the same way, they ought either to be called one; 
else, being counted individually, they might be 
called infinite. 

Now then, to have but one cognitive power, which 
power is contradictory in itself, what becomes of 
human knowledge? With one breath it says: There 
is a God; and with the next: There is no God. 
With one breath it says: The sun rises and sets; 
and with the next : The sun does not rise and set. 
At this rate, knowledge would be positive nescience, 
or still worse, it would be contradiction person- 
ified. 

Whereas, to assume two cognitive powers with 
their respective appointments as indicated above, 
at once explains contradiction, clears up the integ- 
rity of intelligence, and withal exposes materialism ; 
exposes vicious sense as the real perverter of intelli- 
gence. This latter, which may be called the climax 
or upshot of the scheme, admits of no doubt or dis- 
pute : every hour of waking existence, we either 
see, or hear, or read of some instance in which vi- 
cious sense perverts intelligence in attempts to jus- 
tify its vicious deeds. 

It is moreover just as evident, that vicious sense 
does not coerce or distort the radical functions of 



128 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

intelligence— for this would invalidate its integrity; 
instead, it employs deception. By means of some 
illusive object, it lures one or the other cognitive 
power out of its legitimate sphere, and thus causes 
collision. Neither again can this be doubted or 
disputed; insomuch, it may be laid down as a prin- 
ciple without exception, that symbolism or make- 
believe is the universal trick employed by every 
phase of deceit, fraud, lies, hypocrisy, false pre- 
tense, sophistry, or other form of contradiction. 

In every such case, it is the illusion of mistak- 
ing the make-believe for the true — the symbol for 
the real, which supercedes or contradicts the true 
and the real. Or in still other words, every con- 
ceivable phase of falsehood, is but a make-believe 
or symbol of the truth; and as a symbol, being mis- 
taken for the truth, it takes the place, supercedes, 
contradicts the truth. 

Now then, all the foregoing about the solar and 
Kant's four contradictions, only meant to point out 
the undeniable, empirical fact, that illusive sym- 
bolism is the one universal instrument in the hands 
of vicious sense — materialism, whereby all falsehood 
and contradiction are brought about; while this 
principle of illusive symbolism in turn, results from 
confounding mind and matter. 

Then the author was not extravagant in the last 
chapter, when attempting to properly emphasize 



OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS I 2Q. 

the infinite necessity of a clear distinction between 
mind and matter. Indeed, the author was then, 
and is yet, utterly impotent, to fully impress an un- 
familiar mind with the vast import of this distinc- 
tion. It can only be realized little by little, with 
the aid of earnest practical observation. 

As another attempt in this direction, let us in 
the close of this chapter, note a few hints suggested 
here and now. To see how the most brilliant and 
unsuspicious word or sentence, may blur over the 
distinction and lead into error, take this common- 
place child's question : "Mother, who made God?" 
This seems a harmless question; yet, starting out 
on it, we can never find any God. Why? Simply 
because it assumes God to be in the category of 
matter at the very start: it assumes God to be the 
one link in an infinite series of physical causes 
and effects, and thus excludes all possibility, either 
of a beginning, or of a God. 

Again, every thing must have a cause. Here, 
the word every implies each individual of an in- 
finite series, and by tacitly including God in the 
-series, it materializes and denies God. Though dif- 
fering in form, it is substantially the same with 
the first instance. 

On the other side, take this: The universe can- 
not exist without a God for its support. This does 
not stealthily imply divisibility or other physical 



130 THE self: what is it? 

trait in God; it is a unit, all-embracing proposition^ 
which points out God as an absolute necessity. 

Again, can any effect occur without a cause? The 
word any implies allness and unity ; as such, it ex- 
cludes all physical implications, and points to God 
as the prime and%ecessary Cause. 

The word infinite has already been noticed for 
its illusive subtlety. The same may be said of 
eternal, omnipresent, and other kindred words. They 
are only predicable of the extent Or divisibility of 
matter, time and space. If we had no other suita- 
ble words, then as a last alternative, these might 
be applied to God, provided it be done in a rigor- 
ously intensive sense; but the constant tendency 
is, to employ them extensively, and hereby they 
materialize and contradict God. 

The difference of the two words may be illustrated 
thus: The President of the United States, exten- 
sively — physically considered, is restricted to the 
Capitol ; but intensively considered — as the imma- 
terial head of the nation, he is literally present with 
each and all the individual citizens of the nation. 
In this latter sense, God is present to every individ- 
ual thing in the universe; but the word omnipresent 
with its extensive import, makes God physical. 
Alas! alas! water is not more prone to go down hill, 
than we are to make distinctions; to make infinite 
hair-spliting distinctions about intellectual myths 



OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS I 31 

or other like empty nothings; but here at the great 
equator of all thought — the distinction between 
mind and matter, we seem to become" stone-blind, 
unable to distinguish a mole hill from a mountain. 
What wonder then, that the world's perpetual ten- 
dency is to blind pagan idolatry? 

What is idolatry, and how does it come about? 
Plainly, it is the fullest concrete expression of ma- 
terialism. Its phenomena are identical with that of 
contradiction and falsehood, as above indicated, and 
result from confounding the mind or God idea with 
that of matter. Such confounding of the two, re- 
sults in an indefinite symbolism, whereby one phys- 
ical trait after another is ascribed to God, until fi- 
nally, the conception is materialized down to pure 
dead matter — as a wooden image; which image or 
symbol, supercedes — contradicts the real God. 

Superstition is the same with idolatry; a cloth- 
ing of the God or mind .idea with physical raiment 
until the said idea is smothered out. This differ- 
ence only, some phases of superstition might be 
called idolatry intensified to such a pitch, that its 
gravitation turns the other way. That is, having 
fully canceled the mind idea, yet being none the 
less necessitated to assume mind attributes, it here- 
upon ascribes such attributes to inanimate objects, 
which latter thus become endowed with magical 
powers, or what not. 



132 the self: what is it? 

Beyond question, idolatry and superstition are 
but duplicates — but practical illustrations of theo- 
retical materialism. The materialist, precisely like 
the idolator, pulls down the mind or God idea, and 
with the debris builds up matter: denies mind/^ 
se, yet refers all its phenomena to matter — makes 
mind a product of matter, which latter hereby be- 
comes the prime cause and sole god. There is this 
difference between the two however, the pagan idol- 
ator is but a layman, while the professional mate- 
rialist is the high priest of one and the same gos- 
pel. 

There is perhaps a still greater difference between 
the zeal of the two: the zeal of the layman rarely 
ever urges him to the extremity of sacrificing even 
his physical body for his self-made god; but that 
of the unselfish high priest, transcends this — trans- 
cends that of all religionists. In theory at least, 
he sacrifices immortality, heaven, God — annihilates 
himself, at the savage shrine of his self-made god. 

Otherwise than this, idolatry and superstition 
are but practical illustrations of theoretical mate- 
rialism. Nor is it strange that the materialist, in 
view of this evident fact, will turn about and bit- 
terly chide the religious sentiment, for being the 
cause of idolatry and superstition. Materialism 
begins, continues, and ends in contradiction ; it is 
the maker of contradictions; and hence, no wonder 



OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS 1 33 

in the present case, that it repudiates its own two 
children, idolatry and superstition. 



CHAPTER III. 

DISCURSIVE COGNITION. 

The inquiry henceforth will seem in some sort 
desultory: yet each question discussed will have 
direct reference to the outlines sketched off in the 
chapter before the last. 

According to common assumption, discursive cog- 
nition pretty well represents the sum-total of solid 
and valid knowledge; all after that being regarded 
as visionary and uncertain. The assumption tacitly 
says: Give me the five sense perceptions, and you 
are welcome to all the rest. 

At this rate, the discursive ought to have some 
other distinctive function besides comparison, which 
latter is but a plodding, tape-line procedure. Ac- 
cordingly, the first object of this chapter is to in- 
quire, if it have any distinctive trait other than 
comparison; meanwhile, a second object is, to 
get a clearer insight into the principle of symbolism, 
which plays such an officious part in contradiction. 

Just here, in the first edition of this book, refei- 
ence was made to Kant's categories, which he lo- 
cates in the understanding; and which latter corre- 

134 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION 



135 



sponds somewhat to our word discursive. Theoret- 
ically, his categories imply much more than simple 
comparison; but as practically employed by him, 
they amount to little else than measuring instru- 
ments. The difference is not enough at least, to 
justify any notice here; and so they may be omitted 
from this edition. 

IMITATION. 

It is a common, yet great mistake to regard imi- 
tation as a phase of the esthetic faculty called 
taste. The two are direct opposites. Taste does 
not and cannot imitate. Its distinctive trait is to 
give out original beauty from itself; while that of 
imitation is to copy originals— originals of beauty 
or otherwise. Taste is spontaneous; imitation is 
reflected light. 

At the very most, imitation is an attempt to re- 
produce a given original, by making a resemblance, 
copy, or symbol 01 it. Such copy or symbol can 
only be made by a measuring comparison; and 
which points out the plain fact, that imitation is 
but an implication of comparison. In a previous 
illustration of architect and carpenter, it was noted 
that the latter employs a measuring comparison — a 
tape line. But whereunto? Simply in order to 
imitate the architect: that is, to make a copy or 
-symbol of the architect's design. So that, com- 



136 the self: what is it? 

parisOn culminates in imitation; and imitation, in 
symbolism. 

Imitation being thus included in— being the up- 
shot of comparison, adds nothing new to discursive 
cognition. The discursive still remains the discur- 
sive, with comparison as its only distinctive func- 
tion; and which at once satisfies the first inquiry 
of this chapter. But imitation brings us to symbol- 
ism, and symbolism is the second inquiry of the 
chapter; indeed, according to the last two chap- 
ters, it is a most vital point of the general inquiry. 

Symbolism introduces us to a new and vast world 
of shadowy objects: which though dream-like and 
shadowy, yet have a real and deep influence on hu- 
man character; and are indeed indispensable to the 
last two chapters. 

To get started in this dreamland let the state- 
ment just above be added to, thus : Comparison 
culminates in imitation; imitation, in S3'mbolism;. 
and symbolism, in illusion. The latter — illusion, 
is the mistaking of the symbol for the real, original! 
object. Do not infer however, that illusion of ne- 
cessity results from every instance of symbolism* 
Instead, it results from carelessly confounding the 
symbol with the original ; or which is the same in 
other words, carelessly confounding matter and 1 
mind. 

Doubtless the reader is tired of the emphasis* 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION 137 

put upon the confounding of matter and mind; and 
perhaps thinks that the principle of symbolism de- 
duced therefrom, as a vital condition of contradic- 
tion, is far-fetched and labored. However, to mend 
matters, the present object is to show, that this 
same principle of symbolism — as a result from con- 
founding matter and mind, is not only true in the- 
oretical questions like those of the last two chap- 
ters; but is, if not the greatest, at least among the 
greatest practical influences on human character. 

The principle as an abstraction, has an indefinite 
number of phases in its practical manifestations. It 
represents that vast phenomena variously called 
symbol, copy, likeness, image, ritual, ceremony, 
emblem, duplicate, illustration, appearance, sham, 
red-tape, make-believe, counterfeit, falsehood — all 
phenomena, in which one thing substitutes or rep- 
resents another. However various the phases, they 
are all one and the same in this: each one repre- 
sents something other than itself — something which 
is real, original and true. 

Now plainly, by far the greater part of practical 
human life is devoted to one or other of these 
phases of symbolism. The tendency to symbolize, 
runs through every vein and artery of individual 
and collective activity. It shows itself in the ear- 
liest dawn of childhood: as in the dolls and mimic 
houses of little girls and boys. It continues on up 



138 the self: what is it? 

to maturity; indeed, through life to death, alike 
with rich and poor, wise and foolish, virtuous and 
vicious. 

For instance, ritual, though essential, has ever 
been the greatest and most harmful burden of re- 
ligion; insomuch, many of its votaries mistaking the 
ritual for the reality, never get one distinct glimpse 
of the latter. Social usages, especially those of 
fashionable life, consist almost wholly of pure ritual 
— make believe appearances. Civil tribunals devote 
most of their time to the ritual or letter of the law, 
at the expense of its spirit. Political economy oc- 
cupies itself with money and education — mere sym- 
bols of national prosperity. 

In brief, the great mass of mankind, in the ap- 
pointments of their houses, dresses, conduct, occu- 
pations, aspirations — in everything, are taken up 
with appearances — ritual, to such a degree, that 
they go through life as through a dream, without 
any distinct glimpse of reality. To this may be 
added as a climax, that a large class of people are 
but professional ritualists, who devote themselves 
exclusively to the business of a make-believe life; 
as dudes for instance. Also materialists, who even 
deny everything except the physical or symbolic 
part of existence. 

We are all more or less liable to unduly empha- 
size the ritual at the expense of the real. It is vain 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION 1 39 

to look around for exceptions. One would naturally 
enough turn to philosophy, whose especial mission 
it is to search out reality to the very heart; but 
philosophy is no exception. On the contrary, it 
has few rivals in the business of ritual ;' certainly 
no superior, unless may be modern physics. 

But we are upon the wrong end of the inquiry. 
Instead of trying to find out where ritualism is, it 
is a much shorter route to find out where it is not. 
There is no such spot; for where ever reality is, or 
has been, there also imitation will be with its rit- 
ual or symbol. Symbol being but a mimic of the 
real, can only exist where the real is; while the ex- 
istence of the real, makes the symbol a necessity; 
a necessity by virtue of our dual — our material and 
immaterial natures. 

This is but a glance at the vast world of symbol- 
ism, as manifested in practical life ; but it suffices 
to show that it is quite universal in practical re 
spects. But being universal it is not of necessity 
wrong or harmful in the first degree: in this first 
degree it results from our dual nature of matter and 
mind — a symbolic and real existence. The harm 
consists in emphasizing the symbol to such a de- 
gree as to hide the real, and cause contradiction. 

The practical universality of symbolism as just 
seen, illustrates and demonstrates the last two chap- 
ters; which assume, that the confounding of mind 



140 the self: what is it? 

and matter, results in symbolism; that symbolism 
results in illusion; and illusion — mistaking the sym- 
bol for the real, leads to contradiction. Precisely 
this and no more nor less than this, was seen re- 
specting trie solar and Kant's four contradictions. 

Contrast these latter with any phase of practical 
life. As an example of the highest phase, the rit- 
ual or symbols of religion for instance, being too 
much emphasized, are presently mistaken for the 
reality — for religion itself; and in being so mis- 
taken, they supercede and contradict the reality re- 
ligion. Then as the lowest phase of practical life, 
what is any lie, or what are all lies, but make-be- 
lieve symbols of the truth ; which being mistaken, 
for the truth, contradict the truth? 

Thus, the principle of symbolism with its conse- 
quent illusions, enters into all forms of contradic- 
tions, whether those of thoretical speculation, or 
those of practical life. Hence, it may be repeated 
again ani again: Despite a causal and vicious 
sense, despite a passive and pervertible intelli- 
gence, contradiction could never occur, without il- 
lusion, nor illusion without symbolism, nor symbol- 
ism without confounding matter and mind. 

What is the result? Among many others, this 
notably: we are compelled, whether or not, to see 
matter in its totality, as but a symbol; that is, a 
symbol relatively to mind, which latter of equal 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION 141 

necessity, becomes the real, the original, and the 
true element of existence. As mere symbol, matter 
partakes of all the properties of a symbol; it is a 
transient copy, image, make-believe — indeed, being 
unduly emphasized, it is a positive falsehood, rela- 
tively to mind as the real and original. 

To be sure, matter is an indispensable condition 
to the manifestation of mind in a physical exist- 
ence; but it does not follow, that matter is a part 
of mind, or that it is indispensable to the existence 
of mind in any other state. Because certain phys- 
ical machinery is required for certain manifestations 
of electricity, it does not follow that said machin- 
ery is a part of electricity, or that it is indispensa- 
ble to its existence. 

Now, along with matter and mind — symbol and 
real, as representing the sum total of cognizable 
objects, let us connect the cognitive powers. The 
discursive, in being restricted to symbolic matter, 
is but an imitator, and as such represents the sym- 
bolic phase of existence. The intuitive, in being 
restricted to mind, represents the real and imma- 
terial phase. 

The intuitive, for example, makes the design of 
a house; which design, is not only the original and 
real house, but without which, the subsequent phys- 
ical symbol could never be constructed. Meanwhile, 
without an imitating discursive, the said original 



142 



the self: what is it? 



design, could never be symbolized — materialized 
for physical experience; so that, both the designing; 
intuitive and the imitative discursive are indispen- 
sable to our dual existence. 

Without the intuitive in brief, there could be no 
design of a house, ship, telegraph— nothing of a 
real kind could be known to us; while without the 
discursive, said real thing could not be symbolized 
— materialized for physical experience. 

Hence, under the present regime, all human ac- 
tivity implies both designer and imitator, with their 
respective products, design and symbol. The great- 
est or the least action — whether the construction 
of a world or that of a pig-sty, equally imply a de- 
signer and an imitator, with their products, design 
and symbol. But note, the design is of necessity 
anterior to and independent of the symbol. With- 
out an anterior design, the imitator could never 
make a start; indeed, one stroke by the imitator 
without a design as his model — without some defi- 
nite object in view, would be an act of insanity: 
that is, mind as the real, must be anterior to and 
independent of the symbol matter; and the design- 
ing intuitive must be anterior to and independent 
of the imitating discursive. 

Then, can anything be more absurd, can any 
thing be a greater outrage to common sense, than 
to see the symbol only, and deny the design; see: 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION I43 

matter only and deny mind; see the make-believe 
part of existence only, and deny the real, imperish- 
able, and incalculably higher phase? Yet, this is 
precisely what the materialist does. And why? 
Because he emphasizes the symbol to such a degree, 
that i{t hides and contradicts the real. 

We can now perhaps begin to see contradiction 
— materialism in its totality and universality. 
Originating primarily from a causal and vicious 
sense, it perverts a passive intelligence. But how? 
By confounding mind and matter, whence results 
symbolism, whence results illusion, and which leads 
the discursive to contradict the intuitive. 

A little back it was seen, that comparison and 
contrast as cognitive functions, with comparable 
and contrastable as corresponding traits of cogniza- 
ble objects, all four affirm vehemently and harmo- 
niously, that the great distinction implied innately 
in themselves — the distinction between mind and 
matter, is the one central idea of our economy of 
cognition; that our condition is what it is, by virtue 
of said distinction, and could not exist without it. 

This would seem enough respecting the distinc- 
tion between mind and matter. But no. Now in 
this chapter, as if to be certain of making the gulf 
between the two still more impassable, the rudi- 
mental elements of cognition come forward again: 
they compel us whether or not, to see mind as the 



144 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

real and original phase of existence, and matter as 
a mere symbol of said reality. 

And is this all? Nay, indeed: if we ignore this 
fact of symbol and real ; if we dare to dignify mat- 
ter one hair's breadth above the humble relation of 
symbol, the machinery of cognition is thereby in 
stantly perverted and contradiction results. Where- 
as, if matter be kept rigorously in its relation of 
symbol in the first degree, the door is closed against 
all forms of contradiction; and that too, despite 
all other conditions. 

Instead and on the other hand, however, let us 
see how easily contradiction may occur. First, the 
discursive can only see matter, and hence is nat- 
urally prone to deny mind. Second, as seen above, 
the discursive at its best, is but a professional sym- 
bol-maker, its chief work being to materialize in- 
tuitive designs into physical forms. Now add to 
this the fact, that intelligence is wholly passive, and 
it is at once plain, that it requires but a bare wink 
from an over-ruling sense to put the discursive in 
direct collision with the intuitive, on no matter 
what problem; insomuch in fact, that a slight spur- 
ring from sense will urge the discursive to deny 
mind altogether. 

This is but another way of saying, that a man 
may cultivate the five senses to such a degree, and 
meanwhile so suppress all the others, as to finally 



CISCURS1VE COGNITION I45 

become utterly blind to everything except matter; 
and this is all that is meant above, by magnifying 
the symbol matter, until it wholly hides the reality 
mind. To see this illustrated to the most subtle 
and far-reaching degree, it is well .just here before 
quitting the question of symbolism, to briefly no- 
tice the process by which the cause and effect prin- 
ciple is reversed. 

There are four distinct stages in this process, 
each of which is introduced by this same illusion 
of mistaking the symbol for the real. (1) The 
human body for example, which is but a symbol, 
is assumed to be the real man. (2) Since this real 
man — this physical symbol, begins existence as a 
mere germ, and by the addition of atom to atom, 
presently grows up to wholeness, it is thence in- 
ferred, that atoms or parts by combination make 
wholes. (3) Physical wholes and parts, which 
but symbolize the principle of cause and effect, are 
mistaken for the latter. And (4) seeing that parts 
by combination make wholes, it follows that com- 
bined effects make causes. 

Now, though only physical elements are explic- 
itly recognized in this illusive jugglery, yet by 
stealthy implication, the mind principle is included 
in the end; so that as final result, a reversed caus- 
ality has universal application. That is, in all 
cases, whether of mind or matter, reversed causality 



146 the self: what is it? 

stands good; in all, combined parts make wholes,, 
and combined effects make causes; insomuch, even- 
God is but an effect of combined atoms; while ac- 
cording to the latest gospel of materialism, man is. 
but an effect of combined insects, reptiles, and 
what not. 

Plainly enough as before said, a reversed causality- 
reverses the entire machinery of cognition; and in 
so doing, it becomes the most potent instrument of 
materialism. It is to materialism N much the same, 
that the distinction between mind and matter is to> 
orthodox philosophy; the one is an equator of false- 
hood; the other an equator of truth. 

By itself however, reversed causality would amount 
to but little: it requires the aid of a correspond- 
ingly reversed method of inquiry. That is, a so- 
called synthesis is made to supercede analysis; so 
that, instead of beginning inquiry in any given 
case, with the total object as analysis requires, syn- 
thesis on the contrary begins with infinitesimal 
parts; and by combining said parts, conspires with- 
a reversed causality, in deriving wholes from parts, 
and causes from effects. But this reversed method 
by means of synthesis, requires special attention, 
and will be amply noticed in the next chapter. 

Now, though we cannot know anything more pos- 
itively, than that causes must precede and originate 
effects, and hence that reversed causality is an illu- 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION I47 

sive falsehood; still, the illusions leading to it are 
so subtle and beguiling, as to justify a few reflec- 
tions in passing. 

First then, the four assumptions leading to re- 
versed causality, are illusive and groundless at the 
start. That is, the discursive, which is the judge 
in each of the four cases, can only see matter; and 
being hence utterly blind to the principles of life, 
growth, mind, etc., has neither right nor compe- 
tency to even an opinion on such questions. Next,, 
it is undeniable, both from an intuitive and a strict- 
ly discursive standpoint, that matter per se is pas- 
sive and dead; that it can only act as it is acted 
on; and hence, cannot grow in the sense implied.. 

Instead, all so-called animal and vegetable 
growth, is but a process of building, much the 
same with that of building a house. It is a 
process in which, the life principle of the given 
animal or plant, employs passive atoms of matter, 
just as the mason does brick, and by adding atom 
to atom, presently builds up a house around itself. 
If the house is builded, so is the animal or plant 
builded; and just as the house is impossible with- 
out an antecedent design and builder, so is the an* 
imal or plant organism. 

In other words, all growth or building of neces- 
sity presupposes an active mind or life agent, as 
the builder or cause. This agent of course, must 



148 the self: what is it? 

have materials wherewith to build. The said ma- 
terials are but passive atoms of matter, which by 
addition, finally result in the desired object. Now 
then, ignoring the active agent or builder, and only 
seeing a combination of passive parts, the discur- 
sive mistakes said parts for the real builder, and 
hence infers, that combined parts per se build or 
make the whole. 

The last two illusions are less noticeable and 
thereby the more subtle: first, physical wholes and 
parts — which are but symbols of the cause and effect 
principle, are mistaken for said principle; and 
second, since combined parts make the whole, so 
also combined effects make the cause. 

But because the relation between physical wholes 
an 1 parts, in some sort symbolizes that between 
cause and effect, it does not follow, that the two 
are the same in any vital respect, any more than 
that the symbol matter is the same with mind. 
That is, it is false in the first place, to say that 
parts make wholes; but even allowing it to be true 
in physical phenomena, it would not thence follow, 
that effects make causes. 

Wholes and parts, as extensive quantities, are what 
they are by virtue of comparison: either one may 
be changed by addition or subtraction. But the 
principle of cause and effect, as an intensive quan- 
tity, is what it is by virtue of itself, and cannot be 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION 149 

changed by addition or subtraction. The number 
ten intensively considered for instance, cannot be 
changed one whit without annihilation; but its ex- 
tensive symbol —as ten oranges may be changed in- 
definitely. 

Intensively, neither causes nor effects can be com- 
bined ; or were it otherwise, the result would show 
no increase. Were it possible to combine all brute 
minds as causes for instance, or their aggregate 
intelligence as effects, in neither case would the 
sum total equal those of one man. That is, no two 
essences can be combined: memory for instance 
cannot be combined into reason, nor contrariwise; 
nor virtue into vice; nor truth into faleshood; and 
so, neither can effects be combined into causes. 
We only imagine otherwise, by stupidly confound- 
ing mind and matter — the intensive real, with the 
extensive symbol. 

In brief, an apparently reversed causality is refer- 
able to the illusions of confounding the symbol 
with the real, by an incompetent discursive cogni- 
tion; while on the other hand, nothing is more 
positively certain, than that causes precede and 
produce effects. Hence, reversed causality — the 
chief and most subtle agency of materialism, but 
illustrates and demonstrates the foregoing solution 
of contradiction, especially as lespecls cognizable 
objects: viz., That contradiction results from con- 



150 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

founding matter and mind, and thence mistaking 
the symbol matter for the reality mind. 

THYSICS. 

The last section shows, that illusion, symbolism, 
and imitation flow directly from comparison, and 
in no wise imply any new distinctive function for 
discursive cognition. But it is commonly assumed, 
that the discursive attains its highest glory in phys- 
ics; and hence, may perhaps in this latter sphere, 
manifest some other and higher power than that of 
comparison. This results from the common mis- 
take, that physical science is the outcome of a bit 
by bit combination of parts, picked up here or 
there from physical phenomena. Though this is 
true as respects the mechanical process implied, 
it ignores the very marrow of the question. 

These so-called parts of science could not cohere, 
without some cohesive principle to bind them to- 
gether. Indeed, they could not even be found in the 
first place, without some such principle as a means 
of identification. Indiscriminate parts, picked up 
and put together in a pell-mell way, would only 
amount to so much debris. There must be some 
reason or guiding principle for rational combina- 
tion. Such reason must be some kinship, some 
common bond of relation among said parts, where- 
by they are all bound together in unity. And this 



DISCURSIVK COGNITION 151 

bond of relation, which includes everything in the 
given science, is commonly called its fundamental 
principle. 

This principle let it be noted, must exist before 
and independently of the parts to be so combined; 
otherwise the combination could never begin: sci- 
ence could never get started. Of course, two or 
more facts quite often, first suggest and call out 
this fundamental principle; still, the principle 
must have first existed in the observer's mind, else 
it could not be called out. Otherwise in truth, the 
said facts would be void: quite as void as color 
would be without a responsive vision. If bare facts 
could primarily originate and impart the funda- 
mental principle to the observer, then savages— in- 
deed dumb brutes, aided by the same facts, might 
also construct sciences. 

Besides, the fundamental principle is not a phys- 
ical something, but a simple relationship between 
different objects; it is a pure abstraction, and as 
such, is a pure product of pure intelligence. 

Now plainly, without such principle, science 
would be impossible; all the individual facts of 
nature would stand as so many unrelated parts 
without coherent meaning. Hence, the principle 
with its implications, is the total real science; 
while the concrete parts, which get their meaning 
and unity from it, are but a symbol of it, just as 



152 the self: what is it? 

the physical house is a symbol of the design where- 
by it is constructed. 

As said a few pages back, all rational activity, 
whether of body or mind, presupposes some pur- 
pose or design, which design, as model or guiding 
chart, must exist prior to and independent of the 
activity. This design is the original and real thing 
in the given case; while the concrete events or ac- 
tivities but symbolize the said reality. So in the 
other case; the fundamental principle, as the de- 
sign, or end, or goal, in which all the concrete parts 
converge, is the real science; while the said parts 
are but its symbol. 

In other words, a scientific procedure, whether 
as to acts, facts, or otherwise, amounts to no more 
than a proper adjustment of proper means to a 
given end. The getting up of a breakfast by the. 
proper adjustment of proper means, is as scientific 
as any other; and in all cases, the end is the re- 
ality, while the correlated parts are the symbol. 
These reflections lead to several plain inferences. 

(1) Science is not restricted to a few branches of 
physics, as materialism would make believe; but. 
is the very essence of all rational thought and ac- 
tivity. Neither is it primarily a superhuman some- 
thing, springing spontaneously up from nature, 
above and independent of the human mind. In- 
stead, science is science, only in so far as it con- 



DISt URSIVE COGNITION 153 

forms to the laws of human intelligence, otherwise 
called logic or common sense. 

(2) The fundamental principle with its implica- 
tions — a pure product of mind, is the real indivisi- 
ble science, consisting may be of logical, but not of 
literal parts; while all concrete illustrations are but 
illustrations or symbols of the reality. 

And (3), coming to the inquiry of this section, 
discursive cognition, which gathers up the concrete 
parts here or there, only illustrates real science, 
as the carpenter illustrates the architect's design. 

In physics then, the discursive is still an imitator 
or symbolizer as in all other cases. 

How absurd then, the common expression : I 
believe nothing except my five senses. It for- 
gets that the five senses themselves are a part 
of the mind, and as such are as incognizable to 
physical organs, as any other phase of mind. 
What is the proof then of their superior validity? 
None earthly, except the other like thoughtless as- 
sumption, that the objects of the five senses have 
greater reality than the others. But physical ob- 
jects are not as real and certain as immaterial ones. 
We cannot be so certain of house, tree or mountain, 
as we are of justice, truth, science, love, happiness, 
etc. ; if for nothing else, because the former are 
useless except as means for realizing the latter. 

However, the discursive is indispensable in its 



i54 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT ? 

proper sphere. It is the sole and supreme authority 
respecting all concrete physical phenomena. But 
when such phenomena loses its individuality, by 
being generalized or otherwise elevated from a con- 
crete to an abstract plane of thought, it at once 
becomes intuitive property. This shows up the 
two, in the same relation as seen all along. The 
discursive represents the physical or symbolic phase 
of existence; the intuitive represents the immate- 
rial and real phase. But by shifting the standpoint, 
we may perhaps see the relation between the two 
with greater clearness. 

A PRACTICAL ILLUSTRATION. 

A little examination will show, that Lord Bacon 
never devoted any specific attention, to the specific 
method of inquiry. Instead of method, his atten- 
tion was occupied with the objects of inquiry; with 
the objects, as respects their relative worth. He 
advocated what he called practical questions, as 
against those of a theoretical kind. Practical ques- 
tions he claims, tend to the every-day well being 
of man; while theoretical ones are visionary and 
fruitless. 

To be sure, he put great emphasis upon the words 
induction and deduction, which, like the similar 
words synthesis and analysis, imply two distinct 
methods of inquiry. Still, it is obvious throughout, 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION 155 

that, instead of method, he was occupied with the 
objects of inquiry. Hence, since objects are of 
two classes — matter and mind, or practical and the- 
oretical as he called them, he thence inferred two 
methods, instead of two species of intelligence. 

He thus confuses the method of inquiry, with 
the inquiring intelligence. Instead of two species 
of cognition, corresponding with his two classes of 
objects, he assumes two methods: induction, which 
he thus unwittingly makes identical with discursive 
cognition; and deduction, identical with the intui- 
tive. 

Hence, when using the word induction, Bacon 
in reality means discursive cognition — that which 
deals with concrete objects for practical results; 
while by deduction, he means intuitive cognition 
— that which deals with abstractions or theories. 

This construction is self evident from his general 
drift. Practice against theory, the concrete against 
the abstract, maybe called the upshot of his philos- 
ophy. Hence, his antithesis to the old Greek mas- 
ters, whom he berated so vehemently. They were 
for abstract theories, he said, while he was for prac- 
tical questions. Their method, which he called de- 
ductive, was vain and fruitless; while his opposite 
inductive one, is the all-in-all for practical good. 

It signifies nothing, that Bacon and the Greek 
both alike, employed discursive and intuitive cog- 



156 the self: what is it? 

nition, and which two latter employ but one and 
the same method of inquiry: he was not concerned 
about methods or species of cognition, but about 
objects and their practical outcome. Nor can we 
assume otherwise indeed, without impeaching his 
very remarkable sagacity. 

The difference between him and the Greek, is 
precisely that between the discursive and intuitive. 
He did not stop to think, that the two are each 
implied and required by our dual existence; that 
without an intuitive designer, there would be no 
need for a discursive imitator; that without theory 
there could be no practice — no model to practice 
after. Instead, he implicitly assumed discursive 
and intuitive — or induction and deduction as he 
called them, to be independent of each other. 

Looking almost wholly at objects and practical 
results, the discursive was his favorite, which he 
personates to its fullest, in his doctrines. His sole 
aspiration was, to materialize thought; insomuch, 
he counted all thought worthless, which could not 
be materialized into physical experience. 

The Greek on the other hand, personates the in- 
tuitive. Though necessitated to employ the discur- 
sive for physical needs, he seemed to employ it as 
a filthy tool, ever aspiring instead, to the higher 
sphere of original intuitive thought. Thus ever 
seeking the highest thought, he would employ it 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION 1 57 

when found, as a stepping stone to something still 
higher. 

Bacon on the contrary, would employ it just in so 
far as it might subserve practical good: the doc- 
trine of the correlation of forces for instance, he 
would materialize into a telephone or other ma- 
chine; and whatever could not be so utilized, he 
counted worthless. The Greek would build lofty 
temples, as if to rival the mansions of the gods; 
while Bacon would pull down such temples, and 
with the debris, build walls and stalls for beef- 
cattle. 

The tendency of Bacon was to materialize every- 
thing; that of the Greek, to idealize. If existence 
imply no more than "to eat, drink and be merry 
to-day, since to-morrow we die," then Bacon was 
nearer the mark; but if otherwise, he was very 
wide of it. Of course, Bacon gave a great impetus 
to physics ; but no greater than that he gave — 
though doubtless unwittingly, to materialism. The 
latter is just as palpable and wide spread to-day as 
the former. 

But all men more or less illustrate this question; 
all men incline to be either Baconians or Greeks — 
materialists or idealists, accordingly as the dis- 
cursive or intuitive may happen to dominate their 
habits of thought. 

It is also illustrated by the contrast between men 



158 the self: what is it? 

and women. To say nothing as to whether, or to 
what extent, the intelligence of the sexes may nat- 
urally differ, it is plain that usage and habit incline 
one to discursive, and the other to intuitive thought. 
The man, immersed in physical interests, cultivates 
discursive aspiration and thought; while the wo- 
man, less involved in such interests, inclines to the 
intuitive. 

For the same reason, youths of both sexes are 
apt to be in the category with woman, x and through 
youth at least, live in the higher intuitive sphere. 
Instead of being a discredit as the materialist 
charges, it is rather a credit to religion, that wo- 
men and children are its chief votaries. Their in- 
born instincts being less hoodwinked than those of 
men, they ought to be better judges of such ques- 
tions, than men; better at least than men of dis- 
cursive judgments, which latter have no competency^ 
for any intuitive question. 

AN OBJECTION. 

Allowing the discursive to be a mere mimic, how 
does it nevertheless prove a full match for the in- 
tuitive, very often indeed seeming to wholly super- 
cede it? Simply because, both of them being but 
passive instruments, their efficiency in any given 
case does not depend upon their relative powers, 
so much as upon an overruling sense, especially if 
the latter be vicious. 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION 159 

The possibility and extent to which cognition 
may be perverted, is precisely as wide, as the pro- 
vision made in the mental economy for the full 
play of depravity and free agency. Hence, all men 
are not only liable, but inclined to pervert cogni- 
tion; while the easiest and shortest way to do so, 
is to lure the discursive into collision with the in- 
tuitive. 

But though all are thus liable and inclined to 
materialism, no one is necessitated to so persist. 
The same provision which gives vicious sense and 
a pervertible cognition, also gives virtuous inclina- 
tions and moral free agency. 

The native liability to materialism, does not hence 
of necessity result harmfully, to one virtuously in- 
clined: that is, there is no more necessity for per- 
sisting in materialism, than for persisting in a vi- 
cious life. 

But as some men will persist in vice, so also some 
will persist in materialism ; and it is the latter pre- 
cisely, who are materialists proper: not those natur- 
ally liable, but those stubbornly persistent in mate- 
rialism. Those who, from some undue prejudice, 
vanity, desire for notoriety, or other vicious prompt- 
ing, finally become professional materialists — volun- 
teers, who enlist for the whole war. Such an atti- 
tude is one of stubborn persistence in vice, and is 
the same with that of any other confirmed evil 
doer. 



l6o THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

It has been fully seen, that vicious sense, by 
means of illusive symbols, may easily lure either of 
the cognitive powers into contradiction or sophistry. 
It was not then and there explained — from fear of 
causing too much complexity, that on the basis of 
said sophistry, either cognition may be set to work 
as upon truthful premises. For instance, it being 
falsely assumed by the discursive, that the physical 
body is the real man, the intuitive may then be set 
to work as earnestly in support of this false posi- 
tion, as if it were a true one. 

Accordingly, the professional materialist, who 
only admits a five sense or discursive cognition, 
does yet employ the intuitive just as other people: 
only, instead of employing it legitimately, he puts 
it to work in support of false discursive assump- 
tions. And thus, like a piece of passive artillery, 
the intuitive may be directed against friend or foe 
alike. 

It is hence common in materialistic writings, to 
see intuitive reasoning aimed directly against in- 
tuitive truth. In such case, the intuitive is a sort 
of blind Sampson, who being a helpless captive, is 
made to grind out vicious sophistries for the behoof 
of his enemies: as final result and having the 
needed strength, he pulls down the temple of truth 
upon himself and enemies alike. 

But says one, this is allowing vicious sense to 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION l6l 

have too much power: a power sufficient to pull 
down all truth. Yet, the present mental economy 
allows all this. Still, however, such prostitution 
of the cognitive powers, does not make a literal 
end to truth: for truth still has a far mightier 
champion than a pervertible cognition — that is, in- 
stinct. In all times and places, especially in the 
most calamitous, instinct is invincible in holding 
fast to mind, immortality, God, etc., despite the 
arch despoiler materialism. 

The sophistries of a perverted cognition, avail 
nothing against instinct in the long run. In vain 
the materialist as the only alternative, pronounces 
instinct to be an incapable fool, and its beliefs in 
mind and immortality, to be pure superstitions. 
But no matter; instinct still holds its ground, soiled 
and bedaubed may be for a little time; but by and 
by, the cleansing rain comes and leaves it as fair and 
powerful as ever. 

There it stands to-day, just as it has stood from 
the beginning; not a blind Sampson indeed, but 
another Atlas, patient and able, not only to bear 
up God's world, but also that other and hollow world 
of materialistic folly. Alas ! for human vice and 
intelligence; except for its self-preserving instinct, 
humanity would long ago have been in its grave. 

ANOTHER OBJECTION. 

Discursive and intuitive are but two words, rep- 



162 the self: what is it? 

resenting the two grand species of cognition; which 
two species in turn, are constituted by the various 
individual cognitive faculties; are these individ- 
uals then left without a personal supreme head to 
control them, each one being allowed to act at its 
own option? This objection has already been 
glimpsed at, being the same which claims an intel- 
lectual hierarchy, controlled by a supreme reason, 
etc. But it requires another brief notice at this 
particular place. 

As already indicated, the assumption of such 
hierarchy, results directly from the great illusion, 
first pointed out, which assumes intelligence to be 
the controling authority of mind. Except this prime 
illusion, there is no vestige nor even pretense of 
proof for such an hierarchy; but allowing other- 
wise, a world full of arguments and assumptions 
could avail nothing against the bare fact that by 
universal consent, the sense motive is the main- 
spring and responsible agent in human character;: 
and hence, intelligence must be positively passive. 
Being passive and subordinate to sense, it could in 
no case become a dictatorial hierarchy. 

The most important phenomena of intelligence,, 
are wholly inexplicable except on the assumption 
that each individual sense is intelligent; it is a 
practical necessity. But abstractly considered, we 
can conceive of nothing except sense, which is a 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION 163 

thing in and for itself; a thing which includes both 
cause and end in itself; and hence it is the only 
thing which can need or ought to be endowed with 
intelligence as an instrument for realizing its va- 
rious wants. 

Moreover, reason, imagination, memory, will, 
etc., which are assumed to constitute the hierarchy, 
are obviously not individual faculties, but imper- 
sonal principles, which enter into the constitution 
of each individual sense; for otherwise, the latter 
could not perform their respective functions, and 
would thus be wholly useless. 

As for the rest, the supreme principle of the 
mind's unity, will always guarantee a unified and 
concerted action of all the individual members, 
somewhat as gravitation compels harmony among 
the members of the solar system. Thus, four out 
of the five discursive senses, can act all at once 
and in harmony, upon the one object, orange, for 
instance; to vision, the orange is yellow; to the* 
palate, it is sweet; to the smell, fragrant; to the 
feeling, round and soft — that too, all at once and 
without collision. 

Now, what else can we know of the concrete ob- 
ject orange, except by these four senses? Positively 
nothing. But these four, having distinct functions 
and acting on distinct aspects of the object, never- 
theless dove-tail into a unified activity, which results 



X 64 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

in a dove-tailed, total knowledge of the total ob- 
ject orange. What need or possibility then, of an 
extra and supervising intelligence, to supplement 
these four? 

Only this: As gravitation has one great centre to 
which all the motions of the system conform, so 
also in the mental economy. With this difference 
however, the centre of gravitation is fixed; that of 
the mind is contingent. The moral sense ought to be 
the supreme centre or power of the niind; but if it 
were so of fixed necessity, it would compel us to 
act rightly in all cases, and which would annul 
moral free agency. Hence, any one or more senses, 
being allowed to run free, will soon get strong 
enough to overthrow the moral sense ; in which 
case, the usurping sense or senses, become the con- 
trolling centre for the time at least. 

This brings us face to face with the naked, em- 
pirical facts of the case ; and with such facts, all 
*other proof becomes superfluous. Take a man whose 
ruling sense is ambition, for instance; nothing is 
plainer in such instance, than that every other 
power — whether of body, or intelligence, or sense, 
is constrained to subserve the demands of ambition. 
Meanwhile, the characteristic intelligence of such 
a man, corresponds precisely with the ruling sense 
ambition: that is, it is wholly occupied with ambi- 
tious plans and devices for preferment, showing 



DISCURSIVE COGNITION 165 

that it issues directly from ambition itself, just as 
the intelligence of sweet or acid issues directly from 
the palate. 

Now, the ambitious man is not an exception. All 
men, especially those of decisive character, are 
governed by some one or more senses : either by 
the moral, or by one or more rebellious senses; in- 
somuch, the entire life career of the given man, 
will correspond with the sense or senses which may 
happen to be the strongest. Also, in every case, 
intelligence will always conform to and subserve the 
demands of the given ruling sense. 

Hence, in all other events, one thing is empiric- 
ally certain and universal: viz., Intelligence is never 
manifested, except as a passive instrument for 
sense. Being thus a universal cat's paw for sense, 
how can it meanwhile be a supreme hierarchy for 
controlling sense? The bare conception of the lat- 
ter, is among the most amazing of all myths, when 
looked at side by side with the facts seen by us 
every moment of waking existence. 

Groundless as such myths are, they can only be 
exposed by empirical facts; and even these prove 
ineffectual with certain persons. Turning away, they 
still see the sun rise and set. The facts already 
cited on the question, though sufficing for sober 
persons, may be greatly strengthened by a study 
of the individual senses; which latter in detail, is 
quite beyond the scope of this treatise. 



l66 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

To enumerate the primitive senses ; to analyze 
each one individually, and show up their relations 
in a unified whole, is another and a sufficient work 
in itself. All young students should make haste to 
enter this enticing field — a field, destined sooner or 
later to be the El Dorado of philosophy. 

It will not require one half the labor in this field, 
that has been worse than thrown away on a fabu- 
lous intellectual hierarchy. Inquiry in the latter, 
ever begins and continues on a false basis — that in- 
telligence is the basic element of mind; and hence, 
all its painstaking labor has been against wind and 
tide, with fruitless results. The former, — assuming 
sense to be the mainspring and responsible element 
of human character, starts out on real and solid 
ground; and hence, has the vigorous aid of common 
sense and empirical facts all the way through. 

This latter work needs to be done, and done as 
soon as may be; for until it is, philosophy cannot 
be altogether free from the shackles of materialism. 
Already, philosophy has been shackled long enough ; 
chained down indeed, like another Prometheus, as 
if for no purpose, except to be tormented by the 
all-devouring vulture, Materialism. 



CHAPTER IV. 

DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION ; ANALYSIS AND SYN- 
THESIS, ETC. 

It would require a volume equal in bulk to this 
one, to fully derive, define and give the various 
uses of the above words and others of kindred im- 
port; but the reader would be less wise at the end, 
than at the beginning of such a volume. It will be 
much better instead, to go directly to the real thing 
aimed at by these words; that is, the method of 
inquiry. 

And here at the fountain head, it is plainly seen 
how inquiry itself is blinded and misled respecting it- 
self just as it is blinded and misled respecting other 
objects; and that too, by the same means; viz., Il- 
lusion and symbol, which result from confounding 
mind and matter. 

In attempting to inquire about the method of 
inquiry, we make haste as in other cases, to con- 
found the real thing — the method of inquiry, with 
the object inquired about. Because the said object 
presents various aspects for examination, it is at once 
inferred that the inquiring method is changed ac- 

167 



168 the self: what is it? 

cordingly. Yet plainly enough, the method of in- 
quiry is wholly distinct from the object inquired 
about. 

Because the object may be studied either as a 
whole or in its parts, either in reference to its cause or 
its effects — because the operations as respects the 
object, may thus be reversed, it does not follow 
that the inquiring method is correspondingly re- 
versed. 

Vision and landscape for instance,, are two things, 
wholly distinct : because a landscape may be stud- 
ied from right to left, or from left to right — thus 
reversing the operation as respects the landscape, 
it does not follow that vision per se has also been 
reversed. Because a house may be looked at either 
from the front or the rear— thus reversing the order 
as respects the house, it does not follow that vis- 
ion is also reversed in the process. Only the stand- 
point, and not essential vision is changed. 

In each example, there are two things wholly 
distinct; viz., an active agent which operates, and 
a passive object on which the operation is per- 
formed. So in all inquiry, there is an active agent 
on the one hand, and a passive object on the 
other. In every case, the operation — as respects 
the active agent, is spontaneous and identical; 
while as respects the passive object, it may be dual 
or reversible. Now, to mistake the latter for the 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 169 

former — to mistake the reversed operation performed 
on the passive object, for the spontaneous activity 
of the agent, leads to the inference of two such ac- 
tivities — that is, two methods of inquiry. 

It is precisely this mistaking of the symbol for 
the real — the object of inquiry, for the method of 
inquiry, which leads to the assumption of two or 
more methods, variously called analysis and synthe- 
sis, deduction and induction, not to say others. The 
inference is, that because analysis and synthesis are 
two real and distinct operations as respects the pas- 
sive object, so they are equally true of the active 
mind: that is, because a given object may be both 
decomposed and recomposed by the chemist, so like- 
wise, his mind is decomposed and recomposed in the 
given operations. The illusion is plain enough. 

Let it be noted then, that though the words analy- 
sis, synthesis, deduction, induction, classification, 
generalization, abstraction, syllogism, with other 
like words: though these may be predicable of pass- 
ive objects, they have no corresponding import as 
respects the method of inquiry. The latter is but 
one and unchanging, and withal wholly distinct from 
the former. Because passive objects may be classi- 
fied, it does not follow that the mind is classified 
in the process; the one is the active classifier, the 
other is the passive classified. 

The method of inquiry is what it is, by virtue of 



lyo THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

itself, and not by comparison with its objects or 
their varying phases. Fully rid of illusive obscu- 
rities, it is as plain as A, B, C, being indeed the 
very means by which the latter are learned. It is 
one simple, unchanging, universal mode — in kind, 
though not in degree, employed alike by the brute, 
the infant, and the philosopher. It has already 
been glanced at, but requires a fuller notice at this 
special place. 

All inquiry, whether of brute, infant, or philos- 
opher, presupposes some object to be inquired 
about. To get such object, it must first be per- 
ceived. To perceive or identify one special object 
in the midst of others, it must be separated — dis- 
tinguished from those others. To so distinguish 
a special from other objects, implies an inference; 
an inference, that said special object, is what it is, 
and not another object. 

Certainly, nothing can be plainer, than that ra- 
tional perception is impossible without distinction; 
while distinction is equally impossible without in- 
ference. Each one implies the other two, nor can 
either one act without the other two. Though 
three they are but one and inseparable; and as one, 
represent the one sole method of inquiry; inso- 
much, no inquiry is even conceivable without this 
three in one principle or method. Allowing a hun- 
dred so called methods, it is self-evident to com- 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 1 71 

mon sense, that each one would be necessitated to 
perceive, distinguish and infer, else never make 
one step in any inquiry. 

But after the special object has once been got, 
what then is the next step in order to learn said 
object more minutely? Precisely the same with 
that, whereby it was first got. Every physical ob- 
ject consists of literal parts, while all others con- 
sist of logical parts. Once having the special ob- 
ject, it is next separated into its various parts: to 
so separate it into its parts rationally, can only be 
done by perception, distinction and inference re- 
specting said parts; so that, the method of first 
getting and then studying the object minutely, is 
identical. 

After getting a great mass of individual objects, 
the process may change from a separating of parts, 
into a combining of individuals into classes; but 
this reversed process, respects the objects only, and 
not the active mind. To classify or combine ra- 
tionally, requires the same perception, distinction 
and inference respecting the individuals so com- 
bined, as that required in separating a whole into 
its pars. That is, decomposition and recomposition, 
though contrary as respects the object, are identical 
as respects the active mind ; in both alike, perception, 
distinction, and inference are necessities, in order 
either to a rational separation or combination. 



172 the self: what is it? 

But inquiry constantly goes beyond concrete ob- 
jects, out into the realm of abstractions. Yet, such 
realm, in order to be accessible to cognition, must 
also present differing aspects; and which latter must 
be perceived, distinguished and inferred about, just 
as concrete objects. Only this, as knowledge becomes 
more abstract and general, we feel the need of more 
general terms; and instead of perception, distinc- 
tion and inference, the words Identity, Opposition 
and Ground, or others of like import, are employed. 
The latter, though called the three fundamental 
principles of logic, are essentially the same as the 
former. 

The one is a specializing and the other a gener- 
alizing process; but in this they refer to the ob- 
jects, and not to the method of mind; the latter 
is the same in both cases, though acting from differ- 
ent standpoints. The philosopher in his most ab- 
stract inquiries, employs no more and no less, than 
simple perception, distinction and inference, just as 
a child in learning a horse from a cow. 

Indeed, despite the vast chaos of opinions and 
illusive words referring to this question, it is plain 
to sober reflection, that to inquire in any respect — 
whether to decompose, to recompose, to think, to 
reason, to know, to be conscious, or other words 
assuming to represent distinct processes : that each 
ail all employ no more and no less than simple 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 173 

perception, distinction and inference; insomuch, 
that this three in one principle, with its implica- 
tions, personates pretty well all of the rudimental 
elements of cognition. 

This is but saying in another way, that in every 
inquiry the mind converges, not a part, but all its 
available power on the given object. True, all its 
individual faculties are never perhaps converged 
upon any one object; yet, no one of the number 
can act except by perception, distinction and infer- 
ence. Even to remember, to imagine, to build air 
castles, to dream would be impossible without this 
three in one principle. 

This reduction of all the distinctive cognitive 
powers down to perception, distinction and infer- 
ence, still leaves us in the dark as to the essence 
of the three, and especially as to how three can be 
one; still, this view is somewhat more simple and 
natural than a Babel hierarchy of manufactured 
myths. 

The one method of inquiry as consisting of this 
trinal principle, may be called reason, deduction, 
analysis, or other name preferred. The latter two 
are quite unfortunate; for in having cor-relates 
which can only refer to the object, they are mis- 
leading as to the method. But rather than a new 
name, it is better to conform to the most common 
usage, and employ the one word analysis; remem- 



174 i he self: what is it? 

bering always, that it implies but one method o£ 
trinal import as above indicated. 

Now, since analysis in this view — whether as re- 
spects decomposition, recomposition, or other pro- 
cess, is the only method, it follows that synthesis 
can only refer to the passive side of the operation 
as affecting the object. But apart from this, it is 
again plain, that synthesis in any event, must be 
the reverse of analysis; so that, reversing the order 
of the latter, synthesis would first infer, then dis- 
tinguish, and lastly perceive. Thus, its claim as a 
distinct method of mind, is doubly absurd and false. 

To be fully rid of the wilderness of illusions and 
words affecting this question, it is better to seek 
directly for some distinctive activity of mind, other 
than that implied in analysis as the one method. 
Even discursive and intuitive cognition though di- 
rect opposites in most other respects, both alike 
employ analysis: the one by means of comparison, 
the other, by contrast. From these two representa- , 
tive phases cf cognition, even down to dreaming 
as noted above, every distinctive process, is neces- 
sitated to employ perception, distinction and infer- 
ence. 

Then what is the harm of assuming synthesis to 
be a distinct method, inasmuch as v/e are none 
the less necessitated to employ analysis in all cases, 
even though unconsciously? Plainly, such a whole- 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 1 75 

sale error at the very outset of inquiry, can but de- 
ny the truth in a wholesale way throughout the 
given inquiry. 

Firstly, it denies the real element of existence. 
To see this, great care is needed to distinguish be- 
tween two distinct things, viz., the two general 
species — discursive and intuitive cognition on the 
one side, and the one method of inquiry on the 
other. Both species of cognition, one referring to 
mind and the other to matter, employ the one 
method of analysis: that is, both alike employ per- 
ception, distinction and inference, whether in 'the 
decomposition or in the recomposition of their re- 
spective objects mind and matter. So much on the 
one hand. 

Now again and on the other hand, the discursive 
ever tends to deny the intuitive; and in the pres- 
ent case, does so as follows: Confounding the ob- 
ject of inquiry with the method of inquiry, and 
seeing that the passive object can be both decom- 
posed and recomposed, it infers two corresponding 
methods of inquiry: one which decomposes, and the 
other which recomposes ; the latter or recomposer, 
it calls synthesis in distinction to the decomposer 
analysis. 

Two things must be noted just here: (i) This so- 
called synthesis is a pure product of discursive 
illusion, resulting from confounding the object and 



176 the self: what is it? 

the method of inquiry. And (2) being a creature 
of discursive illusion, it must be blind to every- 
thing except matter; so that, its pretended function 
of combining parts into wholes, refers only to phys- 
ical parts and wholes, and meanwhile ignores — de- 
nies the real or mental element of existence. 

In the next place, note, well, that synthesis in 
claiming to be a combiner of parts into wholes, 
therewith claims to be the reverse of analysis — a 
reversed method. Very well: if it be a reversed 
method, then it is a reversed method; and hereby, 
secondly, attains its climax of mischief, in becoming 
a clever-fellow-well-met with a reversed causality. 

That is, according to its origin and pretended 
function, synthesis can only see wholes as the result 
of combined parts, and causes as the result of com- 
bined effects; and thus, shoulder to shoulder with 
a reversed causality, it turns the entire world of 
intelligence wrong end foremost. Hence, instead 
of Nature's own true order, we now see causes re- 
sulting from effects, wholes from parts, fountains 
from streams, the first from the last, and so on. 

Separately, neither a reversed causality nor meth- 
od of inquiry can effect much; but both together, 
they become all powerful for mischief. They are 
the two great instruments, whereby materialism 
has won its chief victories; and without which, it 
could not come upon the battlefield of logic. 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION I 77 

Let us see the origin of each, side by side. The 
illusion of confounding symbol and real — of mistak- 
ing the human body for the mind for instance; and 
then seeing that, by adding part to pan, the body 
presently grows to wholeness, leads to the infer- 
ence, that parts make wholes and effects make causes 
— reversed causality. While again, by mistaking the 
object for the method of inquiry; and seeing that 
the object is both decomposable and recomposable, 
two methods of inquiry are inferred: synthesis — as 
recomposer, and also as the reverse of analysis, 
thus becomes a reversed method, combining parts 
into wholes in harmony with a reversed causality. 
Both alike, as the two great instruments of mater- 
ialism, thus illustrate and confirm the foregoing ex- 
position of contradiction. 

Both alike, being illusive falsehoods, can lead to 
nothing but falsehood. And thus it is plain at a 
glance for instance, that evolution, which derives 
the human mind — the highest cause belonging to 
the world, from a combination of mere trifles, is 
throughout under the guidance of a reversed causal- 
ity and method of inquiry; and hence, must of log- 
ical necessity be wholly false. 

What is the upshot of materialism — what is its 
culminating idea as resulting from a reversed caus- 
ality and method of inquiry? The one doctrine of 
growth : part added to part, presently grows to a 



178 THE self: what is it? 

whole; effect added to effect, presently grows to a 
cause. As product of two self-evident falsehoods, 
this doctrine of growth must also be false. But 
there are still other minor illusions, which, aided 
by long existing prejudices, suffice to keep up a 
notion of growth, even though its two chief props 
be taken away. These minor ones must also be 
noticed. 

This is no digression. An analysis of intelligence 
as often stated, necessitates an exposure of mate- 
rialism. The question of this chapter — the method 
of inquiry, is relevant to both; and leads us withal 
to growth, as the culminating idea of materialism. 
Being the all-inclusive idea, it is not enough to 
see it mainly, but as wholly false; and hereby ma- 
terialism stands exposed bodily. 

GROWTH. 

It is plain enough, that matter being passive, 
can only act as it is acted on, and hence cannot 
grow. Also, that a mere increase of bulk in animal 
and vegetable organisms, is not a growing in the 
materialistic sense; but rather, a building process. 
A process in which the life principle of the animal 
or plant, builds the organism by adding atom to 
atom, as the mason adds brick to brick in building 
a house. 

The question then, is not about the growth of 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 1 79 

the physical or symbolic structure — which is builded ; 
but about the growth of the builder. Does the 
builder of the plant or animal, or house, grow in 
accord with the increasing bulk of their respective 
structures? It has been assumed all along, that ex- 
istence consists of but the two elements, mind and 
matter; and since by common consent, matter can- 
not grow, it only remains to inquire whether mind 
can grow. 

The confounding of symbol and real, which has. 
vexed every question so far, also vexes this. At 
the very outset, mind is confounded with its ob- 
jects, its endowments, or other transient relations; 
and because said relations may increase relatively,, 
mind per se is assumed to grow. Mistaking knowl- 
edge, virtue, religion, civilization, wealth, or other 
contingency, for mind itself; and seeing that these 
contingencies may increase in bulk, it is hastily in- 
ferred that essential mind can grow. 

This is quite absurd : for (i) knowledge, virtue, 
etc., are not literal elements of mind, but only con- 
tingent endowments; and (2) even as contingen- 
cies, they do not grow essentially; but only rela* 
tively, and for the plain reason too, that they are 
just as liable to decrease, as to increase. 

Besides, we make the matter still worse, by not 
distinguishing between self-acquired endowments, 
and those which have been inherited from ancestors. 



l8o THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

Even an increase of self-acquired endowments, is 
no proof of mind growth; much less is an increase 
resulting from inheritance. 

Yet, what but paupers and savages would we be 
to-day, if wholly stripped of all that has come to 
us through sheer inheritance? Or see it thus: Ex- 
change an infant of our civilization for one of sav- 
age birth ; would not ours become a savage among 
savages, and the savage infant reared among us, 
become civilized like ourselves? v Most certainly, 
except perhaps some transient difference. Mark well, 
an essential growth of mind is one thing, while an 
increase in its endowments is quite another; the 
question is about a growth of pure mind. 

It is usual in debates on this question, to restrict 
inquiry almost wholly to intelligence, as an imper- 
sonation of mind ; and so we must do now, in order 
to get at the pros and cons of the case. It must 
be remembered, that intelligence — as a real phase 
of real mind, is quite distinct from knowledge: the 
former is an active agent; the latter, a contingent, 
passive thing to be acquired by the former. 

Remembering this, now if the philosopher be 
stripped of his inheritance— his inheritance from 
ancestors, as also that from his own experience, 
study, etc., then in what respect is he superior to 
an average infant, in respect of the essential machin- 
ery of intelligence? Plainly, not one whit. True 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION l8l 

enough as Locke says, mind is born into the world 
a mere blank. But blank in what respect? In re- 
spect of experience, knowledge, virtue, or other 
contingency to be got later on. As for the rest, the 
infant is equal to the philosopher in all the essen- 
tial elements of intelligence. Without an inborn 
power to perceive, the infant could never begin to 
learn any more than a mile post j while again, a 
power to perceive of necessity implies a power to 
distinguish and infer; and having which three, with 
their implications, the infant has all that the phi- 
losopher has or ever can have in the way of innate 
elements. 

Like all rational machinery, intelligence must be 
complete in itself, before it can run at all It is 
not a thing to start out on one wheel, and by slow 
degrees acquire the other wheels needed for its 
completion, any more than an engine could do. 
We only imagine otherwise, by confounding intel- 
ligence with knowledge, which latter is but a pro- 
duct of the former. The machinery of intelligence 
does not grow simply because its product knowledge 
increases, any more than the machinery of a cotton 
mill grows, because its manufactured products in- 
crease. 

All this means to say — were such thing possible, 
that if the first child born into the world could 
change places with one born now, each one would 



1 82 the self: what is it? 

partake of its surroundings, without showing any 
radical difference of intelligence, except perhaps of 
a transient sort. 

So much to get the question somewhat clearly in 
view: it is not about an increase of varying modes, 
relations, or endowments ; but about a growth of 
intelligence per se. To get as near as can be to the 
question, it is well to glance (i) at the structure 
of intelligence ; (2) the structure of its objects; 
and (3) the structure of knowledge, as product of 
the first two 

As just said, it is undeniable to common sense, 
that intelligence could never start to act without an 
inborn power to perceive its objects ; and that such 
power of necessity includes distinction and infer- 
ence. This three in one principle either contains in 
itself, else it presupposes that other principle, 
cause and effect, in order to its full efficiency. 
Otherwise, perception could only act in a very par- 
tial and fruitless way; could only see a rhapsody 
of passing objects, without any coherent relations. 
The principle of cause and effect is indispensable 
to rational perception; and it does not matter in 
this issue, whether it be assumed as distinct from, 
or as included in perception. In any event it must 
be assumed as innate. 

It is agreed on all hands, that whatever is a uni- 
versal and necessary manifestation of intelligence, 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 183 

is therefore innate; and the principle of cause and 
effect will stand this test, (i) It is universal, 
because all intelligences — men and brutes, act it 
out, whether consciously or not. (2) It is neces- 
sary, because both men and brutes are necessitated 
to refer effects to causes; the brute for instance, 
refers a noise heard in the forest to an enemy, and 
takes to flight. 

This principle itself, has various and most vital 
implications. For instance, the cause as a source 
of the effect, must be prior to, independent of, and 
greater than the effect. The latter meanwhile being 
dependent, is contingent — is what it is, by virtue of 
something other than itself. No number of such 
effects combined, can make one cause ; nor could 
such a thing be coneived of, except by confounding 
spontaneous or intensive causality, with its exten- 
sive symbolism in mechanical operations. 

Now then, rational perception and its implica- 
tions, being the primary elements of cognition, must 
first exist before cognition can begin: they must be 
inborn — already made; for otherwise, cognition 
must be a self creator. Yet, this is the doctrine 
of materialism : beginning at nothing, even before 
itself exists, cognition manages by means of experi- 
ence, to manufacture itself. But how is experience 
possible, before there is some subject to experience 
the experience? At this rate, a stone or stump might 



184 the self: what is it? 

grow wise: a house might lay down its own founda- 
tions and build itself. Or, if primary elements can 
be got by sheer experience, then the brute having 
the same means, ought to be as wise as a man. But 
a doctrine of such amazing folly, can only result 
from a reversed causality and method of inquiry, 
which begins everything with atoms. 

That the essential mechanism of cognition is 
complete and full grown at the start, may be illus- 
trated by the common child's question: Mother, who 
made God? This question results neither from 
choice, nor caprice, nor any special curiosity about 
God ; but from an inborn necessity of the child's 
intelligence, to go back to prime causality. 

Instead of reversing the natural order and begin- 
ning with atoms, the child begins with the whole ;. 
instead of starting with the tip-ends of things like 
the atomist, it begins with the big-end. No child 
is fool enough to begin the. spire of its mimic house, 
before laying the foundation. In learning A, B, C, 
it is learning the key of all written knowledge.- 
In learning to count, it is learning the rudiments 
of arithmetic. So precisely, in Grammar, Geogra- 
phy, and everything else, it begins with foundation- 
elements, and never with the termini of things. 

Though the child and brute both alike, act out 
the cause and effect principle, neither of them is in- 
telligibly conscious of it and which shows again, that 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 185 

said principle is inborn. And though in respect 
of kind, the principle is the same in both; yet, in 
degree or scope, there is an impassable gulf be- 
tween them. The principle as employed by the 
brute, includes but a few concrete things; and is 
never expanded one whit, though the brute should 
live a hundred years. 

Whereas that of the child includes prime causal- 
ity in its vast scope. But no man can ever be either 
so old or so wise, as to conceive of anything be- 
yond or outside of prime causality. It is of neces- 
sity all-inclusive; and as such is the root idea — the 
fundamental element of all possible human intelli- 
gence. Though unconsciously, the child has this 
all inclusive principle at the start ; and hence, 
abstractly at least, the mechanism of its intelligence 
is whole — full grown, at the start. 

Do not confound the so-called growth — building 
of the child's body, with its mind. Extensively 
considered, even God is not so large as a grain of 
sand — indeed, has no extent at all ; yet He is cause 
of all things. Then do not infer the child's mind 
to be small, because its body is. 

Neither must the child's knowledge be confound- 
ed with the machinery of its intelligence. Its knowl- 
edge is contingent — something to be got by itself; 
and whether more or less, does not concern the 
present point. Instead, the vital point to see is 



186 the self: what is it? 

this: The inborn machinery for getting the knowl- 
edge, is large enough to take in the universe at 
the start. Being whole and full grown at the start, 
it cannot grow; obviously enough indeed, it must 
begin its career complete and in full armor like 
Minerva, else never begin at all. 

Next (2) it has been seen elsewhere, that this 
trait of wholeness or totality, attaches also to the 
objects of cognition. To be sure, much is said 
about parts of this and that object; but each of 
said parts is a whole from a rational standpoint — a 
whole part, if no more; while besides, all parts 
are void and meaningless, without relation to the 
whole of which they are parts. 

In other words, rational inquiry is impossible, 
without some total object. As before seen, no two 
facts or parts of a science, can be rationally com- 
bined, without reference to a total fundamental prin- 
ciple. This is true of events, as well as of things. 
The various facts picked up and combined into a 
system of evidence by a jury, would be meaning- 
less, without reference to a murdered man or some 
like primary fact, as a common bond of relation. 

Indeed and in a word, all cognition is converged 
into the one method analysis; while the upshot of 
analysis — by perception, distinction and inference, 
is either to decompose or recompose totals. Plainly, 
this trait of totality, attaching to all cognizable ob- 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 187 

jects, indicates a corresponding trait in the ma- 
chinery of cognition. If the latter be not whole in 
itself, it could not handle the conception wholeness; 
much less would it be necessitated to assume all 
its objects as wholes. 

But (3) a trait attaching universally, both to cog- 
nition and its objects, must of necessity attach to 
knowledge, as product of the two. Hence, each 
conception, proposition, section, or division of any 
given science, is an individual total; all of which 
together, represent a total science. Note, however, 
the subordinate individuals, do not by combination 
make or cause the total science, but flow from it; 
while the total science in turn, flows from its total 
fundamental principle. This means to say, that com- 
bined branches, twigs, leaves, etc., do not make 
the tree, but flow from the tree: effects flow from 
causes, but not contrariwise. 

What is true of the elements and form of one 
special science is true of all sciences together: all 
together, they represent a unified total knowledge. 

Of course knowledge is not yet and perhaps may 
never be practically realized as a literal total; still, 
its abstract principles all together, must represent a 
total unified scheme, corresponding in scope with 
the mechanism of intelligence; and which latter in- 
cludes everything included in prime causality. From 
its very nature, all its parts must have harmony, 



188 the self: what is it? 

unity and totality: nothing can be added to or sub- 
tracted from its essential scheme; nor can it grow 
or decrease any more than the multiplication table. 

Like each of its subordinate sections, the total 
scheme of knowledge, springing forth from one 
great root or fundamental principle, must thence 
continue unfolding from larger to lesser principles 
— which, though increasing in number, diminish in 
import; much as a tree springing forth from the 
life principle of the acorn, thence proceeds to trunk, 
limbs, branches, twigs and leaves. This is but say- 
ing, the scheme of knowledge conforms to the uni- 
versal order, from causes to effects, from wholes to 
parts. 

Like the child, not only savages, but the most il- 
lustrious nations make haste to grapple the God, 
or prime Cause idea first; and thence proceed to 
philosophy, astronomy and so on downward from 
larger to lesser principles. What a number of dis- 
tinct sciences have we now for instance, which, a 
few years ago were included in the one idea natural 
philosophy. 

But according to materialism with its reversed 
causality and method of inquiry, the procedure 
ought to be precisely the contrary; that is, from 
effects to causes, from parts to wholes, from tip- 
ends to big-ends, from nothing to something. 

These facts, selected from a multitude of others, 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 189 

suffice to show beyond dispute, that the structure of 
intelligence, of its objects, and of knowledge, are 
each characterized by the trait of wholeness— fit II- 
grownness; and hence the three conspire to pro- 
nounce the doctrine of mind growth to be a most 
monstrous absurdity. 

Relative increase or decrease — ceaseless modifica- 
tion, is not denied; but essential growth, of no mat- 
ter what kind, is literally impossible according to 
the supreme law of cause and effect. This law does 
not work from less to greater, like an assumed 
growth; but from greater to less, as exemplified by 
the universal order. Otherwise, an atom would 
finally grow up to god-head. 

Or see it thus : If mind can grow, then its intel- 
ligence, its objects, its principles of knowledge 
would also grow; and at which rate, though 2 -{-2=4 
to-day, yet by and by, they might equal 5, or 6, or 
7, and so on. In brief, growth of mind would 
cancel the principles of Identity and Permanence ; 
and in so doing, would cancel both intelligence and 
rational existence. 

EMPIRICAL VIEW. 

No one fact is plainer in the history of man, than 
that his essential mind does not grow; but always 
was, precisely what it is now. Yet a practical view 
of the question, is even more blurred and obscured 
by illusion and false reasoning, than the abstract. 



i go the self: what is it? 

History presents a vast field, in which a profli- 
gate synthesis, by selecting a bit here and a bit 
there, may prove anything. 

The chief illusion in the doctrine of mind growth,, 
has already been seen to consist in confounding 
mind proper, with its contingent modes and endow- 
ments. The same trick — much grosser, however, 
has been employed in the practical view of the 
question. In the latter, instead of its own peculiar 
endowments, the mind is confounded with its phys- 
ical surroundings. Thus confounded — with fine car- 
pets and spring mattresses for instance, it is easy 
to prove, that our ancestors a few years back, were 
but savages ; while at the same rate, and going a 
little further back, man was of logical necessity a 
dumb brute. 

The utter folly of such reasoning may be seen, 
by a just contrast of ourselves, with our so-called 
savage ancestors — say the ancient Greeks for in- 
stance, in respect of essential mind. A just and 
rational contrast would require to subtract from our 
side, all that we have inherited from the Greeks, 
themselves, as well as from their successors down 
to date. 

In the first place then, Christianity is no inven- 
tion of ours, and its benign influence on modern 
society, must be subtracted from our merits. And 
next — but such procedure will disgrace us utterly. 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION igi 

Then, excepting Christianity only, in what valid 
respect are we superior to the Greeks, except in 
physics and their consequent physical advantages? 

But is a knowledge of physics the highest knowl- 
edge, and are physical comforts the most valuable? 
Rather, are not moral, esthetic, philosophical and 
like endowments, more refining and exalting to hu- 
man character? In these latter and higher respects, 
so far from being superior, or even equal to the 
Greeks, we take them as models, and are proud in 
the ratio of successful imitation. 

But let us take astronomy as the highest spire of 
physics, and going still further back, contrast our- 
selves with the Assyrians and Egyptians. Deduct 
our indebtedness to them and their successors down 
to date, and what is left for us to boast about? 
Would we in truth have any astronomy at all? No 
matter; there is one great difference between us 
and those old savages: viz., They wrought out the 
heavier and far more difficult foundation elements, 
leaving the lighter and less original work for their 
successors. 

Much more can the same be said of other branches 
of knowledge. In every valid instance, our ances- 
tors were the robust pioneers, who felled the forests, 
cleared up the fields, plowed and planted the ground, 
leaving us in most cases, little else to do, than 
gather in the harvest. Not satisfied with reaping 



jg 2 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

where we had not sown, we cap the climax by 
claiming essential superiority over our manly bene- 
factors. Nay alas! alas! we slander these heroic 
ancestors as being barbarians, savages — even brutes. 
Such as this may indicate a growth in effeminate 
self-conceit, but not in essential mind. 

Despite the materialistic tendency of Bacon's 
doctrine of induction, he has in another way, given 
quite a spank-in-the-face to this infatuation about 
growth. Not the literal words, but the substance 
is about this: In the infancy of a nation, arms pre- 
vail; in its manhood, arms and learning; in its old 
age, commerce and the mechanical arts. This is 
universal history condensed into a nut-shell; and 
the upshot is : History repeats itself. Being self- 
evidently true, it amounts to a wholesale denial 
and disproof of the doctrine of radical growth. 

This truism does not refer to one special, but to 
all nations, and includes aggregated humanity. 
The civilization of the entire race taken as a unit, 
has ever had its alternating periods of flow and 
ebb, day and night; the former being characterized 
by the stages of infancy, manhood and old age, 
incident to individual nations, and thus presenting 
the same tread-mill routine on the largest possible 
scale. 

Now contrast the several periods of highest civi- 
lization—say, the Assyrian, Egyptian, Greek, Ro- 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION I93 

man, and Anglo -Saxon; and allowing for contingent 
differences, resulting mainly from inheritance, where. 
in do the essential mind manifestations of the sev- 
eral periods differ? The reply can only be: History 
but repeats itself. 

Add to this the sad fact, that civilization and 
barbarism still exist side by side, as they have 
through the past. Still worse indeed, the most 
loathsome barbarism is seen to-day, growing up 
from the very heart of our highest civilization. 
Our largest cities — the centers of our boasted civ- 
ilization, are to a most frightful degree, proving to 
be literal hot-houses for producing the most loath- 
some barbarism. 

All this too in spite of moder?i education, wealth, 
military power, natural selection, and other like 
materialistic humbugs, which pretend to build up 
and maintain a constantly growing civilization. Such 
fungus-growth — downward instead of upward, though 
so well fertilized, not only disproves essential mind 
growth, but shows withal, that manly virtue is the 
only builder, while unmanly vice is the only de- 
stroyer of individual and national prosperity. 

This reminds, that so far, intelligence has been 
tacitly assumed to personate mind; and which was 
required, in order to see the question in its popular 
aspects. But this treatise holds sensibility to be the 
basic element; and hence, a few words are needed 
just here. 



ig4 THE SELF: ^ VHAT IS IT ? 

The proof against a radical growth of intelligence, 
will apply with still greater force against that of 
sense: if for no other reason — according to the as- 
sumption, the latter is the ground of the former. 
Besides there are many facts, peculiar only to 
sense, showing that it, least of all, could have 
grown up from a brute origin. 

For instance, human and brute intelligence, 
though differing in degree, are tfre same in kind; 
but this cannot be said respecting sense. To omit 
the esthetic and other senses, the brute is wholly 
destitute of a conscience or moral sense. Now, 
the point to be noted here, is not so much that 
man has a sense which is lacking in the brute, as 
that the sense so lacking in the brute, is on the 
other hand, man's noblest endowment; and hence, 
makes an incalculably greater gulf between man and 
brute, than that made by their difference of intelli- 
gence. 

Add to this, that the moral sense is, or ought to 
be the supreme causal element in man; and as such 
cause, it could by no possibility grow, unless we 
reverse nature's order, and make causes result from 
effects. 

As for the rest, the senses — as love, anger, etc.,. 
manifest themselves instantly after birth and long 
before the dawn of intelligence. Like intelligence 
of course, these new-born senses are empty of em- 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 195 

pirical content; but in essential mechanism, mani- 
fest full-grownness even before intelligence. They 
may subsequently acquire, either virtue or vice; but 
these are contingent states of sense, and do not im- 
ply a growth of sense per se. 

Sense is not only ahead of intelligence in first sa- 
luting earthly life, but is the last in relaxing its hold 
upon it. At the coming of death, both intelligence 
and the physical body, yielding inch by inch, are 
apt to first become passive and helpless; while 
sense, thus left alone still asserts itself ; insomuch, 
the ruling sense is proverbially the strongest in the. 
grip of death. 

An empirical view is also stronger against a 
growth of sense, than against that of intelligence. 
It is enough to note for instance, that the moral, 
esthetic, and other sense manifestations of the Iliad, 
are radically identical with those of to-day : only, 
we cannot describe our own sensibilities of to-day, 
so well as the Iliad has done it for us. 

EVOLUTION. 

All the foregoing about growth, applies directly 
to evolution, which latter is but an illusive name 
for the same thing. No doctrine of materialism is 
a purer result of reversed causality and method of 
inquiry than evolution. Apart from this, however, 
its very first step is an outrage to Identity, the 



196 the self: what is it? 

first principle of logic. That is, in its search for 
the origin of man, the body, rather than the mind, 
is selected as an object of inquiry; or, if mind be 
discussed at all, it is put on a physical basis and 
treated according to physical maxims. 

To result from either of the three — violated Iden- 
tity, reversed causality or method of inquir)', is 
enough to put evolution beneath logical criticism. 
Still, as a late and most popular expression of ma- 
terialism, its special claims must be glanced at, 
apart from the three mortal ailments specified. 

It only traces man back to the ascidian — some- 
thing lower, though not far off from the tad pole. 
But why? Certainly not for want of ample author- 
ity ; since the facts and logic which trace him back 
to the ascidian, could with even more consistency, 
trace him back to an atom. This is quite a fault 
in evolution: though a doctrine of pure atomism, it 
lacks the logical consistency and manly self-respect, 
to acknowledge its parentage. 

But this glance is simply to see the drift — the 
one general argument of evolution. Looking out 
on the world, it sees everything shifting and chang- 
ing: no one thing '^permanent; there is no sharp 
distinction between any two things; and hence, 
no such thing as a distinct fixed species. All this 
too, is directly suggested from the experience of 
one man. 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 197 

In the face of this, ask the evolutionist for one 
instance in experience, in which a brute was trans- 
formed into a man. Instantly he is astonished, 
that you should expect such transformation within 
the contracted limits of experience; and hereupon, 
assumes countless geologic periods anterior to ex- 
perience. That is, having thrown away a legiti- 
mate intelligence at the outset, in violating Iden- 
tity, he now in turn throws away experie?ice. 

Next, ask for proof of such transformation, during 
his assumed geologic periods, and he is again as- 
tonished, that you should expect decisive proof from 
such source; and hereupon, begins a rig- ma-role 
about the obscurity of geologic records, missing 
links, etc. 

But after such dodging and jugglery are over, 
the only pretense of final proof, is in direct con- 
tradiction to the original premises. That is, at 
the outset, the chief labor is to show up a cease- 
less growth and change, which is urged to such an 
extreme, as to tacitly deny all idea of permanence. 

But as final resort, this same discarded principle 
of permanence is employed as the only means of 
proof: the permanence implied in heredity, rever- 
sion, rudimentary organs, etc., furnish the only 
vestige of final proof. Certain human teeth and 
other like physical trifles, assumed to result from 
heredity, reversion, etc., indicate a real perma- 



I98 HE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

nence; which permanence, though all otherwise 
denied, is yet found sufficient to prove that man 
was a brute countless ages ago. 

Seeing that this doctrine has no one valid fact 
for its support, and is throughout but a series of 
trifling sophistries, why is it none the less so pop- 
ular? Mainly because, being a pure product of pure 
materialism, it personates that element of contra- 
diction and sophistry in human character which ever 
strives to degrade mind down to a v level with mat- 
ter. * 

Besides, it has cunningly managed to impress an 
over zealous popular mind, with the notion, that it 
is a product of genuine science. Having gathered 
much of its data from several branches of physics 
— despite its prostitution of said data, it none the 
less claims to be a product of physics — a product 
of science; and as such, sets up itself as a standard 
of truth. So that: "Dare you deny the plain facts 
of Science," has ever been its most powerful argu- 
ment. 

But even were it strictly true and scientific, it is 
hard to see the need of a science, to excite and in- 
flame that which has ever been one of the most ex- 
cessive tendencies of human nature: viz., A belief 
in excessive growth, or progress as it is popularly 
called. Our inborn tendency this way, is strong 
enough without the aid of science. 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 199 

Perhaps no trait of human character is more ex- 
travagant, than an unbridled self-conceit. This 
trait, always assuming itself to be the highest and 
brightest, naturally enough throws off a dazzling 
radiance upon all near objects; so that, itself, its 
family, its town, its nation, and its generation are 
greatly ahead of all preceding ones. 

Doubtless, each generation between Augustus 
Caesar and Alfred of England, esteemed itself as 
being greatly superior to the preceding one; al- 
though as matter of fact, they represented a con- 
stantly deteriorating series. At the same rate and 
for the same reasons, most youths of fifteen, are 
apt to think themselves wiser than their fathers. 

Of course, though either individuals or nations, 
by using proper means, may advance relatively, in 
knowledge, virtue, religion, wealth, etc. ; yet, by 
improper means, they are equally certain to retro- 
grade in said respects. Besides, no instrument is 
more powerful in bringing about the latter result, 
than a dizzy, self-conceited infatuation of growth 
or progress. 

Why? Plainly because, allowing a radical growth, 
the knowledge acquired to-day, would be obsolete 
to-morrow. The opinions, usages, and institutions 
of each generation, would be as so many relics of 
barbarism to the next. Past experience would be 
■no criterion for present or future purposes. Instead, 



200 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

the watchword would be, the faster we pull down 
the old, so much the better; for hereby, room is 
made for something new and still wiser. 

Thus the door would be thrown wide open for 
ceaseless change, revolution, anarchy and speedy 
annihilation. Certainly the tendency in this direc- 
tion has always been strong enough — especially 
with decaying nations, without the aid of a so- 
called science. 

Seeing the emptiness of the theory; its frightful 
practical tendencies; and withal, its utter reckless- 
ness of the effect on society, it is quite strange to 
hear its chief promulgators called great scientists 
and sages, instead of scientific outlaws. For be- 
yond dispute, the theory from first to last, is one 
continuous broad-sider, not only against civiliza- 
tion, but especially against all true science. 

Of course, these sages have contributed some- 
thing to physics. But what does it signify, to pay 
one's mite of taxes into the public treasury, and 
then turning about, try to destroy the whole treas- 
ury? Or, simply because of giving a drink of water 
to a thirsty traveler, thereupon take authority to 
hurl their doctrines like so many poisoned darts, at 
the great throbbing heart of civilization? 

This doctrine was taught in substance — more log- 
ically too, and was refuted by the great Plato thou- 
sands of years ago. Its late success and popularity, 



DEDUCTION AND INDUCTION 201 

are anything but a proof of radical growth of mind 
since that period. 

Finally, the attempt to trace the human mind to 
a brute origin, through and by means of the physical 
body, is bad enough; but the attempt to do the 
same, by a pretended inquiry into mind per se, is 
still worse. This latter pretends to give mind a 
fair trial on its own merits; but it is a mock trial, 
in which a forsworn synthesis and reversed caus- 
ality pronounce judgment before the trial begins. 



CHAPTER V. 

A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT'S DOCTRINES. 

In an indirect and disinterested way, several of 
Kant's chief doctrines bear upon this treatise; a 
notice of which will be well at this point. The 
Critique contains two chief doctrines around which 
all others revolve. Though not so fully emphasized 
in the Ethics, they are still manifested in it also. 

One of these doctrines represents his greatest 
achievement,- the other, his greatest failure. The 
first was his doctrine of sense perception; the sec- 
ond was the restriction of said perception to time 
and space conditions; or which is the same, to the 
five senses. By the first, he wrested philosophy 
from the embrace of materialism; by the second, 
he restored it to that unnatural embrace. 

True enough, these two doctrines were not set 
forth by him, as being the topic of the Critique; 
nor did they primarily prompt him to its composi- 
tion. Instead, the motive was to answer Hume, 
who, along with Locke, held all knowledge to be a 
product of experience. To refute this, Kant first 
set out to show, that experience itself is impossi- 

202 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT S DOCTRINES 203 

ble, without an anterior perception of space. Thus 
he held, there can be no experience without mat- 
ter, and no matter without space ; so that, a percep- 
iton of space must precede matter, while matter in 
turn must precede experience. 

His next step was to show, that we first come to 
know space by means of sense perception, and not 
by conceptions; and here precisely, he gets his 
first chief doctrine of sense perception. Thus get- 
ting the doctrine incidentally in his reply to Hume, 
it thenceforth became his favorite thought. This 
will be doubted by careless readers; but that it is 
true, may be seen in all his after writings. Firstly 
and fully, by the extravagant value he set upon 
another doctrine resulting from it: viz., "The pos- 
sibility of a priori synthetical judgments, consti- 
tutes the Universal Problem of Pure Reason." No 
matter what we may think of this vast problem, 
Kant at least regarded it as a very great one; yet 
this problem resulted from his space and time doc- 
trines, which in turn resulted from that of sense 
perception. 

In other words, his original object was to answer 
Hume; and this a priori power to perceive space, 
was both an answer to and a victory over Hume. 
But this success was by means of sense perception, 
which latter hereby becomes a favorite. And now, 
as if to reward space for this treasure of sense per- 



204 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

ception, he makes space and time the conditions 
and limits of all perception. That is, he restricts 
perception to space and time — that is, to matter — 
that is, to the five senses. Thus, sense perception 
first, and its restriction secondly, became a sun 
and moon, controlling all the majestic ebbs and 
flows, especially of the Critique. 

The first — sense perception, he assumed as self- 
evident and took no trouble to prove; but the sec- 
ond — its restriction to space limits, he never did 
prove to suit himself, though the attempt to do so, 
was the chief labor of the Critique. The vast labor 
employed to disprove a theoretical knowledge of 
freedom, mind, God, etc. — as glanced at in the 
antinomies, was not in truth so much intended for 
said disproof, as to restrict perception to space 
conditions : that is, perception is limited to space, 
therefore we cannot know God, freedom, etc., which 
are outside of space or five sense conditions. 

In brief, the great work of the Critique, was to 
fight everything which seemed to deny his restricted 
perception. Being in this way led to deny a knowl- 
edge of God, etc., the Ethics at once became a ne- 
cessity to indemnify the negations of the Critique; 
so that, sense perception and its restriction, repre- 
sent the upshot of both books; though Kant doubt- 
less, would have denied this bitterly. 

To restrict perception to space conditions, is 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT'S DOCTRINES 205 

virtually to restrict it to the five senses, and deny 
it to all the others. Yet from first to last, he never 
examined the other senses, nor attempted to show 
them in any way incapable of perception. This is 
not strange, seeing how oblivious he was, and to 
what extremes he went in trying to maintain his 
restricted perception; which latter, despite all, 
he never did to suit himself. 

His restriction is strange, however, in view of his 
space doctrine itself. His exposition of space and 
time, if not the first, was at least the clearest ever 
known before. According to his view, space is 
literally nothing, else it could not be occupied by 
something — could not be occupied by extended 
bodies. Being nothing, it has no real existence, 
except in the mind — except as a perception or con- 
ception of mind, as might be said of non-entity for 
instance. As a conception, it is a positive neces- 
sity, in order to conceive of matter, which latter 
implies extension or space. 

Now plainly, space perse being a non-entity, can- 
not restrict any thing, much less the powers of per- 
ception. Even the conception of space — which is 
a reality in the mind, can only restrict attention 
while the mind is occupied with said conception; 
which same, however, may be said of any other con- 
ception. 

The obvious trouble is, that confounding the noth- 



206 the self: what is it? 

ing called space — a mere symbol, with the concep- 
tion of space — a real thing, we unconsciously as- 
cribe the traits of the real, to the symbol ; and one 
of which traits is infinity. Thus endowed, this 
nothing or symbol instantly expands into a sort of 
vast iron cage, of infinite dimensions, containing 
all things. Yet according to Kant himself, this 
seemingly great iron cage, is nothing but a concep- 
tion of the mind projected externally; and any at- 
tempt to transcend it, is but an attempt to outrun 
one's own shadow. 

The same is true of time. Eternal as applied to 
time and infinite as applied to space, are two words 
which represent the mind's own definition of that 
which is assumed to be endless and limitless. They 
are but conceptions, with no real externality; and 
an attempt to transcend them, is a self-imposed im- 
possibility, requiring the mind to transcend itself. 

Neither again, because matter, implying space 
and time, cannot be conceived of outside of space 
and time limits, does it follow respecting those 
things which do not imply space and time — as mind 
for instance. Because fish cannot live out of water, 
it does not follow of birds also. 

Now then, Kant starting out with Hume on a 
physical plane; elated with triumph by means of 
his space doctrine; and withal, liable to illusion 
like all of us, simply confounds symbol and real, 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT S DOCTRINES 20J 

mattei and mind: because the physical aspects of 
existence are inconceivable outside of space and 
time limits; because nothing of such kind can be 
perceived outside of said limits, he restricts all 
perception to space and time. 

Yet and according to himself, time and space be- 
ing non-entities, cannot restrict any thing. It is 
equally plain, that a conception of them, can re- 
strict—occupy the mind, only while the mind is so 
occupied. It is still more absurd, to limit imma- 
terial things to material restrictions: it is far worse 
indeed, than to say, because light is a necessity for 
vision, so it is a necessity for hearing. 

Freedom of mind is such, that not even God can 
consistently restrict it. Then how can two non-enti- 
ties, or the conceptions of two non-entities, restrict 
it? It would be far more plausible to say, that dark- 
ness restricts hearing and feeling and thinking, sim- 
ply because it restricts seeing. 

POPULAR THEORV. 

Let it be remembered, Kant did not investigate 
contradictions per se\ but taking them for granted, 
employed them to disprove a knowledge of free- 
dom, God, etc. So precisely, in the present case, 
he does not inquire into the perceptive powers of 
the various senses; but rather, assuming that noth- 
ing can be known outside of space and time con- 



2o8 the self: what is it? 

ditions, tacitly denies perception to all except the 
five, on the same ground that he denied a knowl- 
edge of God, etc. Of course, the popular theory is 
along with Kant, in restricting perception to the 
five senses. But the fact is, that Kant has done 
more than any other to explode the popular theory. 

The word touch seems to be the ground of the 
popular theory. As far back as Democritas, the five 
senses were assumed to be modifications of the one 
principle touch. My five senses can touch matter 
and realize it as hard, soft, hot, etc. I cannot 
doubt these five; but as to the other senses, they 
and their objects are so vague and airy, as to be 
wholly intangible. This seems to be about the 
upshot of the common assumption. 

But according to Kant, the common notion of 
touch, is a pure delusion. His system, though 
often implying the contrary, regarded matter as an 
appearance only, having no reality, except in the 
mind, somewhat as was noted relatively to time and 
space. In such event, what does touch signify, 
the object perceived being nothing? 

Or apart from idealism, many truths of mathe- 
matics for instance, have even greater clearness 
and certainty, than perceptions of matter. Yet in 
perceiving said truths, there is no touching in the 
respect under question. Or in the case of vision, 
matter is not touched; but only light, and light is 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT S DOCTRINES 200, 

a force. So in hearing; the object perceived or 
touched, is force and not matter. 

But the notion of touch is an error at the root. 
Confounding the mind with the organs of the five 
senses,, and assuming the latter to touch matter in 
the process of perception, touch is hereby seen to 
be the ground of perception. But plainly, mind and 
mind only can perceive, and being withal immater- 
ial, touch in the common meaning cannot occur be- 
tween it and matter. 

Allowing touch to be so significant, why does not 
the touching of two brickbats, result in perception? 
Obviously because, the brickbats have no feeling 
wherewith to realize the touch. This at once shows 
touch to be utterly void and meaningless, without 
feeling; and hence, that feeling and not touching 
is the real ground of perception. Feeling indeed ! 
But the principle of feeling permeates all the sen- 
ses, and binds them into one unified family. 

If feeling be the ground of perception, and all 
the senses have feeling, why are not all of them 
perceptive as well as the five? Certainly, if the 
quality of feeling, or the quality of the objects im- 
plied, be taken into account, the others have a 
vastly higher claim to perceptive powers than the 
five. Neither again can physical organs be made 
a test; for these are only needed for physical ob- 
jects. Has the mind no objects, except those of 



2IO THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

matter? Yet the stupid assumption is, that the 
feeling of matter with the fingers for instance, is 
perceptive; while the feeling of love, philanthropy,, 
patriotism, etc., is stone blind. 

The truth is, a restriction of perception to 
the five senses, is not only unjust and unnat- 
ural, but has no vestige of authority, except, 
blind assumptions. Though Kant by indirect as- 
sumption restricted it, he meanwhile explodes the 
popular theory in its favor. Besides, implicity at: 
least, he has himself given ample proof for unre- 
stricted perception. 

Thus, he managed, though with great trouble,, 
to squeeze mathematical perceptions into his sys- 
tem; yet, in so doing, he opened the door for un- 
restricted perception. For, from his own stand- 
point, there is not a hair's breadth difference be- 
tween mathematical and esthetic perceptions. But 
the latter act independently of physical organs 
and objects; and if one can, then all may. If the 
esthetic sense be perceptive, why may not the mor- 
al or any other sense be also? 

Again he says, no object — whether in or out of 
the mind can be known, until it is first perceived; 
and emphasizes the fact still more, that sense only 
can perceive. These two statements are self-evident, 
and put together read thus: We can only know, 
what we perceive; and can only perceive, by means. 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT S DOCTRINES 211 

of sense. At this rate and of logical necessity, 
either we can only know five sense objects; else 
all the senses are perceptive. The latter is the 
only alternative; for otherwise, we can only ac- 
count for our knowledge of matter and its implica- 
tions. 

Freed from illusion and prejudice, this question 
is too plain for debate. We have a world full of 
well known objects — as those of a moral, social,, 
religious, political, scientific, educational, and 
many other kinds, which are neither physical, nor 
perceived by physical organs; which yet in truth, 
personate our highest and most vital interests. Do 
we know said interests, or are they mere fancies? 
Rather, do we not know them, with even more 
certainty, than we know objects of the five senses? 

But if we know them, they must first have been 
perceived; and if perceived, then it must have been 
by perceptive senses corresponding to the given ob- 
jects; for clearly, such immaterial objects are for- 
ever beyond five sense perceptions. 

But this is a vital question: let us rely on com- 
mon sense. First, find one valid reason, why all 
the senses are not perceptive. Next, how can any 
sense be first known, except by means of the given 
sense itself; and if itself, can only be known by 
and through itself, how otherwise can its implica- 
tions be known? That is, we do not know vision 



212 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

for instance, by means of hearing or other sense; 
but only by vision itself; hence and much less, can 
we know color or other implication of vision, ex- 
cept by vision itself. 

Plainly, the same is true of all the other senses. 
We can know nothing for instance, of avarice, am- 
bition, love, the esthetic, the moral, nor any other 
sense — much less of their implications, except 
through the given sense itself, just as we can only 
know vision, color, etc., by vision itself. At this 
rate and of necessity, the moral sense cannot be 
known, except by and through itself, much less its 
implications, right, wrong, justice, etc., and with- 
out the latter, how could human society exist? 

AN OBJECTION. 

Careful inquiry will compel us to allow perception 
to all the senses; but it is objected, that only the 
five have sufficient clearness and certitude for prac- 
tical purposes. So it may seem to those in whom 
five sense habits dominate; but just the contrary 
seems true, to those of contrary habits. The five, 
neither as respects themselves nor their objects, are 
any more real and certain, than the others; indeed, 
not so much so when soberly examined. 

We do not realize the sense of vision for instance, 
with any more clearness and certainty, than that of 
love; nor the objects of vision, with more certainty, 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT'S DOCTRINES 213 

than those of love. To do so would be unnatural, 
since the five and their, objects respect the lower 
and less valid phase of existence. 

The trouble in the case, is the same ever recur- 
ring trouble noticed all along: forgetting that ex- 
istence is dual, we see only the symbolic phase, and 
not the real. We are blind to love, virtue, and 
other such objects as realities; but can easily see their 
physical manifestations. That is, because virtue 
for instance, manifests itself in outward action, we 
assume said action to be the all of virtue; which 
all, being in truth but a S}'mbol and visible only to 
vision, is assumed to be invisible otherwise — in- 
deed, non-existent otherwise. At the same rate 
precisely, we may deny all immaterial reality. 

A very little honest thought will show the ab- 
surdity of such sophistry. No one fact of knowl- 
edge can be any more certain, than knowledge it- 
self; nor can knowledge be any more certain, than 
mind which contains it. Then beyond debate, mind 
as the ground of all knowing, must be more certain, 
than any one thing which may be known. Yet, 
mind itself is forever beyond five sense perceptions. 
How then do we come to know mind? By certain 
vague, blind sort of feelings, it is replied. But 
feeling is the very essence and upshot of all per- 
ception ; while to feel or perceive the mind — the 
ground of all knowing, implies the highest and 



214 THE SELF: WHNT 1S IT ? 

strongest perceptive powers — powers wholly differ- 
ent and superior to the five senses. 

It must be noted just here, that Kant, as also the 
materialists, and indeed all writers, either explicitly 
or implicitly agree in two things, viz., (i) Sense 
is the ground of perception; and (2) sense is the 
sole test of all knowledge; insomuch, that no in* 
tellectual activity amounts to any thing more than 
irresponsible theorizing, until tested by sense. The 
two seeming propositions are in truth but one, and 
lead to this : I believe nothing, except my five senses. 
By common consent, the premise being true, the 
result must be true, to those at least, who restrict 
perception to the five senses ; and which latter, 
pretty nearly all do, explicitly or implicitly. 

Now then, to hold on to the undeniable premise, 
and yet dodge the disastrous result, the usage is — 
instead of an unrestricted perception, to construct 
an intellectual hierarchy. Wherefore? Simply to 
account for that part of knowledge which could not 
come through the five senses. But according to 
the premise, so called pure intellectual faculties, 
would be vain and useless. Why? Because in the 
first place, they cannot perceive without sense; and 
in the next, their activity is wholly invalid until 
tested by sense; so that, sense being the beginning 
and ending of knowledge, has no need of such aid. 
• Or see it thus Sense only can perceive; and to 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT'S DOCTRINES 215 

perceive, is to know. Why is to perceive, to know? 
Because, to perceive of necessity implies to dis 
tinguish and infer ; while perception, distinction 
and inference are the upshot of knowing. The re- 
sult is a logical necessity, and makes such hierarchy 
a groundless and useless myth. In truth, it is a far- 
fetched, impossible, materialistic invention, to ac- 
count for our knowledge of immaterial things; which 
can be far more easily, naturally and rationally ac- 
counted for, by a simple unrestricted sense percep- 
tion. 

Thus, all admit, that the five or discursive senses 
perceive, distinguish and infer respecting their 
physical objects, and hence suffice for said objects. 
Now, why may not the other or intuitive senses, 
likewise suffice for immaterial objects? For in- 
stance, why cannot conscience perceive, distinguish 
and infer respecting morals, just as well as vision 
can respecting its objects; or taste or love, respect- 
ing their objects, as well as hearing or smelling, 
respecting theirs; and so on? 

On the other side, if vision only can perceive and 
know color, and conscience only can perceive and 
know morals, what need or possibility of a pure 
intellectual faculty in either case, especially since 
such faculty, in being unable to perceive .color or 
morals, would also be unable to distinguish, infer 
or know anything about them? But allowing said 



216 the self: what is it? 

pure faculty to know color and morals innately or 
otherwise, yet what avails such knowing, since it 
is worthless until tested by sense? 

In brief, by far the greater and higher part of our 
knowledge, is forever above five sense perceptions. 
How is this knowledge to be accounted for? To 
refer it to the other and higher senses is natural, 
simple, analogical, and conformable to all the 
known practical facts. An intellectual hierarchy 
on the other hand, is an illusive, useless, artificial 
system, inexorably opposed to the primary implica- 
tions of cognition. 

Now returning, it has often been pointed out, 
that all the senses — especially the five, are ever lia- 
ble to illusion: what is the proof that any given 
perception is true? Nothing, except a simple feel- 
ing of necessity to accept it as true; and which 
is the last and highest test in every case. The pro- 
position 2+2=4, or an y mathematical truth, stands 
on the same basis. The object, whether material 
or immaterial, being perceived, we are constrained 
by a feeling of necessity to accept it as true; and 
that is an end of it. This is but a repetition of 
the undeniable fact that to perceive is to know; 
while without perception, there is no knowing, 

Then whence the knowledge it is asked, result- 
ing from reflection, meditation, and other like pro- 
cesses? The reply is, that no knowledge so results;. 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT S DOCTRINES ^\ h ] 

and it may be added also, that the question itself 
results from the same illusion which primarily leads 
to an intellectual hierarchy. Plainly, in all thought 
there is an object, and that object can only be got 
by perception; so that, reflection, meditation, etc., 
simply mean a searching up and down, hither and 
thither through the mind, for a proper standpoint, 
whence the desired object may be perceived. In- 
ternally or externally there must be an object: it 
may be a pure abstraction, dimly suggested in some 
dark recess of mind; still it is an object, to per- 
ceive which, is to know it and end the inquiry. To 
get knowledge by sheer reflection or thinking, is 
to make meal by sheer grinding, without any grain; 
so that, in all cases, knowledge implies an object, 
which object can only be got by perception, and 
being so got, we are constrained by a feeling of 
necessity to accept it. 

Now respecting this feeling of necessity, is it any 
more intense in discursive, than in intuitive percep- 
tions? As before seen, to say that we perceive and 
know the object tree, house, or mountain with more 
certainty than the object mind, is a downright con- 
tradiction; it is to say, that the knowing thing is 
less certain than the thing which it knows. 

To avoid the self-evident truth, Kant changed the 
whole issue thus: We cannot know mind, God, 
etc., absolutely or as the thing-in-itself. But this 



2l8 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

does not mend the trouble; for neither can we know 
matter absolutely, or as a thing-in-itself. The ques- 
tion is not about absolute knowledge ; but about the 
relative certainty of discursive and intuitive know- 
ing. 

But respecting perceptions of God — on which he 
devoted so much labor, it may be said that we per- 
ceive God as cause, with just as much certainty as 
we do the effect, physical world. A perception of 
cause and effect is one and inseparable: to perceive 
one, is to perceive both. We cannot perceive a 
pain for instance, with any more certainty, than 
that it has a cause, although the character of the 
cause be wholly unknown. The kind or degree of 
knowledge is not the question; instead, if we can 
claim to know the physical world, we can claim 
with equal certainty to know God as its cause. 
Meanwhile, as to the kind and degree of knowl- 
edge, we ought to know God better than we do 
matter; if for nothing else, God is nearer akin, 
and matter more foreign to our essential nature. 

But by means of the moral sense, we perceive 
God face to face so to say, and far more clearly, 
than by cause and effect, or other like means. 
Even Kant admitted the sufficiency of this evidence. 
In this admission, moreover, he not only yields, 
but helps to prove the vital point claimed in this 
Part II. According to himself, there can be no 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT'S DOCTRINES 2JO, 

knowing without an antecedent perception; so that, 
to know God by means of the moral sense, is to 
ascribe perception to said sense. But to admit 
this one sense to be perceptive of immaterial ob- 
jects, opens the door for all, therewith making 
sense the ground of all knowing and meanwhile su- 
perceding an intellectual hierarchy. 

To say that the moral sense perceives and knows 
God, is not a whit more than to say, we perceive 
and know, that a straight line from the earth to 
the sun, is necessarily the shortest; and that too 
without going to measure it. How do we know it? 
Simply because we perceive it; and perceiving it, 
are necessitated to accept it as true. Beyond this, 
we know nothing about the whys or hows; nothing 
absolutely about this or any thing else. 

So precisely of God, mind, justice, beauty, science, 
and all other immaterial truths: we simply perceive 
them — perceive them even more certainly than a 
house or tree; and perceiving, are necessitated to ac- 
cept them as true. Only, however, some people can 
easily perceive science or other like immateriality, 
without the five senses ; but can never be satisfied 
about God, short of five sense demonstration. 

The constitution of the mind, makes it as impos- 
sible to avoid perceptions of God, as for the trav- 
eler to avoid sunshine on the highway. It is prac- 
tically demonstrated, too, by the fact, that all peo- 



220 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

pie, through all ages, without legitimate exception,, 
have been necessitated to recognize God, though 
under varying conceptions. It is too evident to 
debate; and is only referred to here to show that 
five sense perceptions have no more clearness or 
validity than those of the others: indeed, their to- 
tal merit consists in their subserviency to the other 
and higher senses. 

EXPERIENCE. 

Kant's precise meaning of the word experience, 
cannot be got from his definition or special uses of 
it; but is to be inferred rather, from his general 
drift. Though often using it apparently in the 
same sense with Locke, its true meaning is directly 
the opposite. Fully as much as Fichte or Schell- 
ing, he regarded mind as being the total, real ele- 
ment of existence. Hence, not only the machinery 
and principles, but knowledge itself in the essen- 
tial sense, is solely of mind. Instead of furnishing 
real knowledge through experience, matter only il- 
lustrates or symbolizes that which is already in the 
mind; serves to materialize and realize knowledge 
in a physical existence, somewhat as a twig aids 
the spider to draw out its web. 

Or thus, experience is a scene-shifter, shifting 
time and space relations, whereby the mind gets 
varying standpoints for perception. By going back 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT'S DOCTRINES 221 

and forth between any two points, experience as we 
say, teaches us the way; and this only means, that 
by shifting time and space relations between the 
two points, the various intervening objects become 
familiar, by virtue of direct and repeated percep- 
tions. The only use of experience as also of experi- 
ment, is to afford standpoints for observation; and 
observation is but another name for perception. 

Internal experience is the same, except it is a 
shifting of mental, and not physical standpoints. 
As just said above, thinking, reflection, medita- 
tion, etc., simply mean, that the faculty so employed, 
is going up and down, through the mind so to say, 
in search of a standpoint, whence the desired ob- 
ject may be perceived distinctly; while, to so per- 
ceive it, is to know it, and end the inquiry, as in 
external perception. 

Experience is a very illusive word. It is neither 
the source nor the test of knowledge: instead, the 
inborn mechanism of intelligence is the source, 
while perception is the test. Neither again does 
experience create the object perceived; but only 
opens the way — gives a standpoint, whence the 
mind may perceive the object. 

That is, the process of swimming neither creates 
the swan, nor its power to swim, nor the lake on 
which it swims; instead, it is only a process where- 
by the swan realizes certain of its powers by means 



222 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT t 

of water. And so experience is a process, whereby 
the mind realizes its powers by means of its objects; 
the mind, its powers, and its objects, being mean* 
while anterior to and distinct from experience, just 
as the swan, its powers and the water are anterior 
to and distinct from the swimming. Except with 
the strictest caution, the word ought to be avoided 
in philosophy. 

Let it be noted, that no one of the above is 
Kant's thought in so many words, respecting expe- 
rience: they are, however, fair deductions from his 
several lines of thought. 

At this point in the first edition, a section was 
given to his doctrine of reason, which is now left 
out. Suffice it, as well as can be inferred, not from 
his use of the word so much as from his general 
drift, that theoretical reason corresponds remotely, 
to what is herein called discursive cognition; while 
practical reason, corresponds somewhat to our in- 
tuiiive cognition. The two were unconsciously 
combined as seen in the antinomies for instance; 
while the practical reason was mainly employed in 
the Ethics, its functions being much the same with 
those of the moral sense as looked at from this 
treatise. By means of the theoretical, he could 
not find God, mind, etc., but by means of the prac- 
tical he could; and which corresponds strikingly, 
to discursive and intuitive cognition. He seems 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT S DOCTRINES 223 

generally to regard reason as an individual faculty; 
while this treatise regards it as a general, imper- 
sonal principle, possessed by each individual fac- 
ulty. 

As a specific proposition, Kant would doubtless 
have been horrified at the position herein taken, 
that intelligence is a function or endowment of 
sense. Yet he unquestionably held the same doc- 
trine implicitly, though doubtless unconsciously. 
Despite his elaborate intellectual system, he ne\ er 
tires of telling us that sense and sense only can 
perceive; that to perceive is to know; and to cap 
the climax, that all the operations of cognition are 
worthless, until tested by sense. What more? To 
say that sense perception is the source and the sole 
test of all valid knowledge, is certainly to make 
sense the ground of all knowing; for allowing other 
agency, what is left for it to do? 

Instead of censure, this notice is rather to defend 
Kant ; meanwhile also, to defend the truth. He 
was anything but a materialist or agnostic; yet 
many not understanding him, think just the con- 
trary, as in truth several of his doctrines would 
justify. Others again, regard the Critique as quite 
a philosophical chaos, without unity. So it may 
seem from some standpoints: but not from others. 
He first set out to answer Hume, and in doing so, 
came upon the doctrine of sense perception; which 



224 THE SELF : WHAT TS IT? 

not only sufficed the first purpose, but turned out 
to be the germ of his system of pure reason. The 
latter — resulting from, henceforth revolved around 
the two doctrines, sense perception and its restric- 
tion to time and space conditions. To maintain 
these, is the burden of the Critique; while as a set 
off to tne negations of the latter, he wrote the 
Ethics; so that both together, manifest an unusual 
unity of purpose. 

Above all it must be noted in his defense, that 
while other writers also restrict perception, implic- 
itly at least, yet he alone saw the results of so do- 
ing, and had the courage to fight for his convic- 
tions. He saw distinctly, that there is no knowing 
without perception; no perception without sense ; 
which latter being restricted to a few senses, ex- 
cludes God, mind and other objects beyond the 
scope of said senses. 

To avoid this latter, though logical result, others 
who restrict perception to the five senses, resort to 
an intellectual hierarchy, in order to find God, mind, 
etc., failing meanwhile to see, that said oracle, hav- 
ing no perceptive power, cannot perceive God, 
mind, nor anything else. Worse still, they fail 
to see that perception is to know— is the all : in 
other words, that perception, distinction and in- 
ference is each impossible without the other two; 
so that, to allow sense to be perceptive, is to allow 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT'S DOCTRINES 225 

it to have all the vital elements of cognition — all 
that could be rationally ascribed even to an intel • 
lectual hierarchy. In brief, Kant saw the enemy, 
and had the manly courage to meet him in an open 
field ; while others, either failed to see him, else 
stole around through the dark. 

Owing to a restricted perception, of course the 
Critique is contradictory, vague and misty enough. 
But it is the mist of a vast and deep sea, for all 
that; a sea, whose troubled waves, though frightful 
to look at, will yet bear a watchful navigator to 
some of the richest treasures in the world of philos- 
ophy. 

OTHER AND HIGHER AUTHORITY. 

In some of its phases human intelligence seems 
to be vain and silly to the last degree. The zig-zag 
wanderings of summer fire-Hies illustrate it in some 
sort. No two persons are of the same opinion; and 
presently we say, there is no such thing as truth. 
This view as before noted, results mainly from dis- 
cursive sources. 

But there is another side to the question. We 
could not keep up a tireless search for truth, if 
wholly destitute of truth ourselves; while our love 
and search for it imply powers for rinding it. 
Among these are the intuitive powers already dis- 
cussed. 



226 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

With proper qualifications it may be said, still 
back and of higher authority than the latter, are 
certain fixed and universal traits of mind called in- 
stinct. Much might be said about instinct, not al- 
lowable to our narrow limits. It is enough that any 
fixed, uniform and universal trait, is an expression 
or verdict of universal mind ; and as such, must be 
infallibly true, if such truth can attach to human 
character. 

It is not needed to delay with the origin, num- 
ber, variety, or other specific facts of instinct. It 
is enough for present purposes, that there are cer- 
tain great truths — more felt than intelligibly real- 
ized, which are too evident to debate : all men ac- 
cept them, and no man can reject them, without 
rejecting common sense. Such truths are numerous ; 
and for distinction's sake, may be called verdicts of 
instinct or common sense. The present purpose is 
to select a few of such verdicts, to illustrate and 
confirm at least the drift of this treatise. 

From a multitude, take this familiar one: "An 
honest man is the noblest work of God." This, 
not in words but in sentiment, is and ever has 
been self evident even to fools; so much so in truth, 
that fools more than any, are apt to regard it as 
trite. It is not only plain enough for fools, but so 
deep and strong in the human heart that even 
thieves respect an honest man: nay, as if to give 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT *S DOCTRINES 227 

it proper emphasis, we often apply it where it has 
no application, in saying: "I even respect an honest 
dog." There is no dispute, neither about the reality 
of honesty, nor its priceless worth ; so that, such 
universal admission of the two truths, puts them 
both in the category of universal verdicts. 

They are not debatable questions, allowing of 
error, especially with those unskilled in debate; in- 
stead, they answer the first and most often recurring 
practical question: What is the best and highest 
life for me to live? The verdict answers: "An hon- 
est man is the noblest work of God; " nor could the 
truth of this answer be doubted though denied by- 
all the philosophers ever born. It is a necessary,, 
a universal truth, endorsed by the mind's whole 
integrity. 

But how does this verdict bear upon the doctrines 
of this book? It is a positive proof of its leading 
idea, that human character — the Self, is grounded 
in sense; for honesty, whereby man becomes the 
noblest work of God, is predicable of sense only. 
By implication, it first puts man above all created 
things; then sense, as the highest element in man ; 
and lastly, honesty — moral quality, as the climax 
of sense. 

On the other hand, it implies a degree of con- 
tempt for intelligence, renown, wealth, blood, etc., 
in this, that such things are not even thought of, 



228 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

much less hinted at, as elements in the make-up of 
the noblest work of God. Sense and sense only, 
and sense in its moral phase, can be the noblest 
and highest; and must therefore include the Self. 
Every chief proposition of the book, may in truth 
be deduced from this one verdict. 

But to say that an honest man, in the common 
and contracted meaning, extorts respect from every 
quarter, is to give but a faint id,ea of the full truth. 
This is not one half the full meaning of the phrase, 
honest man; nor one half the honor awarded such. 
The noblest work of God is not one individual 
simply, but a class consisting of degrees or ranks; 
and an honest man in the common meaning, is but 
one in the primary rank, though a nobleman to be 
sure, relatively to his moral inferiors. Whereas, 
an honest man in the full and highest sense, is a 
king or emperor, relatively to those of the primary 
rank. 

That is to say, an honest man in the full sense, 
is one who does his duty in all known respects, and 
to its fullest extent. But to do one's duty fully 
and unflinchingly, often requires the sacrifice of 
life. Right here precisely, in being true to his no- 
bility in the very teeth of death, he mounts from 
the primary rank of nobleman, up to a kingly sjep- 
tre and diadem, in the esteem of universal instinct. 

Despite his well earned prestige and nobility, the 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT S DOCTRINES 220, 

honest man of the primary grade, becomes trite and 
common place, when put alongside of Socrates, Le- 
onidas or other such martyrs. These latter are the 
kings, and the only real kings of the human heart. 
Their lives and deaths crown them as such, and 
thenceforth become influences — become laws, far 
more potent in swaying the destiny of the race, than 
those of the wisest law maker. Monuments are 
built up to them — not always in brass and marble; 
but in history, in poetry, and above all, in the human 
heart. Every heart withal, pays them tribute from 
its most precious treasures of esteem, love, and ven- 
eration. 

But this seems contradictory. At this rate, hu- 
man character — the Self, seems to forsake itself; 
even to give up its own life, for the sake of some- 
thing foreign to itself; and yet by this self-murder, 
mounts up to the highest dignity and honor. Never- 
theless, the universal instinct looks at this self-mur- 
der, as beautiful and sublime to the highest degree. 

But it is no self murder. Instead, the hero, real- 
izing instinctively, that the principle for which he 
dies, is far above physical life, simply sacrifices the 
one rather than forfeit the other; exchanges the 
contracted ends of a contracted Self, for those of 
greater scope; and thus, from a star of smaller mag- 
nitude, expands to one of larger, having a relatively 
larger orbit. Rather than revolve in the orbit of a 



23O THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

contracted Self, Leonidas mounted to the larger and 
higher one of patriotism, and revolved around the 
Hellenic race. Socrates also leaving the contracted 
orbit around himself, mounted to the moral, and re- 
volved in a still higher and grander one, than that 
of Leonidas. So that, in forsaking or going out 
from themselves, they in reality found and exalted 
themselves. At least, so says infallible instinct. 

Plainly, moral excellence is the ground of the 
honor awarded to the honest man. In the lower 
rank, he gives up selfish gain, for the sake of moral 
honesty; in the higher, he gives up life for princi- 
ples higher than life. The honor awarded in either 
case, is not for the sacrifice made; but for the de- 
gree of moral excellence, and which is judged of 
by the degree of self renunciation. 

Here is no trifling fact. Though each of us may 
be selfish in every word and deed; though with the 
lips, we may honor intelligence, blood, wealth and 
fashion; yet in our hearts, we honor men precisely 
in the ratio, that, forsaking their own selfish ends, 
they adopt others of higher and broader moral scope. 
But, the significant point is, we cannot help so 
doing: instinct compels us to thus testify to the 
beauty and priceless worth of moral excellence. 

All along we have been straining on tip-toe, to 
see through the fogs of materialistic illusion, in or- 
der to get clear and intelligible views of an imma- 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT'S DOCTRINES 231 

terial reality, distinct from and higher than the 
material. Now, here, as if in contempt of intelli- 
gence, instinct compels us to recognize such a sys- 
tem — a system withal, characteristically moral. 
Though wholly invisible to the five senses, it is 
yet seen as being so real and palpable, that men 
will sacrifice the present physical, for the sake of 
the other and higher moral system. This may be 
fanatical; yet universal instinct endorses it, by 
honoring such men, just in the ratio of their heroic 
loyalty to this higher system. 

Human intelligence is not infallible: at the best, 
it can only see as through a glass darkly, and never 
says its last word upon any question. But when 
instinct speaks, it is the voice of nature — of God, 
and there's an end to it. According to this author- 
ity, there is a moral system, higher and more real 
than the physical, and for which the latter, as 
a bound offering, is ever ready to be sacrificed. 

This moral system also has its firmament, its 
sun, planets, gravitation, etc., more real and abiding 
than those of the physical. We have seen Socrates, 
Leonidas, and such like, as the planets of this sys- 
tem, with their magnitudes and orbits, greater or 
less, according to their moral brilliancy. 

Having a firmament and varying planets, it must 
also have a central sun. Its planets were seen to be 
positive necessities; instinct was necessitated to 



232 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

set them up for light and comfort, in an elsewise 
dark and cheerless firmament. That a chief, central 
sun is of still greater necessity, is demonstrated by 
the notable fact, that, in the absence of a real one, 
instinct has ever been necessitated to manufacture 
one for itself, rather than be left without. 

Allowing this central sun to be a myth, yet this 
myth is precisely what human nature is necessitated 
to have: just as, allowing the physical sun to be a 
myth, the solar system is none the less necessitated 
to have it as a controlling center. Besides, since 
human nature is necessitated to such a degree, that 
it will itself manufacture a sun for the moral sys- 
tem, rather than be left without, it would be quite 
strange if this, its chief need, be left wholly un- 
provided for. There must hence be such a sun — 
a real central sun, if instinct be truthful. What, 
or who is that central sun? 

The force of this fact is often avoided, by saying: 
If instinct be necessitated to have a sun for its- 
moral system, then it ought also be able to find the 
right one, without any dispute. So it may be replied, 
if instinct be necessitated to have social and polit- 
ical institutions, then it ought also be able to find 
the right ones without any disputes. But it is not 
so in either case, and for plain reasons too. 

However, as an easy and natural study of the 
question, let the inquiry begin with the conception 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT* S DOCTRINES 233 

honest man, in its lowest sense; thence rising 
higher, take Leonidas, then Socrates, then Budda 
and so on. This procedure will bring out the fact, 
that this central sun, must fee the highest ideal de- 
ducible from the conception honest man ; or which 
is the same, the highest ideal of moral excellence: 
it must be perfect. As proof, if the given ideal 
be not perfect, the devotee will make it so — will 
credit it with perfection; indeed, will not stop 
short of divinity. 

Yet, meanwhile as Hegel says, it must be a di- 
vinity concretely manifested; it must be both man 
and God in one, somewhat as illustrated by the 
man-Gods of the ancients. That is on the one 
hand, fully realizing its dependence, human nature 
will, and is necessitated to have a divinity to lean 
upon; and on the other, that divinity must partake 
of human nature, else it could not be touched with 
a feeling for human infirmity. 

Love is one of our strongest traits; and withal, 
is necessitated to have some object to love or re- 
volve about. Now, to be so constituted, and yet 
left without any object, love would be an empty 
lie, chargeable on the Creator. But love has ob- 
jects enough and to spare. Instead, the question 
is, what is the best and highest object for love? 
Instinct replies, it is the highest moral excellence; 
and it is necessitated to so reply. What is the 



234 



THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 



highest moral excellence? God, of course. But 
God is too high and remote ; quite as remote on 
the one hand, as frail man is lacking on the other, 
to meet the imperious need in question. The only 
alternative is a compromise: it must be a perfect 
man; and which amounts to a man-God. 

It does not follow, because love often fixes on 
low or wrong objects, that it has no best or highest 
object ; it does not follow from a discursive theory 
of the solar system, that there is no true theory. 
So, neither do the self-made gods of savages, nor 
does Confucius, nor Budda, nor Mahomet, nor six- 
teen crucified Saviors, nor anything else, disprove 
the necessity and reality of a true man-God as the 
center of the moral system. 

Instead, such facts only emphasize the necessity 
— the burning and agonizing necessity of human in- 
stinct, for such man-God; and withal, extort the 
question: Can it be possible, that no such man- 
God has been provided? To answer no, is to say 
the very heart of human nature is a pure delusion. 
This we cannot do; and hence, must assume a true 
and real man-God. The question is, who is it? 

Though but a glance at the question, in view of 
its bearing on the present line of thought, this 
glance can refer only to the gospel of human in 
stinct. According to this gospel — and which is 
doubtless the veritable handwriting of God, our own 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT'S DOCTRINES 235 

Christ is obviously the man-God in question. He 
is certainly the fullest impersonation of moral ex- 
cellence as manifested by self-renunciation ; and as 
such, the highest Ideal — the great central sun of 
the moral system, according to instinct. 

The plain facts of the case make the result in- 
evitable. But discursive cognition, which contra- 
dicts the true theory of the physical system, is even 
worse respecting the moral. It admits the reality 
of a great sun in the physical system, but makes it 
subordinate — makes it revolve around the earth ; 
while as respects the moral system, it sees neither 
the reality nor the need of any such sun. Among 
many illusions which beset the discursive on this 
question — a question wholly beyond its reach, only 
two need be noted. 

First, the discursive will forever contradict the 
principle of self-renunciation. The idea of return- 
ing good for evil; of caring for others, instead of 
one's self; and of sacrificing one's life for others, 
the discursive will ever pronounce to be unnatural 
and monstrous. Yet, precisely this monstrosity 
as seen above, is what instinct exalts to the highest 
degree of honor. 

Secondly, the discursive being almost wholly 
devoted to symbolism, finds its chief delight in 
make believes, furbelows, and gew-gaws of all sorts. 
Hence and naturally enough, the very last thin- it 



236 the self: what is it? 

would expect in a man-God, was the severe and su- 
perhuman simplicity of Christ. Above all, this su- 
preme simplicity balked the discursive at the start; 
and right there it stays balked to this good day. 
Either one of these principles in fact — self renun- 
ciation or simplicity, is altogether too much for dis- 
cursive comprehension. 

As climax to the foregoing, is the notable mat- 
ter of fact, that Christ has been recognized as the 
man-God by the highest civilization of the world, 
for nineteen hundred years. He must hence be the 
true one, else the highest product of instinct. Be- 
ing assumed as the latter, yet withal as the highest 
ideal, He can never be superceded; for allowing 
the possibility of a higher, it would be above in- 
stinct, and hence a failure. Such a thing is con- 
ceivable only on the assumption of a reversed caus- 
ality, which would put everything — even God, in 
the category of growth. 

As for the rest, Christ neither said nor intended, 
that the proof of His claim should be so positive, 
as to leave no room for doubt; but did say most 
clearly, on the contrary, though implicitly by the 
doctrine of faith, that the possiblity of doubt is 
positively indispensable. 

Without the possibility to sin, there could be no 
moral free agency — no moral system; and which 
first phase of free agency, is implied in Christian- 



A GLANCE AT SEVERAL OF KANT'S DOCTRINES 237 

ity. But it has still another; for though being 
within, it is yet a distinct individual in the moral 
system; and as such, requires another phase of free 
agency peculiar to itself, the condition of which is 
faith; and which faith is impossible, except on 
the possibility of doubt. So that, if Christianity 
were demonstrated beyond doubt, men would be 
constrained to accept it; while such constraint, in 
excluding free agency, would exclude faith as its 
prime condition, and therewith end it as a system 
of religion. 

For fear of straining discursive scruples too much, 
it may be added, that though intelligence is im- 
plied in faith, yet it is not its chief factor, anymore 
than it is in responsibility. The latter also implies 
intelligence; still, neither common sense nor any 
jury, ever yet held intelligence responsible for 
crime: intelligence is not even thought of, much less 
censured in such cases. So also, faith in essential 
respects, is a creature of sense. If only sense be 
properly inclined towards Christianity, there will 
be no trouble about intelligence. "With the heart 
man believeth unto righteousness," and not with 
the head. 

It may now be emphasized as pertinent to this 
treatise, that the great, not to say all-inclusive idea 
of Christ's mission, was the priceless worth of t lie 
human heart — sensibility. His entire m was 



238 the self: what is it? 

addressed to the heart. The head was not sick, nor 
lame, nor blind, nor in need of a physician; but 
only the heart. He did not of course, repudiate^ 
intelligence; but ignored it rather, by addressing, 
the heart exclusively. He hereby said — not once, 
but hundreds of times and ways, that the heart is 
the Self, and sufficiently personates all of prime 
worth or responsibility, in human character. More- 
over, a man is good or bad, degraded or exalted, 
according to his purity of heart. Nor were any of 
these truths debated; but assumed as too evident 
to debate, and which gives them so much the more 
force. 

Much the same, in the respect in question, may 
be said about instinct. Its high estimate of an hon- 
est man as seen above, but expresses the principle, 
that moral excellence as grounded in sense or the 
heart, is the highest good. This amounts to saying 
that the highest expressions of instinct, fully accord 
so far as they go, with those of Christianity. Being 
both grounded in sense, they must stand or fall 
together; nor are they likely ever to fall, until 
something firmer and more abiding than sense can 
be found, whereon to build. Neither is the latter 
possible, without a thorough reconstruction of hu- 
man character. And finally, being grounded on the 
same rock with these two, the leading thought of 
this treatise ought to be secure. 



CHAPTER VI. 

A FINAL GLANCE AT MATERIALISM. 

The purpose of this Part II is an analysis of in- 
telligence, which, however, is not possible to any 
rational degree, without an explanation of contra- 
diction. For, until this latter is done, intelligence 
stands impeached: not only is its integrity in- 
volved, but its otherwise most vital phenomena re- 
main dark and inexplicable. But contradiction 
in turn, can only be explained by tracing it back 
to its source, viz., materialism. Hence, to see the 
latter fully and distinctly, is indispensable to cor- 
rect views of the former two. To this end, a few 
thoughts about materialism not convenient before, 
will perhaps aid to throw clearer light on the whole 
of Part II. 

Materialism was characterized as springing from 
vicious tendency — depravity; and since the latter 
is an adjunct of free agency, it follows, that ma- 
terialism is made possible by virtue of the provis- 
ion in the moral economy, for free agency, respon- 
sibility, etc. But this has already been amply ex- 

23fl 



24O THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

plained: the present point is about the vague ex- 
pression vicious tendency. 

Though the phrase is of indefinite extent and may 
include everything implied in depravity, it does not 
mean that each and all its manifestations, amount 
to gross immorality. Instead, beginning at a moral 
zero, its perversions of intelligence may begin and 
thence proceed many degrees before reaching what 
is coirunonly regarded as downright immorality. 
In other words, the least and most commonplace 
disputes are explicable by the same principle, 
which explains the grosser forms of contradiction 
and falsehood: both alike result from perverting 
intelligence; and which can only be done by vi- 
cious tendency. 

For instance, the facts in any given case may be 
plain and self-evident; yet one attorney will so con- 
strue them, as to make the given object seem white; 
while his opponent will make it seem black. In 
such case and of necessity, one of the two perverts 
the legitimate purposes of intelligence; and since 
such perversion cannot be referred to virtuous ten- 
dency, the only help is to refer it to a vicious one. 

So, from the least debate or difference of opinion 
about the merest trifle, up to the most momentous 
contradiction, it will be found in every case, that 
some sense motive — some bias, whim, interest, 
prejudice, or other unjust influence, is the main- 
spring which perverts intelligence. 



A FINAL GLANCE AT MATERIALISM 24I 

This does not deny, what are called honest mis- 
takes, or an honest misuse of intelligence ; but rath- 
er, refers such mistakes themselves back to some 
anterior caprice, indolence, prejudice, or other- 
wise. This again is only saying, that intelligence 
j>er se being truthful, cannot mislead, unless it be 
perverted ; and it can only be perverted by an over- 
ruling sense; which sense in so perverting the truth, 
cannot be called otherwise than vicious. Study with 
care, any one practical case of debate or contradic- 
tion, and it will prove all the above. It will, indeed 
not only explain the primary ground of contradic- 
tion; but in so doing, give the only possible clew 
to a proper analysis of intelligence. 

Next and again, the precise meaning of the word 
rationalism is hard to get from its common use. 
From our standpoint it is quite plain: viz., The as- 
sumption that intelligence is the supreme authority 
of mind, and as such, is causal, independent and 
responsible. At this rate, and allowing it to be 
truthful withal, then contradiction and falsehood 
■would be impossible. For being truthful, it could 
not voluntarily deceive; and being causal or inde- 
pendent, it could not be used to serve for false pur- 
poses, by any other power. 

So that, the only way to maintain its truth on 
the one hand, and yet explain its seeming falsehood 
on the other, is to make it passive and pervertible, 



242 



THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 



hereby referring its prostitution to an overruling,, 
vicious sense. 

But apart from the impossibility of explaining 
contradiction and the consequent impossibility of 
analyzing intelligence-apart from these, as a couple 
of trifles; yet and despite all, we are still necessi- 
tated to regard intelligence as passive and irre- 
sponsible; if for nothing else, because the sense mo- 
tive only, is held by universal instinct and usage, 
to be the causal and responsible agent in all con- 
duct. 

Nothing can be more certain, or more strongly 
proven, according to human authority. Hence, the 
strange part is, that on turning away, we instantly 
deny it and proclaim intelligence to be the great au- 
tocrat of mind. This is rationalism; and though 
absurd to the last degree, it is the first and most 
wide spread of all materialistic illusions. 

All are implicated in this: it is common to call 
only those rationalists however, who carry out the 
doctrine to its legitimate results. These have a 
degree of logical consistency to say the least ; for if 
intelligence be the supreme authority, then it is 
supreme; and as such, ought to rule our every ac- 
tion. At this rate also, doctrines of expediency, util- 
ity, etc., ought to wholly supersede the authority 
of the moral sense, whereby the words duty, ought,, 
morality, etc., would be meaningless. 



A FINAL GLANCE AT MATERIALISM 243 

Rationalism, like every other form of material- 
ism, comes from mistaking the symbol for the real: 
mistaking the passive instrument intelligence, for 
the real responsible sense authority. It not only 
comes through symbolism, like all other lies of ma- 
terialism, but is as bad and perhaps more harmful, 
than all the grosser forms of materialism put to- 
gether. Thus, it does its frightful work, by destroy- 
ing the entire moral economy at one deadly blow. 
Add to this, that it is the most widespread, stub- 
born, and self conceited of all delusions. 

Only see: We proclaim doctrines of expediency,, 
or otherwise recognize the supremacy of intelli- 
gence, when on the street; but the next moment, 
and after taking oath in the court room, we award 
life or death to a fellow man, according to the 
moral quality of his sense motive in the given case. 
How is this? Is it outright perjury, or stupidity, 
or indolent indifference to truth, or what? 

This first and most amazing of all illusions was 
noticed briefly in Chapter II, Part I; but its vast im- 
port requires further notice. It was noted then and 
there, that a potent influence leading to the notion of 
the supremacy of intelligence, is the fact, that while 
each of us is apt to imagine himself to be controlled 
by calm reflection, we yet refer the conduct of other 
people to sense promptings. We go instinctively 
to sense, in order to find out the mainspring of 



244 THE self: what is it? 

other people's conduct while as for myself, I am 
governed by sober reflection and reason. This ri- 
diculous but most common infatuation, would seem 
enough to open the eyes of the blindest ; but it does 
not. There are many other reasons for thus mistak- 
ing the showy, though purely instrumental func- 
tions of intelligence, for the real and controlling 
cause, a few of which must be added. 

The eye for instance, though intended solely for 
seeing, cannot yet see itself; and much the same 
may be said of the Self. Not, however, because 
the Self cannot, so much as because, being other- 
wise occupied, it is not likely to see itself. The 
Self consists of a number of various senses, each 
one of which is apt to be wholly occupied with its 
own special objects, and meanwhile blind to all 
else. This shows the absolute necessity of a moral 
sense, which is also wholly occupied with its ob- 
ject: viz., To supervise the other senses, and keep 
them as fully as can be, in accord with moral 
Tightness. So that, no one of the senses is apt to 
give much time to study itself, or its fellow senses, 
or even the total Self, as a culmination of all the 
senses together. 

Instead, next after its desired object, the first 
concern of each sense, is the getting of said object ; 
and hereupon percisely, it employs its passive in- 
strument intelligence to devise ways and means for 



A FINAL GLANCE AT MATERIALISM 245 

getting the object. Plainly, without an intelli- 
gence of its own, adapted to its own peculiar ob- 
ject, said object could not be realized, thus leaving 
sense helpless and hopeless. No wonder then, that 
intelligence, though but an instrument for getting 
the desired object, should yet be extolled by sense, 
as being the all in all. For mark, intelligence is 
the primary and chief instrument; while very often, 
sense will idolize even a secondary instrument, be- 
cause of its aid in getting the desired object. The 
inebriate for instance, knows full well that whiskey 
is killing him; yet whiskey is his most adored idol. 
And why? Simply because it is the instrument 
which serves to realize his ruling sense desire. 
This gives a glimpse of the real master of the mind 
— viz., Sense desire. 

The all-devouring desire of the inebriate, is no 
exception either. Avarice, ambition, .vanity, love, 
anger, or any other sense, once aroused and id full 
armor, tyrannizes over the whole man, mind and 
body, to say nothing of a passive intelligence. Rich- 
ard only proposed to give his whole kingdom for 
one horse; but the average sense, unrestrained and 
bent on gratification, would sacrifice the whole 
world, heaven, — everything, and itself into the bar- 
gain, rather than be balked in its desire. 

What folly then, to set up a puny and passive 
intelligence, as a ruler over sense. Plainly, noth- 



246 the self: what is it? 

ing but a fellow kinsman — the moral sense, could 
have one mite of influence in such case; and not 
even that, if the profligate sense be once allowed to 
get under full headway. 

This brings us to the moral aspect of the ques- 
tion ; and which doubtless goes deepest towards an 
explanation of the great illusion in hand. Our 
moral economy seems not to have fairly started, 
until after the serpent was introduced into Eden. 
"The serpent beguiled me and I did eat." The part 
ascribed to the serpent in this first dawn of sin, 
corresponds precisely to that of discursive intelli- 
gence, in beguiling into materialism. 

The point to be noted, however, is this : I was 
beguiled into this unfortunate deed. Can a poor 
ignorant body like myself, beheld as responsible? 
Pray, go to the serpent who beguiled me: he is 
wise and he is responsible. According to this first 
dawn of depravity, intelligence is not only used 
as an instrument for vicious purposes, but is finally 
made to bear the blame and responsibility. It is 
still the invariable resort of vicious sense, to ex- 
cuse or defend itself, in one way or another, by 
means of passive intelligence. 

In brief, the deceptive serpent or human deprav- 
ity, with the other reasons given, in some degree 
explain our constant liability to mistake the symbol 
for the real. This liability in turn, opens the way 



A FINAL GLANCE AT MATERIALISM 247 

for the two grand illusions in question: (i) The 
supremacy of intelligence; and (2) the restriction 
of intelligence to the five senses. These two may 
be said to include all other illusions. A subsequent 
confounding of mind and matter, reversed causality 
and method of inquiry, with an endless number of 
minor illusions, flow from these two great fountains. 

Obviously now, starting out under these two 
grand illusions, no inquiry of large philosophical 
scope, no matter how honest, persistent, and saga- 
cious it may be, can result otherwise than disas- 
trously. This only amounts to saying, that no 
amount of care and sagacity, can transform false- 
hood into truth. Both of these illusions are false ; 
so that, to start out on any far-reaching inquiry, 
under the mislead of either — to say nothing of both, 
must lead to endless perplexity and contradiction. 
And here precisely, is seen the battlefield, on which 
philosophy has kept up a life and death struggle, 
from the earliest period of inquiry. 

Take the first illusion — the supremacy of intel- 
ligence. This is not only a great root error in it- 
self, excluding the possibility of truth in any inquiry 
which may assume it ; but it also leads to a wrong 
method of inquiry at the first step. Instead of tak- 
ing the entire mind analytically, and beginning 
with sense as its basic element, it leads the student 
to begin with intelligence— with the extremities of 



248 the self: what is it? 

mind. Meanwhile the second illusion — restriction 
of intelligence to the five senses, excludes a knowl- 
edge of mind, God, and all other immaterial ob- 
jects. 

Now then, on such a field and shackled with such 
errors, what avail the most giant intellects? Starting 
out under the first illusion, we have seen how Kant, 
who perhaps has no equal since Plato, was led to 
construct a most elaborate intellectual hierarchy; 
yet, practically abandons it in the end, and finds 
the only sure footing for cognition to be in sense. 
Likewise, led by the second illusion to deny a 
knowledge of mind, God, etc. ; yet finally, breaking 
away from the shackles of his premises, he finds 
God in a round about way, by means of the moral 
sense. 

Though greatly superior to Hume in several vital 
respects, yet his system in its logical entirety, was 
not a whit above that of Hume, owing to the two 
illusions in question. True enough, by his a priori 
perception of space, he carried his point against 
Hume; but in restricting perception, he fell back 
into the same pit with Hume. That is, he got 
himself a fine pair of wings to be sure; but so pin- 
ioned them, that he could soar no higher than 
Hume after all. 

Moreover, despite their native differences, they 
were alike in this: Each was a materialist, by vir- 



A FINAL GLANCE AT MATERIALISM 249 

tue of a discursive or restricted perception; yet 
each was also an idealist, by virtue of a silent or 
unrecognized intuitive perception. Practically, Kant 
sloughed off materialism, and held fast to idealism. 
Hume held on to both, and as result, fell into uni- 
versal skepticism. 

Hume's inferiority to Kant in a high mettled 
moral prowess, gave him a seeming superiority in 
logical respects. He stubbornly followed his prem- 
ises to their legitimate, though bitter results. Ac- 
cording to his standpoint, as indeed, according to 
that of Kant and all of us who restrict preception, 
he was logically consistent and unanswerable in his 
famous argument against miracles. He never once 
thought to inquire, whether anything can occur 
above or beyond a five sense experience; but as- 
sumed it as wholly impossible. 

Hence on the one hand, since miracles are im- 
possible according to his standard of experience ; 
and since on the other hand, it is common for men 
to be either false or deluded, therefore the wit- 
nesses of miracles were false or deceived. And this 
invincible argument against superstition he says, 
will stand good to the end of the world. So it 
will, according to a restricted perception; and so 
likewise will it stand good against Newtonian grav- 
ity, the Copernican philosophy, as in fact, against 
all truths above a five sense perception. The plain 



25^ the self: what is it?. 

fact is, the five senses can only see the symbols or 
illustrations of truth; but never one single truth 
£er se. 

An indefinite number, besides Hume and Kant, 
might be employed to illustrate the illusions in 
question. Let two others suffice —say, Fichte and 
Spinoza. It will be hard to find two men in mod- 
ern times, more earnest, acute, or otherwise better 
endowed for difficult problems, than these two. 
Let them be glanced at briefly. 

On several accounts, Fichte might be called a 
more intense idealist than Kant. None of the 
grosser phases of materialism, can be found in his 
writings; yet it permeates his entire system. Not to 
mention specific instances, it is enough that the 
very germ of his system is pure materialism. 

To explain: Kant more clearly than any other, 
saw that the mechanism of intelligence presupposes 
God, as an unconditioned ground for its operations: 
the syllogism for instance, would be wholly and 
directly inoperative, without unconditioned totality. 
Very well: but along with this, his restricted pre- 
ception denies God altogether; so that, on the one 
hand, God is a necessity implied in the structure 
of intelligence; while on the other, there is no 
God. To reconcile this trouble, he invents what 
he calls an idea of God, to serve as the uncondi- 
tioned ground in demand. This idea of God, how- 



A FINAL GLANCE AT MATERIALISM 25 1 

ever, he says, is neither God, nor an)' proof of the 
reality of God; but only an inborn idea of God, 
intended to serve as the ground of cognitive activ- 
ity. 

Now then, this dummy idea of God — a mere make- 
shift to reconcile the contradiction indicated, was 
adopted, though perhaps unconsciously, by his 
disciple, Fichte, as the germ of a new system. 
That is, this idea of God, so essential to intelli- 
gence, was put on as a sort of climax to the human 
Ego, and presently expanded into an absolute Ego; 
so that, there is no God, nor anything else except 
the Ego, according to Fichte's final outcome. 

But the point now to be noted is this: This idea 
of God as employed by Kant, cannot at the very 
most, be called anything more than a mere symbol 
of God; yet it was this symbol precisely, which 
Fichte vitalized and expanded into an absolute Ego 
— the all-in-all of existence. A system thus spring- 
ing from a pure symbol as its root idea, cannot be 
else than pure materialism throughout; though to 
a careless reader, it seems the most purely abstract 
and anti-materialistic system to be found. 

It is not needed to go into details with Spinoza. 
His wholesale confounding of mind and matter from 
beginning to end, is his notable characteristic; and 
makes his system one of downright materialism, 
beyond all debate. 



252 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

It must be noted of both in addition, however, 
that besides being two of the most acute thinkers 
of modern times, they were perhaps never equaled, 
much less excelled, in a rigid and severe loyalty to 
philosophical ritual. Each went to the utmost limit 
in his special forms of inquiry. Each seemed to 
think, that by his peculiar procedure, knowledge 
can be got, even where there is none; somewhat 
as if a farmer, without seeds, would expect a fine 
harvest by sheer ploughing. 

Yet and despite all, see the final results: Fichte, 
with his severely critical procedure, utterly failed 
to find any God in the universe; while Spinoza, 
with his infallible mathematical procedure, equally 
failed to find anything at all in the Universe, except 
God. 

But such illustrations seem to overshoot the 
mark. How is it, that starting out under the same 
illusions, on the same premises, and each one withal 
of such superior sagacity: how is it, that the final 
results are so wide apart? Firstly, to start in gross 
error, can but lead to other errors ; so that, there 
is no telling what the result may be. Besides, as 
explained a score of* times, all inquiry is liable to 
be unduly influenced by a power behind the throne 
— that is, by an overruling sense, as was just seen 
above respecting Hume and Kant. 

Kant was even superior to Hume in logical acute- 



A FINAL GLANCE AT MATERIALISM 253 

ness and a love of logical consistency; but he was 
also dominated by a still stronger power — a love of 
moral consistency. Starting out in error, his log- 
ical tended to annul his moral system; but the lat- 
ter being the stronger of the two, led him to finally 
compromise — indeed, to bend the logical to the 
moral, and thus to seem at a great logical disad- 
vantage. 

Hume, starting under the same illusions, but 
meanwhile dominated by an early and bitter preju- 
dice to religion, found his discursive logic to be a 
strong ally against religion ; and hence, employed 
it to the bitter end. This gave him a greater seem- 
ing of logical consistency, than Kant; yet his logic, 
like that of Kant, was a passive instrument in the 
hands of a dominating sense. 

This amounts to saying no more, than what is self- 
evident almost universally in practical life. In 
other words, to know a man's party in politics, or 
his sect in theology, or his social attitude, is to 
know pretty well in advance, his logical drift re- 
specting these several questions. And this again, 
is but repeating the dominant idea of the book: 
viz., That intelligence is passive and pervertible; 
and as such, is ever ready to serve the purposes of 
an overruling sense. 

But it is well in this connection, to emphasize 
again and for the last time, the word distinction. 



254 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

With its implications, no one word has so much 
significance in an analysis of intelligence. Being 
central, it presupposes perception in the first place, 
and implies inference in the second. Each of the 
three is meaningless, without the other two; while 
the three together, as an indivisible one, and as 
the sole method in every inquiry, personate all cog- 
nitive activity. 

Very well: but the several famous men glanced at 
above, were noted more than others, for clear, 
sharp, and the most hair-splitting distinctions be- 
tween things: what more? Only this: the first and 
most vital of all distinctions, is a distinction be- 
tween distinctions themselves — between the relative 
worth of trifling and vital distinctions. It is one 
thing to distinguish between trifles; but it is quite 
another, to distinguish between things of moment; 
yet strangely enough, the constant tendency to fail- 
ure is in the latter 

In other words, what avail the most delicate dis- 
tinctions in the details of an inquiry, if the very 
root of the inquiry itself, be false? And is it 
extravagant to say, that ninety-nine hundredths of 
our debates are about ambiguous words ; else about 
vague or erroneous premises at the start? Plainly, 
to start in error, is to continue in error, despite 
a subsequent world full of hair-splitting distinctions, 
between trifles. 



A FINAL GLANXE AT .MATERIALISM 255 

It would seem quite strange, if the architect with- 
out distinctions at the outset, should construct 
spires and domes, before the foundation, putting the 
former at the bottom, and the latter at the top. 
Yet, precisely this, no more nor less than this, is 
done in the most vital inquiries of philosophy. 

Ignoring the prime fact, which is as plain as 
noon-day, that the sense motive, in being the main- 
spring and responsible agent, must hence be the 
basic element of mind, we begin and end our in- 
quiries in mental philosophy with intelligence ; thus 
not only making spire and dome first, but first and 
last, without any foundation at all. 

To so mistake the symbol for the real — to mis- 
take the showy, liveried servant intelligence, for 
the real master, is an inexorable root error ; but it 
is not all. As seen above, this first great error, 
opens the way and lures to a reversed method of in- 
quiry : instead of taking mind analytically, and be- 
ginning with sense as its basic element, it lures to 
a so-called synthesis, which begins with intellectual 
traits — spires and domes, and combines these into 
a total, with the basis left out. 

In brief, neglecting to distinguish between mole 
hills and mountains in the premises, it is easy and 
natural enough thenceforth, to confound mind and 
matter, reverse causality or prove any thing which 
may be dictated by sense caprice, or prejudice, cr 
indolence. 



256 THE SELF : WHAT IS IT? 

And hence, not only the gross materialist, who 
deduces mind from matter, but the rationalist — the 
fanatical devotee who sets up intelligence as the 
supreme authority, are both alike materialists: both 
alike, mistake the symbol for the real. 

This sufficiently accounts for the infinite differ- 
ences of opinion and errors among frail mortals. 
It holds intelligence to be truthful and blameless 
throughout, and refers all errors to a sense origin. 
The latter being usually predetermined at the outset 
of the given debate, misleads at the outset by means 
of subtle illusions — illusions as to root ideas; and 
being once so started, can easily keep up a show of 
logical consistency to the end. 

CONCLUSION. 

Perhaps a few words about the origin and early 
budding forth of this volume, might give the clear- 
est view of the whole in a nut shell. The seed 
which so sprouted forth into a volume, was planted 
in the author's mind some years ago, while reading 
the English Quarterlies, so rife at that time with 
the doctrine of utility. Doubtless, the author of 
this doctrine — an old doctrine with a new name did 
not intend it as a direct insult to the present writer. 

Yet, he so took it: not for himself only, but for 
the whole human race; and thereupon, set about 
resenting it. 



A FINAL GLANCE AT MATERIALISM 257 

The notion that all our conduct results from cold 
rational designs of utility; that there is no spon- 
taneous and unselfish love, no generosity, no philan- 
thropy — nothing noble or manly in man: yes, this 
was taken as an arch insult to the entire race. 

What was to be done? Abundant facts to dis- 
prove the doctrine, were plentiful on all sides. But 
the sophistry which upheld the doctrine, stood ever 
ready with other sophistries to elude said facts; 
sufficiently at least, to mistify and prevent clear 
demonstration. It was finally seen as an only alter- 
native, to take up the doctrine root and branch ; else 
it would continue a deadly Upas tree on the high- 
way, poisoning every passer by. 

Thus looking up and down, smarting and chafing 
seemingly for an age, the question was finally whit- 
tled down to this one sharp point: What, as a 
matter of positive fact, is the prime mainspring of 
all human conduct? With this sharp question, very 
socn the utility doctrine stood clearly out to view, 
as an absurd impossibility. 

Rational designs of utility, forsooth! But utility 
for what end or object? To satisfy some desire, 
necessarily; for without some desire as mainspring 
to activity, the only possible conception of activity 
would be a blind, aimless motion, without any mover. 
Meanwhile, reason as a principle of intelligence, 
is cold and passionless, without any desire; for if 



258 THE SELF: WHAT IS IT? 

it have desire, then it is a sense. Besides, the very 
word design implies instrumentality, and not caus- 
ality. It is neither cause nor end; but a device — a 
means, for realizing something beyond itself; and 
cannot be called a motor or controlling cause. 

It thus became plain, that sense desire and sense 
desire only, is the sole mainspring to human con- 
duct. Very well: but on turning about from this 
new discovery, the author was well astonished to 
find, that everybody else sees the same undeniable 
truth; for, to say nothing of moral, religious, social 
and civil usage — which hold the sense motive to be 
causal and responsible, it was evident that any sim- 
pleton, led by pure instinct, would invariably go 
straight to sense motive, in order to find the main- 
spring and responsible agent of any action. 

Next came up the trouble, that causality and re- 
sponsibility both presuppose intelligence — are in- 
deed inconceivable without it. What now? Here 
is another nut to crack. After long worry, need- 
less to detail, it was finally seen, that though in- 
telligence is always implied, it is still never explic- 
itly — officially recognized, either as causal or re- 
sponsible. It is always present; but is present as 
servant and not as master. Hence and as only 
inference, it must be subordinate— indeed, it must 
be an implication or endowment of sense. For sense 
on the contrary, being the universally explicit and 



A FINAL GLANCE AT MATERIALISM 259 

recognized head, must of necessity be self endowed 
with all the intelligence implied in causality and 
responsibility. It presently became plain indeed, 
that being the causal element of mind, sense must 
of necessity include not only intelligence, but every 
vital element of the Self; and thus, all the proposi- 
tions of Part I, resulted directly from sense caus- 
ality. 

But on turning about again, the astonishment was 
greater than ever, to find that every body denies 
sense causality; for though universally admitted 
in the court room, it was universally denied else- 
where. In learned debates and books, man is recog- 
nized as a noble being, governed by a god-like 
reason. To be sure, he has animal passions and 
brute appetites ; but these are a superfluous nui- 
sance, which ought to be wholly dug up, else sub- 
ordinated to his god-like reason. 

How is this? Here is a positive contradiction — 
something radically wrong, not to say positively 
false ; and the fault seems withal, to be in intelli- 
gence. If intelligence itself be false, how can it 
be a valid standard of truth about other things? It 
cannot be false perse\ the fault must be deeper — 
must be further back. Then it became plain, that 
sense being the active cause, intelligence must of 
necessity be a passive instrument; and being pass- 
ive, it is pervertible; so that its seeming contra- 



260 THE self: what is it? 

dictions, are referable to an overruling sense. 

Bat why should sense pervert intelligence? 
Wrong doing can only be referred to wrong motives 
—depravity. As a matter of fact beyond denial, 
every criminal or wrong doer, perverts the legiti- 
mate uses of intelligence, when employing it to ac- 
complish his vicious deeds; and then perverts it 
again, when using it to excuse or justify himself. 

These reflections were all suggested by Part I 
and led the way to an analysis of intelligence in 
Part II. But as just seen, a proper analysis of in- 
telligence is impossible, without explaining its 
seeming contradictions; which latter can only be 
done, by tracing them back to their cause: viz., 
Depravity, or materialism as called in this in- 
stance. 

The consequent scheme of cognition and mode of 
materialism speak for themselves. They vindicate 
the integrity of intelligence and explain all contra- 
diction; insomuch, that to violate them one hair's 
breadth, is to pervert intelligence and cause inexpli- 
cable contradiction. They especially forbid the 
use, at least of human intelligence, to the materi- 
alist ; for to deny the impassable gulf between mind 
and matter, as the materialist does, is to repudiate 
the rudiments of human cognition. He has neither 
moral nor logical right, to set up doctrines, which 
doctrines repudiate the very intelligence which was 



A FINAL GLANCE AT MATERIALISM 26l 

employed to set them up. To do so, can be called no 
less than moral and logical out-lawry. 

In brief, each leading proposition of the book is 
deducible from sense causality, and which in turn, 
resulted from a study of the utility doctrine. This 
statement about the origin of the book is given with 
the hope, that it may prove a clew to any who may 
be interested in the system so resulting. 

Of course, from the first line of the Introduction 
down to this present sentence, the author has often 
thought about the propriety of an apology, for 
seeming temerity in setting forth such revolutionary 
principles. It may be said in extenuation, that it 
has been an aim throughout, to avoid theory and 
argumentation; and instead, to rely wholly upon 
a common sense exposition of self-evident empirical 
facts. If such facts, interpreted by common sense, 
be not the highest authority in philosophy, then 
the author deserves pardon on the score of igno : 
ranee ^otherwise, apologies in the case, would amount 
to an apology for the laws of nature or the ways 
of providence. 

In view of its difficult problems, and the attempt 
to condense them into the smallest compass, it 
would be quite remarkable if the book should not 
abound in inadvertencies, obscurities, and many 
minor errors. These may be emphasized indefi- 
nitely; yet to do so, and meanwhile ignore the 



262 the self: what is it? 

frame work of the system, as some reviewers did 
respecting the first edition, is to virtually endorse 
the system. 

Being mainly intended for popular readers and 
young students, it has been an aim in the use of 
every word and in the structure of every sentence, 
to be as plain and intelligible as possible; and this 
too, mainly with the final object, to entice each 
reader out to look and think for himself. To such 
readers, philosophy offers the greatest interest and 
advantage; while to the opposite class, it is fruit- 
less, except in make-believe ritual. 

It is not at all foreign, but altogether relevant 
to the foregoing exposition, to close with these two 
questions: (1) How much, or in what prime re- 
spect has philosophy advanced, since the days of 
Plato? (2) What is the hope of its improvement, 
so long as it continues under that first and chief 
of illusions, that intelligence is the supreme au- 
thority of human character? 



THE END. 



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